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Waiting times for elective surgery constitute a key performance indicator for the
NHS. The principal policy response has been to introduce maximum waiting
time targets against which performance is measured and rewarded. The aim of
this thesis is to shed light on the mechanism of patients' admittance for elective
surgery in UK by examining the whole distribution of their waiting times from
an empirical and theoretical perspective.
In Chapter 2, we empirically investigate the eect of government targets
on the distribution of patients' waiting times by applying duration analysis
techniques to waiting time data from 2001/02 and 2002/03 for three specialties:
general surgery, trauma & orthopaedics and ophthalmology. In Chapter 3, we
examine further the variation in the way hospitals and surgeons manage their
waiting lists by exposing detailed patterns regarding the shape of the survival
and hazard curves of patients' waits. We use an expanded dataset (1997/98
to 2005/06) both in a cross-sectional and across time framework controlling
for factors such as size, type and performance rating for hospitals and activity
level for doctors. We also address the issue of the evolution of waiting time
distributions over time.
Chapter 4 provides a theoretical supply model on how a hospital manages its
stock of patients given its objective function and the constraints it is faced with.
We derive the optimal waiting time distribution and identify important factors
that could explain the dierences between the observed empirical patterns.
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A common characteristic of all health care systems is that people often have
to wait in person to see a physician or to receive treatment. They devote their
personal time to forming a queue -time that could be spent elsewhere- which
will grow until the cost in time due to waiting equals the value of the good or
service received by the marginal individual (Cullis, Jones and Propper, 2000).
However, in some health care systems, demanders of non-emergency hospital
care are allocated by specialised physicians to explicit waiting lists. Queuing
in such circumstances does not impose a cost in wasted time to the occupants
of the list as they queue in absentia (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984). These
waiting lists constitute a feature of tax-nanced systems, where coverage is
universal and consumers face zero price at the point of demand of health care.
Various reasons have been suggested to account for the existence of waiting
lists. Firstly, they serve as a means of prioritisation of patients on behalf of
physicians, usually based on the clinical urgency of medical conditions. Sec-
ondly, they facilitate the scheduling of available resources by using theater ses-
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sions at most ecient and exible way, for example, by combining long complex
procedures with quicker routine ones (Appleby et al., 2005b). Moreover, waiting
time might correspond to a time period in which some clinical conditions might
improve and thus operations prevented. Hence, their existence enables clinical
purposes based on the argument that every surgical procedure comes with some
kind of risk (Mullen, 1992). Consultants might have various incentives to keep
their lists, such as encouraging implicitly or explicitly their patients to seek
private care when the former work both at the National Health Service (NHS)
and for the private sector (Hamblin, Harrison and Boyle, 1998). It is evident
that patients who prefer to be treated by particular physicians would have a
preference to follow them in private sector instead of remaining in the lengthy
waiting lists of NHS (Yates, 1987).
Most importantly, waiting lists serve as rationing devices in health care
systems where price is zero at the point of demand (Barzel, 1974). The number
of patients waiting at any point in time is being determined by the rate at
which people leave the list, by being admitted for surgery, self-deferring; being
removed due to clinical reasons or dying, relative to the rate at which people join
the list, by the decision by a consultant to admit them. Various determinants
can inuence the entry to or the exit from the waiting list. At the same time,
Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003a) have demonstrated that waiting times and
waiting list sizes act as signals that have an impact upon both supply and
demand.
Long waiting lists and extensive waiting times are observed for elective
surgery -that is, routine, non-emergency clinical procedures- such as hip or
knee replacement, cataract surgery, general surgery, cholecystectomy, prosta-
tectomy, vaginal hysterectomy, varicose vein surgery, inguinal hernia repair,
coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) and percutaneous translunimal coro-
nary angioplasty (PTCA). On the other hand, emergency care is not rationed
16
at all and is directly supplied by the hospital accident and emergency depart-
ments. Moreover, even within the group of dierent types of elective surgery
it has been reported that the waiting times for less urgent procedures such as
hip replacement and cataract surgery are systematically higher than the wait-
ing times for more urgent procedures such as CABG and PTCA (Siciliani and
Hurst, 2003; MacCormick and Parry, 2003).
The existence of long waiting lists and high waiting times has been an issue
in many countries. In the United Kingdom (UK) it has persisted since the
launch of NHS in 1948 and remains as one of the most signicant concerns of
the English health care system. It is also present in the Netherlands (Brouwer
et al., 2003) and in Sweden (Hanning, 1996), where long waiting lists have for
many years remained a serious quality problem on the health policy agenda.
One study attempting to compare the extent of the problem among 20 countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
investigating the possible causes for the variation in waiting times revealed that
countries with the highest waiting times were the UK and Finland followed by
Denmark, Norway, Australia and Spain (Siciliani and Hurst, 2003). As a result,
shortening waiting lists and reducing waiting times represent a signicant health
policy concern leading governmental bodies to set targets and develop other
strategies for the amelioration of the problem.
Focusing on the UK, in 1948, NHS inherited a waiting list of around 500,000
patients but ever since and up to the late 1990s, the number of patients waiting
has been growing rapidly. More importantly, the actual waits that patients
faced until treatment have been also quite extensive. The highest peak was
reached in 1998 with 1.3 million patients awaiting admission for hospital treat-
ment half of whom had to wait at least 6 months and 6.5% of whom at least a
year. In addition, more than 450,000 people had to wait more than 3 months
17
for an outpatient appointment1.
Long waiting lists and the time spent on these have been a persistent source
of health policy and political concern in the UK. The existence, complexity and
persistence of the problem has been stimulating the interest of patients, physi-
cians of primary and secondary care, managers of trusts, politicians and policy
makers. The public's main concern lies in the speed with which the queue moves
rather than the number of people waiting in front of them. The more they have
to wait the more anxious they become while their health status could gradually
deteriorate aecting both their personal and social life. General practitioners
and specialised consultants act according to their own perception of best clini-
cal practice prioritising patients according to medical urgency; yet, at the same
time, waiting lists do reect upon their professional prestige. Managerial sta
aim at increasing the performance of the organisations they work for, focusing
on eciency criteria and at the same time trying to abide by national standards.
Policy makers develop measures and initiatives to serve the basic principles em-
bodied in the NHS; universal coverage, free access to health care, high quality
of services delivered, eciency and equity. Thus, considerable resources and
eort have been directed to reducing waiting lists and waiting times in UK as
they undoubtedly represent a key indicator of NHS's overall performance.
The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the mechanism of admitting
patients for elective surgery in the NHS by examining the distribution of their
waiting times. We depart from other studies that focus either on mean waiting
times or proportions of patients waiting more than a predetermined period (e.g.
6 months) by analysing the whole spectrum of patients' waits, that is the entire
waiting time distribution. Moving one step further, an endeavour to identify the
factors that inuence these waiting time distributions is made. In this respect,
the eect of the national target regime on elective waits plays a signicant role.
1Historical time series available on http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/index.htm.
18
The analysis is motivated by the extensive concerns on long lists and waiting
times in the NHS since its creation. In fact, understanding the factors leading
to particular waiting time distributions could enable physicians, health care
managers and policy makers handle them in a more ecient way. In conse-
quence, patients' dissatisfaction of the health care system's tardiness could be
weakened.
The aim of this thesis is three-fold. In the rst part, we empirically in-
vestigate the eect of maximum targets on waiting times for elective surgery
in the NHS. Compared to the existing literature on the eect of targets on
NHS performance, the new element in this work is the application of duration
analysis, which enables the study of the whole waiting time distribution. The
use of this approach is motivated by the fact that waiting times reect a spell,
with a well-dened start (decision to join a list) and nish point (hospital ad-
mission for treatment). Based on the insights provided by the rst part, we
further study the level of variation of patients' waiting time distributions by
highlighting their management by suppliers. In the second part, the focus on a
much more in-depth analysis of the diversity of waiting distributions succeeds
in exposing hospital tactics and physicians' behaviours with respect to their
patients' waits. This is also an empirical work that exploits the advantages of
the methodology of duration analysis, yet in a less-aggregated and across time
aspect that results in depicting distinct shapes and patterns of the survival
and hazard functions of waiting times. However, the need to understand and
provide a profound explanation of the patterns of distributions observed is im-
perative. This is where the third part of the study comes; to accomplish this,
we move on developing a theoretical supply model of how a hospital manages its
stock of patients for elective surgery. In particular, it is a utility maximisation
problem that derives the optimal behaviour of the hospital with respect to the
waiting time distribution of the patients it treats, given the constraints it faces.
19
In that respect, this thesis contributes to the strand of literature that engages
with theoretical models of waiting times.
The introductory chapter is organised as follows. The next section describes
the elective health care system in UK. Then the various policy initiatives to cut
down the long waits are presented. In Section 1.3, we depict the existing litera-
ture on waiting times, both theoretical and empirical. The last section demon-
strates the rationale and aims of the current study and provides a presentation
of the next chapters.
1.1 The main characteristics of the system of elec-
tive surgery in UK
The British NHS is a central government agency and constitutes the principal
provider of health care in the UK. It is publicly funded and patients are not
charged directly for the services they receive. Almost all citizens are registered
within a NHS general practitioner (GP) who acts as a gatekeeper between pri-
mary and secondary health care (Gervas et al., 1994; Glied, 2000; Forrest, 2003).
If patients experience any ill-health symptoms, they schedule an appointment
with their family GP who, after performing a series of diagnostic tests and if
it is found to be necessary, refers them to a hospital specialist. The specialist,
if necessary, orders further tests and after evaluating the patients' condition,
decides whether or not they need to be admitted as inpatients. If this is the
case, patients, depending on how severe their condition is, are either admitted
immediately to receive treatment or are allocated to a waiting list for future
elective surgery.
It is worth emphasising the dierent levels of waiting elapsed between the
rst clinical symptoms one faces and his/her admission for a surgical procedure
(Hamblin, Harrison and Boyle, 1998). As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the rst
20
Figure 1.1: Levels of waiting times within the NHS.
level incorporates the wait to see a GP, which is the rst representative of the
health care sector the patient gets in contact with. If the patient's medical
status requires further investigation he is referred to a specialist; therefore he
has to wait a further time period for a rst appointment and subsequent eval-
uation by the doctor. This corresponds to the second level of waiting, which
is surely longer than the rst one. It is now the specialist's turn to perform
diagnostic tests and appropriate exams in order to deliver the correct diagnosis;
these might consist of blood tests, ultrasounds, x-rays, computed tomographies
(CTs) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRIs). Thus, another level of wait
within the system is the one that includes the time for all relevant tests to
be completed. Finally, the last step in this `waiting ladder' comprises of the
waiting time between joining the waiting list of a surgeon and admitted to hos-
pital for the actual operation. This thesis aims at investigating this last wait
that will be referred to as `waiting time for elective surgery'. Although there
are dierent levels of waiting throughout the whole system, they are denitely
not independent to each other; waiting lists management aects the outpatient
follow-ups of operated patients as well as the outpatient inow2.
Historically, until April 1991, the GPs had no incentives to restrain refer-
2For an analytical review of the levels of waiting for an elective surgery see Appleby et al.
(2005a), page 21 and Harrison and Appleby (2005), page 7.
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rals for elective procedures as the cost of those was covered by geographically
dened entities, the Health Authorities. In 1991, as part of NHS reforms3, GPs
were given the option of becoming fundholders; they could hold a xed budget
to cover the cost of a range of elective procedures for their patients. `District
Health Authorities' represented the second type of purchaser in the internal
NHS market and were responsible for buying health care services for the pop-
ulation of specic geographical areas. Under the same reforms, hospitals were
renamed as NHS trusts and, although remaining public sector bodies, had to
compete with each other in order to negotiate contracts with the two purchaser
authorities mentioned above.
This reform created a direct incentive to contain referrals by GPs as they
were allowed to retain any budgetary surplus and use it to improve their pa-
tients' care in other ways. However, there is some controversy with regards to
the net impact of the above mentioned policy shift. Le Grand, Mays and Mul-
ligan (1998) suggested that such restraint did not occur, while others showed
that fundholders had fewer patients admitted (Gravelle, Dusheiko and Sutton,
2002). Moreover, Croxson, Propper and Perkins (2001) suggested that fund-
holding gaming took place during the period of the 1991 reforms of NHS. They
argued that fundholders had an incentive to increase their referrals in the year
before they became fundholders and reduced them just after.
Fundholding was abolished in 1999 and was replaced by new organisations,
the Primary Care Groups (PCGs), which were later to become separate legal
entities as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). All practices had to join their local
PCTs, which were responsible for the health care of their population by hold-
ing a budget to cover all types of NHS expenditure4. Lastly, a new type of
3For information on the NHS internal market see Appleby et al. (1990), Le Grand (1991);
Propper (1995); Le Grand, Mays and Mulligan (1998); Propper, Wilson and Soderlund (1998);
Propper and Soderlund (1998); Propper, Burgess and Green (2004) and Propper, Burgess and
Gossage (2007a).
4Department of Health (1997a,b).
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NHS trust, called foundation trust, was introduced in 2004 allowing for greater
nancial and operational autonomy on behalf of the hospital. These trusts re-
mained within the NHS's performance inspection system and were part of the
government's goal to de-centralise the public services5.
1.2 Policy initiatives to tackle waiting lists and wait-
ing times for elective surgery in UK
Long waiting lists and excessive waiting times have stimulated the interest of
policy makers since the launch of NHS. A number of dierent initiatives have
been developed through the years to deal with this persistent problem. These
policy measures can be directed to inuence the demand or supply of elective
care and can be of regulatory, nancial, managerial or informational avor.
Some examples of such policies over the years have been the following: in-
creases in funding, increases or better use of existing capacity (e.g. number of
doctors, nurses, beds), increases of operating and technical support (e.g. ac-
tivities of the National Access Patient Team, Waiting List Action Team, Task
Forces), set up of treatment centres and enhancement of day surgeries, intro-
duction of specialty programmes (e.g. targeting specialties with very long waits
such as ophthalmology and orthopaedics), greater involvement of the private
sector, increases in booking admissions, guidance and management on priori-
tisation of patients and referrals, switching activity away from hospitals (e.g.
support of GPs with special interests and expansion of nursing roles in com-
munity settings), increases of the initiatives of patients and sta (e.g. `patient
choice' and `payment by results'), initiatives to reduce the number of people on
the lists, monitoring of waiting lists and publication of routine statistics and
5More information can be found at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/dh.gov.uk
/en/healthcare/secondarycare/nhsfoundationtrust/index.htm.
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performance measures either on the system overall (star-rating system) or on
specic elds (national targets for outpatients and inpatients)6.
Before reviewing in detail the use of performance measures and especially
the introduction of targets on inpatient waits, we will briey pinpoint a couple of
issues. Interestingly, informing patients about the time they are going to spend
on lists is important as it eliminates the distress and the anxiety they feel due
to the uncertainty concerning the time they will receive treatment (Propper,
1990). The main role of the National Booked Admissions Programme, which
was rstly launched in 1998 as a pilot and was expanded later, was to give
patients the opportunity to be made aware of the date of their admission7.
Although, previously, most patients in need for an elective procedure were added
to a waiting list. However, the use of the booking system revealed management
diculties for hospitals that had to deal with variation in emergency demand.
An additional initiative that strengthened the patients' rights, gave them
the opportunity to be able to choose another hospital if they faced long waiting
times. Initially, this was set up as a strategy to reduce the number of people
waiting more than 6 months for surgery, yet later on, the view that patients
should select hospitals and not hospitals patients was widely established. At the
beginning, choice was introduced on a pilot basis for heart patients but from
December 2005 all patients requiring elective surgery were oered the choice
between 4-5 hospitals at the point where their GP decides to refer them to
a specialist8;9. At the same time, a new system called `Payment by Results'
6More information on the policy initiatives can be found in Harrison and Appleby (2005).
The authors further divide the policies adopted by the government into three categories: phase
1 (1997-2000), phase 2 (2000-2004) and phase 3 (2005-2008 and beyond).
7Comparisons of dierent admission methods will be discussed in Chapter 2.
8Building on the best: Choice, responsiveness and equity in the NHS - Department of
Health (2003), Choose and book: Patient's choice of hospital and booked appointment -
Department of Health (2004), Choice at six months. Good practice - Department of Health
(2005).
9More information on the evaluation of the London Patient Choice Project was published
by Burge et al. (2005).
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was introduced to allow for the fact that money had to follow the patient to
the chosen hospital. This programme aimed at linking a hospital's income to
the amount of work it performed, while at the same time it created incentives
for the hospital to improve performance in order to attract more patients and
reduce costs so as to survive nancially.
Performance measures
Performance measures have been commonly used in the public sector in
order to improve accountability, increase productivity and reduce consumers
dissatisfaction of the services provided. This process involves a series of actions
starting with the development of well-dened and observable performance in-
dicators followed by their publication and subsequent monitoring (Bird et al.,
2005). Performance management could comprise of various types of measures
that could be less or more explicitly introduced. Yet, they are strongly linked to
either monetary or non-monetary rewards. Besides the eld of education, the
health care service constitutes one of the commonest public sectors applying
aggressive targets in their ght against under-performance.
Some basic information regarding the performance of hospitals in England
and Wales has been available since the early 1980s. The `Health Services Man-
agement Centre' of the University of Birmingham was the rst to use perfor-
mance indicators based on routinely collected data. Following this attempt,
the government initiated a programme within NHS (it came as a series of grey
books) by publishing 123 performance indicators for the local health authori-
ties (Smith, 1990). Since 1999 there has been a large increase in the number
of published data on performance indicators of health care providers, with the
introduction of waiting times targets among the most important ones.
Besides the benecial eect of performance indicators (publication of data,
systematic monitoring of agents, increased productivity, increase of the amount
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of eort towards targeted tasks, decrease of patient disutility and dissatisfac-
tion), a few problems have appeared in their use in the public sector; it is evident
that targets can produce perverse eects as well. Among the most important is
misinterpreting them due to complexity and inconsistency as well as having the
incentive to distort behaviour by the employment of manipulation, gaming and
inappropriate responses. Another signicant worry is that well monitored as-
pects could receive a higher priority increasing the peril to shift attention away
from unmonitored, less concrete and poorly measured elds such as quality of
services (Propper and Wilson, 2003).
According to Smith (1993), performance measurement could encourage var-
ious undesirable outcomes such tunnel vision (shift away from unmonitored but
important tasks so as to concentrate to targeted features only), sub-optimisation
(managers pursuit their personal objectives instead of the ones set up centri-
cally), myopia (avoidance to consider long term attributes and concentration on
short term issues), convergence (organisations respond to performance manage-
ment by avoiding extreme performance behaviour resulting in a convergence of
all responses), ossication (behaviours are characterised by a strong attachment
to conventional patterns denying any innovative methodology), gaming (distort
behaviour so as to demonstrate achievement of the performance standards) and
misrepresentation (commitment of fraud).
These problems tend to appear quite frequently in multi-product public or-
ganisations that have multiple principals and face multiple incentives. For ex-
ample, take under consideration the dierent number of actors that are involved
in such an organisation: the users of the service, the payers, the providers, the
managers of the providers and the politicians of various levels of the govern-
ment. It not dicult to comprehend the extensive range of goals and incentives
these agents have10.
10For a more detailed discussion of these incentives look at Burgess and Ratto (2003) and
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A characteristic example of such an organisation is the English health care
sector. The introduction of explicit national performance targets took place
with the publication of the NHS Plan in 200011. The proposed strategy con-
sisted of maximum waiting times for elective surgery that health care providers
had to meet, with rewards and penalties for successful and unsuccessful perfor-
mance. Rewards included greater autonomy for hospitals that performed well,
promotions of managers and positive advertising of the institution due to the
publication of waiting times. Penalties comprised of threats, demotions and
dismissals of managers in hospitals that performed poorly and `shaming' of the
trust through the release of its poor performance. In particular, nobody had
to wait more than 18 months by the end of March 2000, 15 months by March
2002, 12 months by March 2003, 9 months by March 2004 and 6 months by
December 2005. Similar targets that focused on specic elds were introduced
for outpatients, cancer patients, patients attending `Accident & Emergency'
and patients waiting to book an appointment with their GP12.
Furthermore, an annual `star rating' system consisting both of a small num-
ber of `key targets' and a series of indicators in a `balanced scorecard' was
applied for acute hospitals from 2001 to 200513. Scores ranged from 0 (unsuc-
cessful trusts) to 3 (successful trusts) stars based on the trusts' performance
according to the criteria mentioned above. It is worth mentioning that six out
of the nine key targets were set up for waiting times with the other three being
nancial balance, hospital cleanliness and improvement of the working lives of
sta.
In 2004, the government introduced a new maximum waiting time target
Besley and Ghatak (2003).
11The NHS plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform, Department of Health (2000).
12A list of all the dierent waiting list targets announced since 1997 can be found at Appleby
and Coote (2002), page 26.
13Department of Health (2001, 2002), Commission for Health Improvement(2003), Health-
care Commission (2004, 2005).
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of 18 weeks from the initial referral of a GP to a specialist until admission
for surgery. From the patient's perspective, this new waiting time target was
quite desirable as it attempted to reveal hidden delays not previously measured
that indeed lengthened their actual waiting for treatment. Indeed, the govern-
ment moved into setting a target that takes into account the complete patients'
journey within the NHS; in other words it considers the total time patients
wait from GP referral to surgery, including any delays in waiting for diagnostic
tests and receiving the results. This time period is now known as `Referral To
Treatment' (RTT)14.
After describing the NHS system, its evolution and the various policy initia-
tives to tackle waiting times, we turn to explore the theoretical and empirical
literature on healthcare provision.
1.3 Related Literature
1.3.1 Theoretical models
The existing literature on waiting times has been extensive15. Economic models
of waiting lists and waiting times have predominantly been developed in the
context of demand and supply models of health care markets. We rst review
a series of basic demand models and then move towards the presentation of
frameworks that focus on the supply side of health care market, which is also
the focus of this thesis.
Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) develop a demand model of waiting list
queues in order to demonstrate how the healthcare market reaches an equilib-
rium and how changes in the waiting time, the service rate and other variables
aect this equilibrium. They investigate the decisions of the marginal patient in
14Information on RTT can be found at http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics
/Statistics/Performancedataandstatistics/ReferraltoTreatmentstatistics/DH 089757.
15See Cullis et al. (2000) for a survey.
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a steady state in which the numbers of people joining the list are equal to those
leaving the list. They consider two main assumptions; rst, individual demand
is assumed to be unpredictable. This assumption provides a rationale for the
existence of queues and for the waiting lists to be clearing the market. Second,
delay in the receipt of the good lowers the value to the demander. Assuming
that the position in the queue is linked to the date of delivery, the value and
the number of people joining the list will be inuenced by the length of the
list. Hence, it is the diminishing value placed on obtaining such a good that
results in demand meeting supply. Their main theoretical nding suggests that
increased service rate (capacity) is not necessarily resulting in reduced waiting
lists. The authors do not model the supply of elective care but just assume that
it is aected by a vector of unknown factors and the waiting time.
Extending on the framework of Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984), a stream
of theoretical contributions has developed on similar lines in the literature.
These include Cullis and Jones (1986), Gravelle, Dusheiko and Sutton (2002),
Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003a,b) and Martin and Smith (2003). Some
authors take under consideration the patient's choice between the public and
the private sector (Goddard, Malek and Tavakoli, 1995; Martin and Smith,
1999) and nd that long waiting times in the public sector may encourage
patients to seek private surgery. Besley, Hall and Preston (1998, 1999) show
that longer waiting lists in the NHS are associated with greater demand and
purchase of private health insurance or private surgery out-of pocket.
In the majority of the articles mentioned above, waiting time is modelled
as a static phenomenon where perfect clearance in the health care market is
assumed. Thus, waiting times are known and deterministic. Among the rst
to introduce a dynamic element in the analysis is Worthington (1987, 1991)
who applies queuing theory to hospitals waiting lists. A further step towards
dynamic modelling is achieved by Gravelle, Smith and Xavier (2003a), who
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employ the methodology of dynamic optimisation in discrete time. They model
the utility function of the hospital manager to include not only current but
lagged waiting time indicators. They do not consider an equilibrium between
demand and supply, yet, for comparative-statics purposes, the authors assume
that providers care only about the eect of current actions on current utility.
Furthermore, one might be interested on the path of reaching a equilibrium
and more importantly on what happens in disequilibrium conditions. The for-
mulation of a comprehensive dynamic model is achieved by Siciliani (2006) who
uses optimal control theory to model hospital incentives within a continuous
time dynamic framework16.
With respect to the stand of literature that investigates the supply side
of elective care one of the rst basic models was proposed by Iversen (1993).
Inversen focuses on the elective system of the National Health Service in Norway
and after constructing the production function of health services he models the
long-run equilibrium of a non-cooperative game between the hospital and its
sponsor, the government. He discovers that under this type of game, where
the hospital decides rst and the government follows, excessive waiting times
exist under a stackelberg equilibrium. On the other hand, in a Nash equilibrium
where the two players act simultaneously, no excessive waits appear. In another
work, Iversen (1997) investigates the eect of the private sector on the waiting
times of NHS patients. The results suggest that concerns about minimising
the costs of public health care can also lead to maintaining longer waiting lists,
which could induce a shift of patients to the private sector.
Farnworth (2003) builds on Iversen's work and develops a theoretical model
of how interactions among hospitals that charge dierent prices for health ser-
vices can determine and aect the equilibrium (average) waiting time. His
16This work is actually modeling the supply of elective services. Based on how expected
waiting time is perceived, the optimal path towards the (steady state) equilibrium is depicted.
The results are also extended to incorporate stochastic demand.
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ndings suggest that, under specic circumstances, an increase in the price
charged to one hospital can lower the waiting time for all.
Another three contributions that examine whether waiting times are wel-
fare improving under specic behaviours or decisions of patients and doctors
are those of Olivella (2002), Hoel and Saether (2003) and Barros and Olivella
(2005). The rst shows that the movement of patients from the public to the
private sector due to long waits on the former is welfare improving when the
public sector operates with over capacity and the private sector with under
capacity. The analysis is conducted within a framework in which the list is
prioritised by the level of severity of patient's health status. The second work
reaches similar conclusions within a dierent structure. They also analyse wel-
fare considerations when there is a concern for equity and examine the optimal
tax/subsidy for private health care.
The work of Barros and Olivella (2005) focuses more on the strategic be-
haviour of doctors in selecting the milder cases to be treated in the private
sector (cream skimming). This study relates to the literature on prioritisation
of a list within the same specialty17 and addresses the rationing of public treat-
ment, that is, only cases that meet particular criteria are admitted. Given the
admissions requirement (rationing policy) and the co-existence, in the same
doctor, of private and public practice, there is scope for patient selection. The
nd that full cream skimming18 takes place only with intermediate rationing
policies and partial cream skimming with very stringent (or lax) rationing poli-
cies. Additional studies on cream skimming of low severity patients are those
of Ellis (1998) and Gonzalez (2005). Moreover, Xavier (2003), Siciliani (2005)
and Brekke et al. (2008) examine further the eect of competition on waiting
times. Unlike the other studies on competition, in which it is assumed that the
17The work on prioritisation is mainly concerned with across specialties dierences. See
Cullis et al. (2000) for more details.
18That is, all milder cases are treated in the private sector.
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hospitals are local monopolists, the above papers model competition within a
Hotelling or a duopoly framework.
The last chapter of this thesis develops a model that also focuses on the
supply side of healthcare provision. It does not explicitly consider competition
with other hospitals, nor the strategic interaction with the government. The
aim of our model is the derivation of the whole waiting time distribution of a
given list, and the exploration of relevant supply side factors and their eect
on the optimal (steady state) admittance pattern. In that sense, the work of
Dixon and Siciliani (2009) is similar. Motivated by the drive to compare and
link the two main sources of NHS data on individual waiting times, they con-
struct two measures (i) the waiting time distribution of patients on a list (at a
census date) and (ii) the distribution of waiting times of patients treated. They
show under dierent conditions what those two measures capture and how they
are linked19. In Chapter 4 we develop the waiting time distribution of measure
(ii) within a supply model.
1.3.2 Empirical models
In the UK, economic models of supply and demand have also been tested empir-
ically (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin and Smith, 1999, 2003; Gravelle
et al., 2003a; Martin et al., 2007). These studies use cross-sectional or panel
data to investigate the responsiveness of demand for or supply of health services
to waiting times.
In particular, Martin and Smith (1999) use HES data for 1990/1991 and
nd a small elasticity of demand with respect to waiting time (-0.20). They
further conclude that increased resources may reduce waiting times without
greatly stimulating utilization. Yet, they use aggregate data of a small area
19However, they do not consider a model.
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(ward) level in England and their model equations are identied by exclusion
restrictions (Windmeijer et al., 2005). Gravelle et al. (2002) propose a model of
the admission process for cataract surgery for a three year period in an English
Health Authority and conclude that admission rates are negatively related to
waiting times and distance to hospital (elasticity was equal to -0.25). Martin
and Smith (2003) use small area panel data to estimate supply and demand
functions for seven specialties and all specialties combined, nding that the
demand elasticity varies between specialties, but is always small. Gravelle,
Smith and Xavier (2003a) develop a dynamic demand and supply model, again
tested using panel data, and nd that supply increased and demand decreased
(estimated elasticities for two dierent models are -0.30 and -0.21) in response to
measures of the previous period waiting time. The authors again use aggregate
hospital utilization data at health authority level for 24 quarters during the
years 1987-1993.
Siciliani, Stanciole and Jacobs (2009) use data for 137 hospitals during the
period 1998-2002 and estimate the elasticity of hospital's costs with respect
to waiting times (in both cross-sectional and panel data). The results indicate
(whenever signicant) inelastic costs and a U-shaped relationship between costs
and waiting times.
Empirical evidence of the eect of waiting time targets in the UK will be
analysed in detail in Chapter 2. Indicatively, it is mainly conducted in a before
and after framework, as for example in Harrison and Appleby (2005), Hauck and
Street (2007), Propper et al. (2007b, 2008a). Propper et al. (2010) introduce
a measure of `target pressure' and examine the kernel densities of waits before
and after the policy initiative.
The use of duration analysis in the study of waiting times literature is
scarce and sporadic. MacCormick and Parry (2003) investigate the dierences
in waiting times for four diagnoses of elective general surgery using a sample of
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918 patients in a tertiary level hospital in New Zealand. The authors use the
non-parametric techniques of duration analysis to compare the waiting times of
patients for the four diagnoses. Their ndings show that dierent waiting time
thresholds exist for dierent diagnoses. The authors, therefore, are in favour of
the application of distinct waiting times that will reect and correspond to the
natural history of each disease.
Levy et al. (2005) examine whether extra funding for CABG operations in
British Columbia, Canada (1991-2000) had an eect on the time patients spent
on waiting lists. In particular, the authors compare the waiting time until
surgery for equal proportions of patients in synthetic cohorts before and after
the funding became available. Their data set consists of 9,231 records whose
waiting times are treated as duration times. The authors nd that time to
CABG shortens after the introduction of the supplementary funding {possibly
due to hospital capacity utilization{ and at the same time this eect is not
uniform across dierent priority groups.
Furthermore, Sobolev et al. (2005) conduct a survival analysis of a cohort
of 1,928 patients waiting to be admitted in the Division of Vascular Surgery at
Queens University in Kingston, Canada for four dierent surgical procedures
due to vascular disease. Duration analysis reveals dierent patterns of wait-
ing time distributions and variations among dierent procedures are compared.
Mainly, they observe shorter times for more urgent groups, although in some
comparisons less urgent patients had a signicant chance of admission to more
urgent cases. Patient-related delays in scheduling operations, availability of hos-
pital resources, anticipated length of stay in the IC and cancellations of booked
surgeries may account for this phenomenon. The concern that waiting times
for elective surgery might be determined not only by how many patients are on
the list and the urgency of their condition but also by waiting list management
has been reported previously by the same authors (Sobolev et al., 2000, 2001).
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The studies mentioned above attempt to address and investigate dierent
questions using duration analysis. Although the adopted design is not the
same among them, they clearly show that duration analysis can reveal various
patterns of waiting times distributions. Some of the limitations of these studies
involve small sample size, observation of not statistically signicant results and
in some studies exclusion of censored observations. Our work employs the
technique of duration analysis20 for elective surgery in the UK. We deviate
from the above mentioned studies in terms of both coverage and scope. Firstly,
we provide a wide and systematic analysis of UK waiting time data both across
time and at dierent degrees of disaggregation (hospitals, operative procedures,
physicians). Secondly, we use a much larger sample. Most importantly, we
utilise duration analysis, and its unique insights, to study the eect of waiting
time targets.
1.4 Rationale and aims of the study
As mentioned previously, this thesis is related to the strand of literature that
examines the elective health care system in UK. Interest in the elective waiting
list mechanism is motivated by its complexity and the view that waiting for
treatment represents a key indicator for NHS performance. The core strategy
in England since the publication of the NHS Plan has been to use maximum
waiting times targets every hospital should abide to.
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the elective admission
process by taking under consideration the waiting times of all patients on the
list and not just measures of central tendency such as mean or median waiting
time. In consequence, we look into the whole waiting time distribution of
patients, empirically, with the application of duration analysis techniques and
20Our empirical methodology is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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theoretically, with the development of a supply model that derives endogenously
the entire optimal waiting time distribution of patients.
The second chapter of the thesis explores the impact of government targets
on the distribution of waiting times of elective patients in the NHS21. How does
the probability of admission for any given patient vary during the time that
they wait and how is it aected by the targets? What incentives do targets
create to hospital managers? Do hospitals change their behaviour as a result
of the targets?
In order to address these issues we estimate the survival and hazard func-
tions of patients' waits at the level of specialty and operation of all NHS hos-
pitals in UK. We start examining the waiting times distribution at such an
aggregated level due to the universal nature of the policy initiative; maximum
targets were addressed to all elective patients of every medical specialty in all
trusts all over UK. We also explore dierences by type of admission (waiting
list, booked, planned surgeries) and by a small set of seven trusts geographically
spread across England. In order to identify changes of responses to targets we
utilise data for two years, 2001/2002 where the maximum target was set for 15
months and 2002/2003 where the target was trimmed down to 12 months. We
focus on three elective specialties; general surgery, trauma and orthopaedics
and ophthalmology.
The third chapter of the thesis aims at examining further the variation in the
way hospitals and physicians manage their waiting lists. The rationale of this
piece of work lies in exposing detailed patterns regarding the shape of survival
and hazard curves of patients' waits. It is an informative piece of investigation
as we learn more about the hospitals' and doctors' behaviour on waiting list
21The second chapter of the thesis is derived from Dimakou et al. (2009). Regarding the
division of responsibilities among the co-authors, I was responsible for all the analyses under-
taken while Professors David Parkin and Nancy Devlin were the project supervisors. John
Appleby provided useful information on HES data.
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administration and patient admittance for treatment. To achieve this goal, we
expand the initial empirical analysis by exploring wait data for a greater time
period (nancial years from 1997 to 2005) for an expanded set of hospitals at
less aggregated levels. We further examine the waiting time distributions of
elective patients by specic consultants.
In particular, we apply the methodology of duration analysis either in a
cross-sectional or an across time framework controlling for factors such as size,
type and performance rating for hospitals and activity level for doctors. We
also address the issue of the evolution of waiting time distributions over time.
In the fourth chapter of the thesis, we build on our empirical ndings and
develop a supply model of how a hospital manages its waiting lists given its
objective function and the constraints it is faced with. This chapter focuses
at matching important empirical patterns of the waiting times distributions of
hospitals' patients and identifying possible factors that could explain the ob-
served distributions. Two are the distinct features of our theoretical framework
(i) the dynamic element of the model and (ii) the derivation of the entire opti-
mal waiting time distribution of patients treated at the steady state. On that
basis, we also construct and compare the corresponding survival and hazard
functions. We solve the model numerically and perform several comparative
statics exercises.
As a whole, this thesis explores the mechanism of patients' admittance for
elective surgery in UK and their associated waiting time distribution from both
an empirical and a theoretical perspective. The former reveals both the great
level of variability in the shape of the survival and hazard curves of patients'
waiting times and their evolution over time. The latter contributes to the
theoretical literature on waiting times models by deriving endogenously the
waiting time distribution and provides valuable insights on the potential factors
that may explain the distinct empirical behavioural patterns.
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CHAPTER 2
The impact of government targets on
waiting times for elective surgery in the
NHS
2.1 Introduction
Long waiting lists and extensive waiting times for elective surgery have been
a persistent source of health policy and political concern in the UK and other
OECD countries (Siciliani and Hurst, 2003). Waiting lists function, in part,
as a non-price rationing device to reconcile the dierences between supply and
demand that arise when coverage is universal and those demanding -patients or
their agents- face zero price at the point of demand (Cullis, Jones and Propper,
2000). Waiting times and waiting list sizes act as signals that have an impact
upon both the supply of and demand for health care (Gravelle, Smith and
Xavier, 2003a).
Policies intended to reduce waiting lists may impact on either supply or de-
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mand or both. Supply-side responses include extra funding for elective surgery,
tackling supply bottlenecks, provider monitoring and management of waiting
lists. Demand management includes promulgating guidelines for appropriate
referral and explicit methods for prioritising patients. Historically, UK NHS
policies on waiting tended to reect a view that waiting lists were a backlog of
untreated patients, which could be addressed by short-term increases in activity
(Hamblin, Harrison and Boyle, 1998).
More recently, the emphasis of policy has shifted from waiting lists to wait-
ing times, on the grounds that patients and policy makers are more concerned
about the speed with which the queue moves -and thus the time spent on the
list- rather than the number of people waiting.
While current NHS policy combines a number of the supply- and demand-
side strategies noted above, the main strategy in England since the publication
of the NHS Plan in 20001 has been to use waiting times targets (Harrison and
Appleby, 2005). These stipulate maximum waiting times for elective surgery
that health care providers should meet, with rewards and penalties for success-
ful and unsuccessful performance. The inpatient waiting time target has been
progressively reduced from 18 months in March 2000 to 15 months in March
2002, 12 months in March 2003, 9 months in March 2004 and 6 months in De-
cember 2005 (Appleby et al., 2005b). The most important feature of the targets
lies in their national and universal character; they apply to all elective patients
of every medical specialty in all trusts all over UK. Furthermore, in 20042, the
government presented a new target for the end of 2008, which incorporated a
maximum wait of 18 weeks from initial referral of a patient by a general practi-
tioner for an outpatient consultation and any subsequent treatment, including
a hospital stay if needed. It is apparent that in recent years more attention
1The NHS plan: A plan for investment, a plan for reform, Department of Health (2000).
2The NHS Improvement Plan: Putting people at the heart of public services, Department
of Health (2004).
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is drawn on the complete patients journey within the NHS, that is the total
waiting time of patients from GP referral to surgery.
Since 2000, there has been substantial progress in reducing waiting lists,
overall waiting times and the number of patients waiting over 6 months, as
Figure 2.1 demonstrates.
Figure 2.1: Provided-based inpatient waiting lists and times in the English
NHS, Quarterly, 2000-2006. Source: King's Fund, London.
However, seven years after the introduction of the NHS plan and despite the
considerable resources and eort that have been directed to reducing waiting
lists and waiting times, the number waiting for inpatient treatment is around
750,000, with just over 1,000 still waiting 6 or more months, and just over
a quarter still waiting over 3 months. A further one million are waiting for
an outpatient appointment; and around one million are waiting for various
diagnostic tests to be carried out, although the extent of the overlap between
these latter gures is impossible to determine3.
3http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/index.htm
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There are a number of concerns relating to the use and impact of these
targets, especially, as they become even more stringent. Principal among these
is the extent to which targets distort clinical priorities, by changing the order,
and thus speed, with which patients are treated. The National Audit Oce
reports that 20% of consultants surveyed in three specialties stated they had
changed the order they had prioritised patients in order to meet government
targets4.
In one respect, this changed order of priorities might be considered not as
an unwanted or unanticipated side eect, but rather as an intended outcome.
Although there is evidence to suggest that the length of a patient's wait may
have inuenced clinical decisions to admit even before the introduction of tar-
gets (Harrison and Appleby, 2005), presumably the targets reect an explicit
view that whatever clinical or social factors previously determined priority for
treatment did not place sucient weight on time waited, in particular, max-
imum time waited. However, if providers are meeting targets by substituting
less urgent cases, with less ability to benet, for more urgent cases, with higher
ability to benet, then this would be a potential cause for concern on both
economic and ethical grounds.
The challenge in analysing the number, importance and eect of these
changes in admission decisions arising from the targets is that the admission
criteria without targets are neither clearly specied nor consistent. Individual
clinicians assess patients' conditions according to their own personal judge-
ments of clinical urgency. There are neither gold standard admission criteria
nor any systematic scoring system in widespread use in the UK to aid between-
patient prioritisation. Cullis and Jones (1976) advocated such an approach
over 25 years ago, and there are examples of such systems from other countries
4Inpatient and Outpatient waiting in the NHS. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor
General., National Audit Oce (2001).
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(Siciliani and Hurst, 2003; Hadorn and Holmes, 1997).
More fundamentally, neither the way in which providers meet the targets
nor what dierentiates successful from unsuccessful hospital trusts with respect
to the targets are clear. For example, targets may be met mainly by increasing
surgical throughput -reducing waiting times for all patients- or by substituting
higher wait for lower wait patients, or a mix of both. The targets create incen-
tives which might be expected to aect both manager and clinician behaviour.
Evidence on the eects of the targets tends to focus on average waiting times
or the total number of those waiting for specied periods; the eect on the dis-
tribution of waiting times is less well understood. Harrison and Appleby (2005)
compared waiting times distributions for orthopaedic surgery before and after
the introduction of targets, with dierences in the distributions used to identify
changes in admission patterns. The results suggested that \...any reordering of
cases had less to do with substituting very short wait (presumed urgent) cases
with longer wait (presumed less urgent) cases but rather that the latter dis-
placed some (less urgent) `ller cases' -that is, those with short operating times
which could be used to make best use of available theatre time". However,
these results rely on relatively crude before-and-after comparisons of waiting
times distributions, so the conclusion remains somewhat speculative. The same
view is also supported by Propper et al. (2008a) who state that shorter waiting
times might have been achieved by targeting less needy patients but actually it
was not evident that it happened.
Only a few other papers in the existing literature of waiting times exam-
ine the eect of targets on the elimination of long waits in the NHS and the
subsequent improvement of hospitals performance. As mentioned in chapter 1,
Smith (1990, 1993), Propper and Wilson (2003) and Bird et al. (2005) review
the eects of performance management in health care and in the public sector.
They all agree that such indicators can be manipulated by public organisations
42
(e.g. hospitals) so as to falsely declare accordance to targets. Yet, they do not
provide any theoretical or empirical model to support their views.
Another attempt to reveal the eects of the dierent policy initiative of
waiting time targets in England is made by Alvarez-Rosete et al. (2005) and
Bevan and Hood (2006a,b). They all conclude that the target regime trimmed
down the waiting times of elective patients5;6. However, the former study only
employs descriptive statistics in a simple before-and-after analysis of a very
small number of indicators, where both the quality and comparability of the
data between the countries tested is questionable, while in the latter, statistical
analysis of waiting times is only limited to plain illustrations of frequencies
of patients waiting specic periods of time, with no consideration at all on
wait distributions or more sophisticated modelling. Further, the presence and
mechanism of gaming is not straightforwardly demonstrated.
Thus, the segment of research that followed (Hauck and Street, 2007; Prop-
per et al., 2007b, 2008a,b, 2010; Besley et al., 2008, 2009) utilise a mixture
of econometric models to estimate the eect of targets on performance in the
health sector7. They all take advantage of the dierent timing and nature of
5Alvarez-Rosete et al. use performance data for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland in an attempt to compare a variety of indicators (health indicators such as mortality
ratios and life expectancies, NHS expenditure per capita, availability of hospital beds, sta
numbers, activity measures and waiting times) for years 1996/1997 (before the devolution)
and 2002/2003 (after the devolution).
6The two studies by Bevan and Hood examine whether the star-rating system for NHS
trusts improved performance in England. In the rst, the authors, after presenting the per-
centages of patients waiting longer than 6 and 12 months for treatment for 1999-2005, conclude
that the stricter policy of `naming and shaming ' in England created lots of pressure to reduce
waiting times for elective surgery. As a result, it ameliorated performance but at the same
time gaming was evident. In the second, the authors, after providing assumptions regarding
the way the government sets priorities and measures performance (idea of synecdoche) and
regarding the gaming (dened as hitting the target and missing the point), they conclude that
targets have operated as `management and terror ' in order to achieve wait reductions drawing
parallels with the Soviet regime.
7Hauck and Street analyse routine data collected over a six year period in three English and
one Welsh hospital close to the English-Welsh border employing the techniques of OLS and
PROBIT estimation. Propper et al. (2007b, 2008a) use the dierence-in-dierence methodol-
ogy to compare performance in reducing waiting times in England and Scotland while Besley,
Bevan and Burchardi (2008, 2009) undertake the same analysis for England and Wales.
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the policy measures of elective treatment (natural experiment) between Eng-
land and Scotland/Wales and similarly report greater reductions of extensive
waiting times of elective patients in England compared to the other two.
Interestingly, Propper et al. (2010) introduce a measure of `target pressure'
dened as the ratio of the number of patients at the end of the previous quarter
whose waiting times will exceed the end of the quarter target if left untreated
divided by the total number of patients waiting at the end of the previous
quarter. By illustrating the kernel densities of waits before and after the policy
initiative, they suggest that the distribution of waits in England was slightly
pulled leftwards at the right tail, especially for 2003/2004. However, these com-
parisons are not very informative. The authors conclude that targets achieved
their objective and led to a signicant fall of inpatient waiting times, however,
not due to the gaming activities that had been advocated by some. Further-
more, among their ndings of the eects of the target regime are the increase
of elective admissions, the unchanged order in which patients were treated, the
same percentage of urgent cases and the absence of any impairment of quality
indicators. Although some evidence of waiting list manipulation was evident
-an increase of suspensions and removals- it did not cause any alterations to
overall patient outcomes.
The aim of this chapter is to empirically identify the impact of government
targets on the distribution of waiting times in the NHS. We depart from the
above-mentioned studies by exposing the whole spectrum of patients' waits
and its possible alteration due to the imposition of universal targets. The
relevant literature does not pay much implicit attention to the examination and
evolution of waiting time distributions; due to the fact that previous studies
rely on relatively crude before-and-after comparisons of average waiting times
or wait distributions, the eect of targets on the distribution of waiting times
remains to be investigated. Therefore, there is scope for further research so as
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to enlighten the waiting list system and its response to policy initiatives.
The focus on a more in-depth analysis of the waiting time distributions is
motivated by the following considerations. Firstly, the same average waiting
time might correspond to totally dierent waiting time distributions. Although
averages of waiting times might remain constant over years, a whole series of
distinct hospitals' behaviours with respect of admissions rates might have taken
place. Secondly, it would be helpful to acquire as much information as possible
regarding the ways hospitals and physicians behave in the process of decision-
making -decision to join a list, decision to admit for treatment- of patients' ow
into the system.
To achieve this, we employ the techniques of duration analysis that are
proven a valuable tool in dealing with variables that represent time periods; on
top of this, they reveal the overall distribution of such spells. We use adminis-
trative data on three specialties -general surgery, trauma and orthopaedics and
ophthalmology- for all the NHS trusts in England.
Specically, we address the following questions: (i) How does the probability
of admission for any given patient vary during the time that they wait? (ii)
How is the probability of admission for any given waiting time aected by the
targets? (iii) Can variations in waiting times be explained by clinical, patient,
or provider-level characteristics? (iv) What implications may be drawn from
our results with respect to providers managerial responses to the targets?
The structure of the remainder of the chapter is as follows. The next section
outlines the features of the methodology employed and describes the data. In
Section 2.3, the main ndings of the empirical analysis are discussed. These
include empirical estimation of the waiting time distributions at dierent levels
of disaggregation and in relation to the introduced waiting time targets, as
well as covariate analysis determining the importance of patients' and clinical
characteristics on the waiting times. Section 2.4 provides concluding remarks.
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2.2 Methodology: Duration analysis of waiting times
data
Duration analysis is the usual label applied in econometrics to a set of techniques
known in biomedical sciences as survival analysis, in other social sciences as
time-to-event analysis and in engineering as failure-time analysis or reliability
analysis. It consists of parametric and non-parametric methods for estimating
survival and hazard functions, explained below, which permits comparison of
the duration of states of interest for dierent groups and estimation of the
impact of explanatory variables on duration (Cox and Oakes, 1984; Collett,
2003)8.
In Economics and other disciplines interest is drawn to variables that come
in the form of a specied time period or duration, which is the time elapsed
until a certain event occurs9. A well dened origin (date of entering the state
of interest) and exit (date of leaving the state of interest) dene the spell length
or spell duration. In Economics, these data are referred to as duration data.
In the context of this study, we are interested in the duration of waiting,
which is a state initiated by referral to join a list and terminated by admission
for treatment. The duration of waiting is treated as a continuous variable in our
empirical analysis. The following graph depicts the process of creating duration
spells of various lengths (waiting times) for all individuals admitted for surgery
within 2002/2003.
8For more information on survival analysis techniques see Miller, Gong and Mu~noz (1981);
Allison (1984); Kalbeisch and Prentice (1980); Fleming and Harrington (1991); Elandt and
Johnson (1999) and Hosmer, Lemeshow and May (2011).
9Examples of applications from dierent disciplines that use duration analysis techniques
are shown in Table 2.8 at the end of this Chapter.
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Figure 2.2: Wait spells of patients admitted for surgery during 2002/2003.
Duration analysis oers several advantages in analysing waiting time data.
First, as mentioned before, it looks at the distribution of waiting times, which
generates deeper insights than methods that focus on average waiting times.
Secondly, it takes account of the fact that waiting times are not usually normally
distributed. Thirdly, it allows for censored observations, where either the date
of referral or of admittance is not known. However, in this study the data
set does not include censored observations; this will be explained in the next
section of the chapter.
2.2.1 Survival and Hazard functions
Two key concepts in duration analysis are survival functions and hazard func-
tions. Let t be the length of a completed spell. It is the realisation of a
continuous non-negative random variable T with a probability density function
(pdf), f(t), and a cumulative distribution function (cdf), F (t). In the survival
analysis literature, f(t) is also known as the \failure probability function" and
F (t) as the \failure function".
The failure function (cdf) represents the probability that duration time is
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less or equal than some value t.
F (t) = P (T  t); t  0: (2.1)
This implies that the survival function, S(t), which is the complement of F (t),
is equal to:
S(t) = P (T > t) = 1  F (t); t  0: (2.2)
It represents the probability that an individual survives from the time origin






Both F (t) and S(t) are probabilities and therefore inherit the properties of
probabilities. In particular, the survival function lies between zero and one;
it is equal to one at the start of the spell (t = 0) and is then decreasing as t
increases. The rst order derivative is negative, while the second can be either
positive or negative:






The pdf is the limiting value of the probability of failing to survive within the
interval t and (t+t) as t tends to zero:
f(t) = lim
t!0
P (t  T < t+t)
t
: (2.3)
This density function does not summarise probabilities; it may be greater than
one in value but it is always non-negative:
f(t)  0:
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Easily seen from the following two formulae, the pdf is the slope of the cdf and










The hazard function, h(t), is widely used to express the risk or hazard of failure
at some time t and is obtained from the probability that an individual fails to
survive in the interval (t; t+t) conditional on survival up to that time.
h(t) = P (t  T < t+tjT  t):
This conditional probability can be expressed as a probability per unit time by
dividing by the time interval t, to give a rate. The hazard function h(t) is the
limiting value of this quantity as t tends to zero. So,
h(t) = lim
t!0
P (t  T < t+tjT  t)
t
; (2.4)




The function h(t) is also known as the hazard rate, the instantaneous death
rate, the intensity rate, the force of mortality or the inverse Mills ratio. In the
context of our application, h(t) is the instantaneous rate of admission.
It should be stated that the hazard rate is not a probability and therefore
does not have the properties of probabilities. Like the f(t), the only restriction
implied by its specication is that h(t)  0.
Moreover, the integrated or cumulative hazard function, H(t), shows the












; S(t) = exp
 H(t) and H(t) =   logS(t): (2.5)
It is important to note that whatever functional form is chosen one can derive
all the other functions from it. In practice, it is advantageous to model the
hazard function and derive the other functions from that.
2.2.2 Specic functional forms of the survival and hazard func-
tions
The hazard rate h(t) is particularly useful in duration data analysis as it repre-
sents the risk of failure at some time t. Sometimes, there is available information
as to how this rate could change over time and specic distributions of h(t) are
adopted. Yet, more often, there is no obvious shape for it and any distribution
over non-negative values could be a possible candidate.
The commonest functional forms that have been used in the literature com-
prise of the exponential, weibull, log-normal, log-logistic, generalised gamma
and gompertz. These distributions have been described by several authors using
dierent parameterisation; we mainly follow the specication given by Collett
(2003). The various functional forms for the survival and hazard functions of
the above distributions are summarised on Table 2.1.
2.2.3 Estimation of the survival and hazard functions
The survival function can be estimated by various methods among which the
most important are the life table estimator and the Kaplan-Meier estimator
(KM). The life table is one of the oldest techniques to present lifetime data by
illustrating the survival experience of a cohort of individuals who are grouped
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Table 2.1: Functional forms for the survival and hazard functions
Hazard function Survival function Parameters
Exponential  e t 
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Source: Collet (2003)
in well dened time intervals. However, our interest lies on the non-parametric
estimation of the survival function using the KM or product limit estimator.
To begin with, suppose we have a single sample of ungrouped complete
duration times. Their survival function can be estimated by the `empirical
survival function' given below:
S^(t) =
number of observations with duration spells  t
number of observations in the data set
:
We assume that the estimated S^(t) is constant between two adjacent fail-
ures, hence when we plot it against t a step-function is created. Similarly, the
`empirical distribution function' F^ (t) is given by F^ (t) = 1  S^(t).
To incorporate censored observations in the analysis some modication is
needed. Kaplan and Meier (1958) provided such extension by the introduction
of the \product limit or Kaplan-Meier" estimate. It is dened as follows: Sup-
pose that we have information on n individuals and that there are k distinct
times t1 < t2 < ::: < tk at which failures occur. Some of these individuals might
be right-censored (denoted as c). Thus, we suppose that there are k failures
times amongst the individuals where k  n. If we rank them in ascending
order, the j-th is given by t(j), for j = 0; 1; 2; :::r. If dj represents the number
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of individuals observed to fail at time tj , nj the number of individuals at risk
at time tj , and  an innitesimal time interval, then the probability that an
individual fails within the interval (tj   ; tj) is given by dj=nj . The estimated
probability of survival is given by (nj   dj)=nj . Given the way these intervals
were constructed, the probability of surviving from tj to (tj+1   ) is one and
the joint probability of surviving from (tj ) to tj and from tj to (tj+1 ) can
be estimated by (nj   dj)=nj . As  tends to innity, this becomes the estimate
for the probability of surviving between tj and tj+1. The KM estimate for the







This represents the product of one minus the number of failures divided by
the number of individuals at risk or the product of one minus the \exit rate"
at each of the duration times. From the estimated S(t) one can derive the
estimates for F (t), f(t), H(t) and h(t).
The standard error of the KM estimate, that is the square root of the











At the tails of the S^(t) distribution, the estimate of the variance using the
above formula can underestimate the true variance. Alternative formulas are
used to avoid such problem (Peto et al., 1977).
The KM estimate is formed as a product of a series of estimated probabilities
and is the limiting value of the life table estimate as the number of intervals
tends to innity and their width tends to zero. For the above reason, it is also
known as the product-limit estimator of the survival function.
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An alternative way to estimate the survival function especially for smaller
samples is the Nelson-Allen estimate. For more details, visit Collett (2003).
Estimation of the hazard function can be also achieved by the life-table and







tend to be irregular. However, there
are a number of ways for smoothing the hazard function, such as the kernel
smoothed estimate, enabling the identication of any possible patterns.
2.2.4 Comparison of the survival functions of two or more groups
of duration data
The simplest way of comparing the survival times obtained from two groups of
individuals is to graphically plot the corresponding estimates of the two survival
functions on the same axes. Moreover, hypothesis testing enables us to assess
whether a possible dierence between the survival curves of the two groups
is real or a result of chance variation. Two of the commonest non-parametric
procedures to evaluate group dierences are the log-rank test and the Wilcoxon-
Breslow-Gehan test. Below we summarise the dierent methods and formulas
for testing the equality of survival functions across groups.
Denitions-Hypotheses-Test statistics
Let t1 < t2 < ::: < tk represent the ordered failure times, dj be the number
of individuals observed to fail at time tj , nj is the number of individuals at
risk just before tj , and dij and nij denote the same things for group i, where
i = 1; 2; :::; r.
The null hypothesis that there is no dierence in the survivor experience
of the individuals in the r groups is tested against the alternative that at least
53
one of these is dierent from the others.
To access the above hypotheses we evaluate the dierence between the ob-
served number of individuals in group i that fail at time tj and the expected
number of failures given the null hypothesis is true.
The expected number of failures group i at time tj is eij = nijdij=nj .
By summing the dierences between the observed and expected failures over




W (tj)(d1j   e1j ; :::; drj   erj);
where W (tj) is a positive weight function that takes the value of zero when nij
is zero.












Note that ~S(tj) is the estimated KM survival function value for the combined







2.2.5 Duration analysis of waiting times
In our application, a survival function shows the probability of a person remain-
ing -or surviving- on the waiting list beyond a given time. In other words, the
survival function shows the percentage of people admitted to hospital from the
waiting list and the variations in this proportion as waiting time increases. It
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also provides an estimate of the average waiting time as the integral of the sur-
vival function, though for data that are not censored this is merely an alterna-
tive calculation to a straightforward mean. An advantage of survival functions
is the ability to observe patterns of waiting list behaviour over time; the same
average waiting time might be generated by very dierent distributions of wait-
ing time, reecting dierent ways of managing lists. We estimate the survival
functions using the non-parametric KM estimator described above. Survival
functions can be compared between dierent groups, dened by, for example,
illness, treatment, doctor or patient characteristics, and the log-rank test can be
used for statistical testing of dierences between them. The impact of variables
that aect waiting time patterns can also be analysed.
The hazard function shows the rate at which patients leave the waiting list
at a given time. Specically it represents the probability that an individual is
admitted for surgery conditional on having waited in a list up to that time. For
example, if the hazard function is constant -the instantaneous rate remains the
same at all times- this generates an exponential survival function of the form
S(t) = e ()t, where  is the hazard rate. The advantage of examining hazard
functions is that it may reveal patterns of waiting list behaviour that would not
otherwise be apparent. For example, if management eort in clearing waiting
lists varies over time, the probability of a patient being admitted at a particular
time will vary -as the length of time that they have had to wait increases, the
probability of being admitted may rise, fall or remain constant.
Regression analysis can also be employed on duration data. Parametric es-
timation models for durations have two avours, which depend on assumptions
about the hazard rate. Proportional hazard (PH) models assume that there is
a baseline hazard function that depends on time but not on other variables that
aect duration, and is therefore common to all individuals. These other vari-
ables, which are usually assumed to be time-invariant, essentially scale the haz-
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ard function for each individual. A valuable technique in estimating PH models
is the semi-parametric Cox regression, which does not require any assumption
about the hazard rate, simply the impact on it of the other variables. Acceler-
ated failure time (AFT) models allow scaling to vary over time. Although these
are therefore more exible, they are entirely reliant on assumptions about the
underlying hazard function; there is no equivalent of Cox regression.
2.3 Waiting times data
2.3.1 The structure of Hospital Episode Statistics
In UK there are two ocial waiting time datasets. The rst comprises the
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database which provides the waiting times
of patients treated in a given nancial year10. Each year's data consists of all
admissions within that year and records both the date the patient was placed
on the waiting list and the date he was admitted to the hospital to receive
treatment. Thus, the measure of waiting time is constructed by the dierence of
the two dates. The second source of data stems from the Department of Health
waiting list returns11, a cross-sectional measure which contains the time patients
spend on the list at a particular census date. The above measures of waiting
times are fundamentally dierent. For more details see Dixon (2004) and Dixon
and Siciliani (2009). Due to the fact that the rst oers complete waiting times
of treated patients -even thought the spells are generated retrospectively- while
the second constitutes a snapshot of incomplete waiting times currently on the
list, it serves best the scope of our research to work with HES.






service is run by the `Health and Social Care Information Centre'12 through
`Northgate Information Solutions'. HES data cover episodes of care for NHS-
funded admitted patients that were treated in NHS trusts, primary care trusts
or in the independent sector. It constitutes a record-level database of hospital
admissions in all NHS trusts in England since 1989, with more than 12 million
inpatient records per year, and outpatient records since 2003, comprising more
than 40 million records per year. Although private hospitals are not included,
private patients treated in NHS hospitals are. Information on personal, admin-
istrative, geographical and clinical characteristics is submitted on an annual
base by NHS Trusts to the `NHS Wide Clearing Service' and from December
2006 to the `Secondary Uses Services' (SUS). The latter, after making the data
available to the commissioners, include them in their database. At a particu-
lar and pre-arranged date, SUS send an extract from their database to HES.
After this point HES data is xed as opposed to SUS data that keep changing.
The next step in the processing cycle comprises the validation and cleaning of
the extract by HES. Data quality reports and checks are completed at various
stages in the above cycle.
As stated in the previous paragraph, before making information available,
HES data quality team is responsible for cleaning all incoming data13. HES
performs checks and makes corrections where errors are identied. This cleaning
system consists of four stages; provider mapping, automatic cleaning, manual
cleaning and derivation. They also generate quality reports and derive new
variables that might be of interest for providers and HES users. Yet, the fact
that data are gathered from a large number of trusts with each of them having a
dierent administrative system can create concerns about the quality of data as
a whole. There might be well-organised trusts that provide high quality data,
12It was previously known as the `NHS Information Centre'.
13http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentServer?siteID=1937&categoryID=376
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but at the same time there might be trusts with poor information systems.
Thus, HES sets special data quality indicators to improve the quality of the
data collected. It is worth mentioning that the quality of the data is inspected
at various stages of the process; at SUS and both during the HES administration
of it and even after its publication.
Furthermore, data security and patient condentiality issues are quite crit-
ical so as to limit the possibility of identifying particular individuals -either
patients or consultants- through sensitive information. That is the reason why
HES provides tables with data in an aggregated form while a `Data Access Ad-
visory Group' is responsible for dealing with requests for sensitive data. The
original HES protocol, which was updated in 2009, and the HES user guide
supply guidelines for the handling of data aiming at protecting the privacy of
individuals and meeting all the required security standards14.
More specically, the data are collected by nancial year and among oth-
ers include information on specialty, diagnosis, operation, healthcare resource
group, admitting hospital, type of admission, waiting times, length of stay and
patient characteristics such as age, sex, ethnicity and residence. Through the
years HES has been updating the items it provides and has been enriched with
new variables such as codes of GP practice, pseudonymised consultant codes
and socioeconomic domains.
2.3.2 Exploratory data analysis
HES data for 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 covering the English NHS are analysed.
Due to the fact that we have the waiting times for all the admissions recorded
in each year the data are complete with respect to date of admission; hence
they are not right-censored. This analysis focuses on elective care; it excludes
emergency and maternity cases, which are not counted as part of waiting lists.
14http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentServer?siteID=1937&categoryID=331
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Data are included on all three principal routes to admission for elective surgery:
waiting lists, where there is no exact date of admission; booked admissions,
where there is an exact date for admission; and planned, where there is an exact
date of admission for a course of treatment over time or a second operation.
As shown in Table 2.2, waiting times for elective surgery are asymmetrical;
for both years, they are positively skewed with long right tails and have an
average of at least 130 days for all methods of admission (waiting lists, booked
and planned) and 155 days if admission takes place by waiting lists. Another
feature of interest is the huge standard deviations observed for all the cases,
revealing the extent of the variability of waits.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of the variable waiting time.
2001/2002 2002/2003
elective waiting list elective waiting list
Number of observations 1639007 1052279 1709155 1042757
Mean 130.29 155.67 134.39 161.43
Standard deviation 157.93 155.73 159.78 154.17
Median 70 101 75 112
Minimum 1 1 1 1
Maximum 4236 3691 7577 5102
Skewness 2.94 1.92 3.26 2.09
Kurtosis 21.95 11.32 29.58 16.74
Figure 2.3 illustrates the kernel densities of the patients' waiting times ad-
mitted from a waiting list. The kernel density estimation is a non-parametric
way to estimate the probability density function (pdf) of a random variable. It
is a data smoothing process in which the smoothing parameter (the bandwidth)
has a strong inuence on the derived estimate. The kernel densities of Figure
2.3 illustrate that overall waiting times distributions are skewed to the right
with the bulk of the distribution lying way below 500 days of wait. However, as
the rest of the chapter (and Chapter 3) will show, duration analysis is a much
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Figure 2.3: Kernel densities of waiting times, 2001/2002 (top) and 2002/2003
(bottom).
The probability of remaining on the waiting list past a certain point in
time (survival function) may be more interesting than expected waiting time,
especially for policymaking. In particular, with regards to the impact of waiting
time targets, which is a major focus of this chapter, the kernel density can only
provide information on whether the bulk of the distribution lies around the set
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targeted waiting time. However, the hazard function can lend more insight on
the `failure' mechanism, that is, the response of the admission mechanism to
the set target. The hazard rate allows to approximate the probability of exiting
the list within an incremental interval, conditional on having `survived' up to
that point. It thus approximates the conditional probability of leaving the list
given the amount of time on test, rather than the unconditional probability
(pdf), and as such is more meaningful.
As we will see, we can utilise the hazard rate to essentially establish whether
there is increased probability (or not) of patients being treated `around' the
interval of the waiting time target. The duration analysis technique can help us
with the question: given that the patients' duration is approaching the waiting
time target, what is the probability of exiting the list? The unconditional
probability (pdf) does not take into account the time that has elapsed and the
pre-announced waiting time target.
We obtained HES data on each episode, including specialty, diagnosis, op-
eration, admitting hospital and type of admission, and on the characteristics of
the patient whose episode it was, including age, sex, ethnicity, and residence.
The data were anonymous with respect to patients.
We evaluate data from three specialties: general surgery; trauma and or-
thopaedics and ophthalmology. These were chosen because together they con-
stitute more than 50% of the patients waiting for elective treatment. Initial
analysis reveals some patients who appear to have waited an implausibly long
time -some greater than ten years- which is most likely the result of coding prob-
lems; consequently, the 0.1% of patients whose waits appeared to be longer than
three years were excluded.
We analyse the data at three levels. The incentives associated with waiting
times targets apply to the hospital, so it is appropriate to analyse overall hospi-
tal waits. However, given the possibility of systematic dierences in waiting list
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management between specialties within any hospital, we examine the waiting
times separately for the three specialties. Moreover, it is possible that waiting
lists are managed dierently for particular operations, so we also focus on the





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We start o by analysing the managing of waiting times according to clini-
cal characteristics; that is specialty, operative procedure and admission source.
We then explore the overall waiting times of a selected set of NHS hospitals
for both years. In all levels of analysis, the survival and hazard functions are
estimated non-parametrically and the long-rank test for signicance of dier-
ences is performed. Also, note that the HES data are very rich and a ne level
of disaggregation of the data is possible. This generates a very large set of
possible analyses; here only a fraction of the results generated is reported. Key
dierences or similarities between the data that were selected for presentation,
and those not shown, are identied.
2.4.1 Estimation of survival and hazard functions
Variation in the probability of admission by specialty and operative
procedure
Figure 2.4 presents survival curves for all patients admitted15 in each of the
three specialties during 2001/2002. In eect, these show the proportion of
patients who remain on the waiting lists at each point in time. At time 0,
all patients are on the list and the curve falls as they leave the list by being
admitted. The graphs have been truncated at two years, as this helps to display
more clearly the patterns for the very large majority of patients that have
waiting times below that level.
The shortest waiting times are for general surgery and the longest are for
trauma and orthopaedics, but examining the shapes of the curves shows a
more complex picture than that. Until around three months the rate at which
patients are admitted from a list is similar for ophthalmology and trauma and
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Figure 2.4: Kaplan{Meier survival curves for three specialities, 2001/2002.
orthopaedics, both being very much slower than for general surgery. After that
the admittance rate becomes relatively faster for ophthalmology until, by 15
months, survival on the ophthalmology waiting list is similar to that of general
surgery. The corresponding survival curves for 2002/2003 (not shown) are very
similar. The log-rank test for equality of the survival functions demonstrates
statistically signicant dierences between waiting times for the three specialties
for both years, suggesting systematic dierences in waiting times and admission
patterns between surgical specialties.
Figure 2.5 shows the estimated hazard functions for 2001/2002 and 2002/2003,
with the national waiting list targets for those years represented by the bold
dashed lines. The hazard functions are all characterised by `peaks'; there is
initially an increasing probability of admission as waiting time increases, this
reaches a maximum, after which there is a decreasing probability. The exact
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Figure 2.5: Hazard curves for three specialities, 2001/2002 (top) and 2002/2003
(bottom).
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In 2001/2002, for general surgery, increased waiting list activity is observed
by peaks in the curve at 4 and 15 months; for ophthalmology, at exactly 15
months; and for orthopaedics between 15 and 18 months. The waiting list
target for that year was 15 months.
The waiting time target for 2002/2003 was 12 months. The hazard curves for
that year show, in every case, that the peaks occurred earlier than in 2001/2002.
For general surgery, the main peak in probability of admission in 2002/2003
reduced to 12 months; for orthopaedics between 12 and 15 months; and for
ophthalmology to around 14 months.
We now turn to examine the management of the lists in terms of the most
common procedures in each specialty. The top graph in Figure 2.6 shows the
survival curves for the four most common procedures within general surgery
for 2001/2002 and the bottom graph shows the corresponding hazard curves.
The shortest waiting times were for excision of skin lesions, followed by inguinal
hernia, gall bladder excision and varicose vein ligation. The log-rank test for
equality of the survivor function showed that these dierences are statistically
signicant.
Each operation has a peak close to the waiting time target of 15 months,
though excision of skin lesions has an additional earlier peak at 3 months.
For 2002/2003 (not shown), the peaks for every procedure again occur earlier,
between 12 and 15 months, coincident with the lower target time. However the
earlier peak for excision of skin lesions at 3 months is unchanged. Earlier peaks
are observed in other occasions (see Chapter 3). The most prominent possible
explanation for this phenomenon is prioritisation in the admission process, also
veried in the theoretical model of Chapter 4. Given that hospitals undertake
some sort of prioritisation of cases based on clinical urgency, we would expect
an early peak due to more urgent cases being scheduled for earlier periods. In
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Figure 2.6: Survival (top) and hazard (bottom) curves for the four most common
general surgical procedures, 2001/2002.
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management of the list based on targets set by the hospitals at distinct points,
say 3 months, 6 months etc, before the pre-announced universal and formal
waiting time targets. Thus, earlier peaks could also represent clinical preference
for a particular date of admissions, unrelated to the set target.
These results are broadly replicated in analyses of procedures in the other
two specialties. In each case there are statistically signicant dierences in
waiting times between the most common procedures within each specialty, and
peaks in the hazard functions are at around 15 months for 2001/2002 and be-
tween 12 and 15 months for 2002/2003 -both coinciding with the prevailing
waiting time target for those years.
Variation in the probability of admission by type of admission
While patients can be admitted to hospital from a variety of sources, the three
principal routes are waiting lists, booked admissions, and planned admissions.
Waiting times targets apply only to patients on waiting lists. Figure 2.7 shows
the survival curves for 2001/2002 by admission method and Figure 2.8 shows
the hazard curves for both 2001/2002 and 2002/2003.
Booked admission patients have the lowest waiting times and waiting list
patients the longest; the dierences between the three routes are statistically
signicant. The survival curves show that the proportion of patients waiting for
planned admissions reaches that of waiting list patients at around 15 months.
Booked admissions have two hazard curve peaks, a larger one at 3 months for
both years and a smaller one at 15 months in 2001/2002 and at 12 months for
2002/2003.
The hazard rates for planned admissions have very small variations over
waiting times, but the very slight peaks that are observable are similar to those
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Figure 2.7: Survival curves by type of admission, 2001/2002.
peak which reduces from around 15 months in 2001/2002 to between 12-15
months in 2002/2003.
These results also point to the direction of a change in the list management
due to the implementation of the target, since the `move' of peaks is more ap-
parent in the case of waiting lists, rather than planned or booked admissions.
A somewhat contrary observation is that we would not expect any peaks at the
target times for planned admissions because these are not subject to waiting
times targets; however, there are in fact peaks (albeit slight). One plausible
explanation is that part of the managerial response to targets may include re-
classifying patients between waiting list and planned admissions.
Variation in the probability of admission by hospital
We further analyse the data for a selection of seven trusts to highlight the
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Figure 2.8: Hazard rates by type of admission, 2001/2002 and 2002/2003.
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able geographic spread across England, and Table 2.4 shows the NHS Regional
Oces within which they are located.
Table 2.4: Seven trusts and their equivalent NHS Regional Oces.
Trust Regional Oce
Manchester University Hospital North West
Nottingham University Hospital Trent
Southampton Hospital South East
Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospitals Northern and Yorkshire
Birmingham Heartlands and Solihull West Midlands
Royal Free Hospital North Central London
Guys and St.Thomas Hospitals South East London
Figure 2.9 shows the hazard curves for each trust for each year. The patterns
and peaks in admission probabilities at each point in time dier greatly between
providers. Some do not have notable peaks; for these providers, the probability
of admission did not vary much over waiting time. In particular, the hazard
curve for the Royal Free Hospital is almost horizontal in both years. All of
the peaks, for those providers that have them, occur at lower waiting times
in 2002/2003 compared to 2001/2002, although the extent of this diers. For
example Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospital has a main peak of between 6 and
12 months for both years, with only a small dierence between them. Other
providers changes were much larger, for example, the main peak for Birmingham
Heartlands & Solihull reduced from a little more than 15 months in 2001/2002
to 12 months in 2002/2003, an almost exact mirroring of the change in targets.
Much variation is observed at a hospital level. Indeed the implementation of
the targets in the UK identies cases, to a more or lesser extent, that appear to
exhibit increased instantaneous probabilities of patients admission (`peaks' in
the hazard curves) around the time of the target. This disaggregated analysis
is extended in Chapter 3, in an attempt to identify patterns of variation across
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Figure 2.9: Hazard rates for seven NHS Hospital Trusts, 2001/2002 (top) and
2002/2003 (bottom).
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2.4.2 Duration analysis with covariates
In this section, we explore the adjustments of the survival and hazard rate func-
tions for the eects of covariates representing patient and clinical characteristics
that may impact on waiting times, using parametric PH and AFT models under
dierent distributional assumptions and Cox regression.
For the AFT models, the dependent variable is waiting time until admission;
for the PH models it is the hazard rate. For both models, the independent
variables are Age, (calculated as age minus 50, the average for the sample),
and a series of dummy variables representing sex, admission category, main
specialty, patient classication and ethnicity (see Table 2.5). Together, these
dene a reference group of people that are male, 50 years old, NHS patients,
admitted in general surgery, admitted to inpatients and white. The dummy
variables are therefore Female; Private patient; Orthopaedics; Ophthalmology;
Day case; Black; Indian; and Other ethnicity. We analysed data for both
years, but because the results were very similar we report analyses only of the
2002/2003 data.
Table 2.6 shows the results from four alternative AFT models. It should
be noted that the very large sample size means that the statistical signicance
of each coecient is a poor guide to its practical signicance16. The only
coecients that are not statistically signicant are those for Black, in all spec-
ications, and for Female in the AFT Log-normal specication. All models are
statistically signicant with high log-likelihood values; the sign and magnitude
of the estimated coecients is similar regardless of the particular assumptions
made about the distribution. We are unable to distinguish statistically between
the dierent models according to goodness of t criteria, and indeed they pro-
duce very similar results.
16See Johnson (1999), and references therein, for an analysis on the relation between sample
size, signicance and power of tests.
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Table 2.5: Description of variables
Name Description of variable
Age at the start of episode It is the age in years calculated from the date an episode
starts and the date of birth. Recode of patients younger
than 1 year old.









Main specialty It is the specialty under which the consultant is contracted
by the hospital. We are going to investigate the following
specialties:
 general surgery
 trauma and orthopaedics
 ophthalmology
Patient classication Patients are classied as
 ordinary admissions
 day cases
Ethnic group It species the ethnic group of patients. Although from
April 2001 new codes have been created, the old ones are




 any other ethnic group
Date of decision to admit It is the date a consultant decided to include a patient in
the waiting list for a surgical procedure. The patient might
be admitted immediately or some time later.
Date of admission It is the date the patient was admitted to the hospital.
Waiting time It is the period in days from the date of decision to admit
to the date of admission.
Because of this, we will restrict our discussion to the AFT-Exponential
model. The antilog of the constant term is the average waiting time for the
reference group as dened above, i.e., e4:91 = 136:5 days. Although Age has a
signicant coecient, this translates into an increase of less than one days wait-
ing time for a one-year increase in age, other things being equal. The changes in
waiting times for Female or Indian are also less than one day. Such dierences
75
are obviously of no account -but other ndings are of more interest. Other
things being equal, private patients wait on average 99 fewer days; orthopaedic
and ophthalmology patients wait on average 74 and 71 more days; day case
patients wait on average 30 fewer days; ethnic groups other than Black, White
and Indian wait on average 33 fewer days.
Table 2.7 shows the results from the PH models. All covariates are, again,
statistically signicant, apart from Black. The results from the parametric
models are consistent statistically, functionally and quantitatively with those
from the Cox regression.
Since there is very little to choose between the dierent models, the results
presented above concerning the impact of the independent variables may be
taken as representative. Some variables have no real impact on waiting times,
such as age and sex; however, some -such as whether the patient is NHS or














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Statistics on average waiting times, and on performance against targets, show
that the NHS has made considerable progress in improving its performance in
this respect since 2000. The analysis conducted in this chapter conrms that
conclusion. By examining not only the central tendency but also the nature of
the underlying distribution of waiting times, we oer new insights into the way
waiting targets are being managed, as well as revealing some important issues.
First, the hazard functions by specialty, by procedure and to a lesser extent
by hospital, show that the period of time at which the probability of admission
peaks coincides with the prevailing waiting times target; and that the introduc-
tion of shorter targets coincides with a reduction in the waiting time at which
this peak occurs. Is this causal or a coincidence? It cannot be claimed that
the conditions that prevailed in the two periods were identical. In addition to
changed waiting times targets, there were other measures, including increased
spending on elective surgery and the greater use of private sector hospitals to
overcome supply bottlenecks in the public sector. However, although these
measures may have had an inuence on the ability to reduce waiting times, the
coincidence of the timing that we have observed is highly suggestive that the
targets have inuenced the way in which waiting times have been reduced17.
Specically, one interpretation of the observed peaks is that management
and surgeon eorts have been directed to avoiding breaching the institutional
targets, since the rewards and penalties focus on the number of patients treated
before or after the target, and that there is therefore an increasing probability of
admission as the target approaches. However, once a target has been breached,
the extent to which it is breached is less important, so the probability of admis-
17As shown in the following chapter, similar patterns in admission rates are observed for
the coming years while the targets get stricter.
79
sion falls and priorities are directed elsewhere. If increased resources for elective
surgery were the sole explanation for reduced waiting times, one might instead
expect an equal eort devoted to the admission and treatment of everyone
irrespective of whether their admission is before, at or beyond the target.
Further evidence suggesting the dominance of targets as the driver of change
comes from the observation that, both at the level of procedures and of hospi-
tals, the peaks in the probability of admission that are evident at or around the
target wait changed over the two years, while other observable peaks, such as
those at 3 months for all general surgical procedures and for booked and planned
admissions, remained unchanged. One could speculate that these peaks repre-
sent some clinical preferences for a date of admission or perhaps an approximate
division between more and less urgent cases, but since these clinical thresholds
are below the targets they are not aected. Thus, prioritisation of the list with
urgent cases treated quicker can explain the earlier peaks observed. With re-
gards to later -after the target- peaks, as in the case of of Newcastle Upon Tyne
Hospital (Figure 2.9), this can be explained again by some clinical preference
for a `maximum' acceptable waiting time. In addition, if penalties from breach-
ing the target are proportional to the `length' of breach, then one could justify
an increased admissions rate at a later point.
Another striking nding from the analyses is the wide variation in waiting
time distributions and implied admission tactics by hospital, specialty and by
procedure. We suggest that the dierences between trusts reect the level and
type of activity employed by them at any given time. Some hospitals exhibit
great eort to tackle excessive waits; some manage only the longest waiters;
while others appear to tackle the whole spectrum of the waiting times distri-
bution. This is consistent with the ndings of qualitative research (Appleby
et al., 2005a). One possible interpretation is that, notwithstanding the signif-
icant dierences that are evident between entire hospitals in their pattern of
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admissions, and the observable response in the probability of admission to a
change in waiting times targets at all levels, the managerial inuence that this
implies is more generally overwhelmed by the decision processes of individual
clinical teams, each pursuing quite dierent priorities and admissions criteria.
Targets may be met equally, but the ways in which they are met are quite
dierent.
An alternative interpretation is that the dierences in the probability of ad-
mission between specialty or procedure are determined by inherent dierences
in patient characteristics, such as the severity of their condition, operation type,
clinical diculty in performing it, and whether the surgery can be performed
as a day-case. However, in the absence of data enabling comparisons of the
health status of patients (Appleby and Devlin, 2004) and the lack of any ob-
jective means of dierentiating between surgical procedures on these grounds,
for example judging the excision of skin lesions to be clinically more important
than varicose veins, such explanations would be highly speculative.
Can variations between individuals' waiting times be explained by clinical,
patient or provider-level characteristics? These results suggest that they can,
although more analyses are needed to answer this properly. From an equity
point of view, it is useful to know that characteristics such as age and sex do not
aect waiting times in any important way, and that we can be condent about
those ndings because of the very large sample size. Some ndings suggest
that more investigation is required, for example the dierence in waiting times
for `Other' ethnic groups. However, some large dierences are of immediate
interest.
Of particular interest is the very large dierence between NHS and private
patients -which in this context is private patients using NHS accommodation
or services- suggesting that private patients have a considerable advantage in
access compared to NHS patients, even though the two groups use exactly the
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same facilities and services. Private work undertaken by the NHS is at the dis-
cretion of the responsible NHS body, usually the hospital. The main reason for
carrying out such work is to generate income -around 300 million in 2001/2002-
and to recruit and retain consultants in areas where their access to private fa-
cilities, and hence private income, is limited. The rules and guidance governing
the treatment of private patients in NHS facilities are complex. However, a re-
cent code of conduct18 re-emphasises a key point of previous guidance; private
work in NHS hospitals should not `interfere with the organisation's obligations
to NHS patients'. Our nding that patients treated privately by the NHS had
signicantly shorter waits than other, NHS, patients suggests, but does not
prove, that private patients can buy priority of access over NHS patients.
Also, as suggested, it is possible that trusts may have to some extent met
their targets by adjustments such as reclassifying patients included on waiting
lists as planned cases and reclassifying day-cases as outpatients19.
The application of duration analysis to waiting times data oers an impor-
tant means of improving the understanding of waiting times management and
of gauging the behavioural responses to policy measures. Research at the next
chapter uses these techniques to analyse dierences between the waiting times
distributions of trusts who dier by size and type and those who are successful
and unsuccessful in meeting the waiting times targets in each period, as well as
examining the extent to which dierences in the probability of admissions are
evident at still greater levels of disaggregation, such as by individual consultant.
18A Code of Conduct for Private Practice: Guidance for NHS Medical Sta. Department
of Health, London (2003).










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variability of waiting time distributions by
hospitals and doctors
3.1 Introduction
The analysis undertaken in the previous chapter has established that targets
have played an important role in the cut of long waiting times. We conclude
that, rst, the period of time at which increasing probability of admissions
takes place -illustrated by peaks in hazard curves- coincides with the prevailing
waiting times target. It is also evident that the introduction of stricter waiting
time targets leads to leftward shifts of the new peaks. Second, the patterns of
admissions for elective surgery by a waiting list -illustrated by dierent survival
curves- vary between dierent specialties, operative procedures and providers.
Initially, the analysis concentrated on the dierences between specialties as a
whole, the second part revealed waiting times variations by type of operation
and the last part explored dierences between selected hospitals across England.
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The aim of this chapter is to examine further the variation in the way hos-
pitals and physicians manage their waiting lists. We pose questions in two
directions: the rst focuses on the behaviour of the hospitals. How do trusts
admit patients for elective surgery? Are the waiting time distributions of pa-
tients of distinct hospitals exhibiting similarities? What are the commonest
patterns of wait distributions? How have waiting time distributions evolved
through years? The second direction focuses on the behaviour of physicians. Is
there variation in the way doctors manage their waiting lists? How do doctors
with similar activity levels regulate the ow of their patients? What is the
behaviour of doctors with respect to elective admission across time?
This chapter is also motivated by the small area variation literature that
emphasizes large dierences in the utilization rates of medical services between
geographical regions1. Even when controlling for age and sex, a great proportion
of variation in the use of hospitals remains (e.g. number of admissions, length
of stay, average expenditure per patient and input of physician eort). Possible
explanations proposed by this literature include the dierent way medical teams
practice medicine2, dierences in the incidence and prevalence of the disease,
socioeconomic or ethnic characteristics of the population and dierent supply
of health care resources. Here we focus on revealing variation in the waiting
time distribution of patients and hence the admission rates of dierent hospitals
and physicians.
A more detailed investigation of hospitals' behaviour and the identication
of distinct admissions patterns sets the basis of Chapter 4. In Chapter 4 we
develop a supply-side theoretical model for the optimal admissions behaviour
of hospitals and the derived waiting time distribution. Based on the disaggre-
1Indicatively, Wennberg and Gittelsohn (1973) Folland and Stano (1990), Cohen et al.
(1992), Eibich and Ziebarth (2013).
2For example, dierent surgical styles, dierent beliefs among doctors regarding the ecacy
of procedures and more defensive medicine against a more aggressive view.
85
gated and detailed empirical observations of Chapter 3, we can replicate these
distinct patterns in our theoretical model, and most importantly, relate them
to particular supply-side factors.
In addressing these questions, there is an additional aim, to assess whether
or not duration analysis should be more widely applied to waiting time data
and thus represent a useful tool for systematic exploration of the hospitals'
waiting time distributions and their evolution through time. A simple average
waiting time cannot reveal the ways a hospital employs to change its behaviour
in order to face the problem of long lists and waiting times. In other words,
we also aim at evaluating the potential role of duration analysis to capture the
changes in hospitals' tactics, that are expressed by changes of the waiting time
distributions of their patients.
The present study also implements the techniques of duration analysis to
HES data, yet, for an expanded time period that ranges from 1997 to 2005.
Focusing on hospitals, the investigation involves comparisons by overall waits,
by specialty and operative procedure (thus moving towards a less aggregated
analysis of the waiting time distributions). We begin with a more detailed
examination of the waiting time distributions of two of the seven trusts intro-
duced in the previous chapter (part I). This study further attempts to compare
the wait distributions of hospitals controlling for attributes such as size, type
and performance rating (part II). The nal part of the analysis on hospitals
is devoted to the evolution of their waiting time distributions over time (part
III). Focusing on physicians with similar activity levels, again, the examination
consists of comparisons by specialty and operative procedure.
Specically, the analysis comprises of the estimation of survival and haz-
ard curves performed either in a cross-sectional (comparisons of a set of hos-
pitals/doctors at specic years) or an across time framework (waiting times
distributions of one hospital/doctor through years). The selection of this ap-
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proach is supported by two arguments; the rst emerges from the technical
advantages of both the long-rank test, that succeeds in revealing statistically
signicant dierences between distinct survival curves and the non-parametric
estimation of hazard functions that exposes dierences in the probability of
patients' admissions. Since there are no known mathematical functional forms
to t the empirical admission patterns as waiting time increases, application of
non-parametric analysis is advantageous. The second reects the nature of the
available HES data that do not include variables on hospitals characteristics
(e.g. information on capacity, hospital workload and nances). The study by
Propper et al. (2010) uses data from various sources3, yet there is a risk of
under- or over-estimation of results due to the lack of proper matching between
data from dierent sources. This is the reason why we do not perform any
further regression analysis.
The rationale of this chapter of the thesis lies in exposing detailed patterns
regarding the shape of survival and hazard curves of patients' waits. It is
an informative piece of investigation as we learn more about the hospitals'
and doctors' behaviour on waiting list administration and patient admittance
for treatment. Using trusts and consultants as units of analysis allows us to
observe in a more disaggregated level how health care providers with dierent
characteristics perform within the NHS. On top of that, it is among their own
interest to show performance excellence and achieve NHS goals by supplying
high quality services when needed. No one can argue against the imperative
role that `time until treatment' plays for patients, institutions, doctors and the
state itself.
The main nding of this chapter is a signicant variation in the waiting
time distributions of patients among hospitals and even more when comparing
3HES database of England, the Scottish morbidity record for Scotland, census data for Eng-
land, public expenditure statistical analyses data, ONS population trends, data on workforce
and nances of English hospitals from the Department of Health.
87
doctors. However, one can rightly ask which are the factors responsible for
producing specic distributional patterns. What is the role of hospital bud-
get, capacity levels, cost of treatment and national targets in managing waiting
lists? Which attributes could account for changes in the wait distributions?
Development of a theoretical supply model that attempts to interpret the men-
tioned dierences of the distribution of patients' waiting times is presented in
Chapter 4.
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows. A brief presentation of
the data set is presented in the next section, followed by a graphical illustration
of the results and relevant concluding remarks.
3.2 Data
We further obtained HES data on the specialties of general surgery, trauma
and orthopaedics and ophthalmology for 9 years (1997/1998 to 2005/2006)4. A
graphical presentation of yearly admissions by specialty and type of admission
is presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, while Figure 3.3 demonstrates the kernel
densities of elective waits (admission method: waiting list) by year.
The majority of the procedures are general surgeries followed by orthopaedic
ones while ophthalmologic procedures have the smaller percentages. Yet, there
is a steady increase on admission numbers of all specialties through years. More-
over, there is evidence of a decline of patients admitted via waiting lists with a
simultaneous raise of booked and planned admissions.
Although data were truncated at 730 days, estimation of the kernel densities
reveals the before-mentioned point that waiting times are positively skewed.
4The expressions `1997/1998' and `1997' will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
They both refer to the nancial year starting in April 1997 and nishing in the end of March
1998. The same stands for all the years of the analysis.
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Figure 3.2: Number of yearly admissions by type of admission.
The rst part of the distribution represents patients whose waits are quite
short. It is clear that there is an increase of the number of patients with such
waits admitted for surgery. The second part of the distribution illustrates the
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Figure 3.3: Kernel densities of waiting times by year, waiting time(top) and log
of waiting time(bottom).
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gradual decrease of the number of patients who have waited longer periods.
Long right tails reveal that some patients wait far too long to be treated. It is
obvious that for years 2003, 2004 and 2005 the second part of the distribution
changes. Moreover, the graphs of the log of waiting times gradually shift left-
wards at the right tail suggesting a cut of the long waiters. However, although
it is obvious that there are changes on waiting time distributions over years, yet
this illustration cannot easily expose them. A more informative presentation
that uses duration analysis techniques is provided in the next section of the
chapter.
Since the aim of the analysis is to examine the level of variability among
hospitals, data are further classied according to size and type of NHS trust.
Taking under consideration information on NHS trust clustering by the Depart-
ment of Health5 we classify hospitals by size (large acute, medium acute, small
acute) and by type6 (acute, specialist, teaching). After excluding trusts with
missing data over the 9 year period, a set of 52 hospitals remains for further ex-
amination. Moreover, based on the performance star-rating system adopted by
NHS ranging from 2000 to 2005, we develop an additional grouping of hospitals
consisting of good and bad performers.
Clusters reect the largest part of hospital's activity; in acute trusts, a large
proportion of their expenditure covers acute activity while specialist trusts oer
specialist acute services (e.g. orthopaedic and children's hospitals). We dene
as excellent performers those trusts that acquired a 3 star rating for all ve
years the performance star rating system was in action and as bad performers
those that had the worst evaluations (zeros and 1 star ratings). In particular,
our set of hospitals consists of: seven large acute trusts, thirteen medium acute
hospitals, twelve small acute hospitals, twelve teaching hospitals (ve in London
5http://ratings2004.healthcarecommission.org.uk/cluster.asp. We further matched this in-
formation with a list of trust clusters we obtained from the Department of Health.
6The HES variable on the type of provider has not been helpful.
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and seven outside London) and eight specialty hospitals (four orthopaedic, three
children's and one specialist for reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation).
In this chapter, we are focusing on consultant teams7 that exhibit high ac-
tivity levels and particularly on those that performed more than 1000 surgeries
per year for at least one year of our 9-year dataset.
3.3 Results
Our results comprise of two subsections. The rst part examines the wait-
ing time distributions of patients either among dierent hospitals in a cross-
sectional framework and of the same hospital over time. The second part focuses
on the investigation of waiting time distributions by physicians.
3.3.1 Behaviour of trusts
This subsection consists of a much less aggregated analysis for two of the seven
trusts examined in Chapter 2, the cases of Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull
and Royal Free Hampstead (part I), an illustration of distinct patterns of wait
distributions through a selection of survival and hazard curves of specic trusts
grouped by size, type or performance rating (part II). Lastly, an example of
evolution of waiting time distributions over time is presented using data for
Hammersmith hospital (part III).
Part I: Less aggregated analysis by hospital
The case of Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull
Figure 3.4 shows the survival and hazard curves of overall waiting times for
elective surgery for Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull. For 2001/2002, at time
0, all patients are on the list, at around 2 months (57 days) 50% of them have
7The HES variable is described as `Pseudonymised consultant team code'.
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been moved from the list to be treated and at around 4.5 months (143 days)
the proportion increases to 75%. The same pattern characterises the waiting
time distribution of elective patients for 2002/2003. Hazard curves reveal no-
table peaks at a little more than 15 months for 2001/2002 and 12 months for
2002/2003. It is obvious that this trust attempts to adjust to national targets
by changing the probability of moving patients from its lists for admission.
What is not clear, though, is whether it maintains the same behaviour for all
specialties and dierent operative procedures.
Analysis at the level of specialty and type of operation illustrates variability
in trust responses (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). Figure 3.5 demonstrates the estimated
survival and hazard functions by dierent specialties for years 2001/2002 and
2002/2003. In particular, patients waiting for general surgery tend to wait
shorter periods than patients scheduled for orthopaedic or ophthalmologic pro-
cedures. According to 2001/2002 survival curve, 50% of patients is moved o
the general surgery list at around 1 month (34 days), the orthopaedic list at
4 months (111 days) and the ophthalmologic list at 6.5 months (194 days).
At around 8 months the survival curves of the last two specialties intersect.
Similar results are observed for the subsequent year, yet the dierence between
orthopaedic and ophthalmologic specialties diminishes.
In addition, the probability of admission does not remain constant and
exhibits dierent patterns for each specialty. For general surgery, increased
waiting list activity is observed as peaks in the curve for people waiting 3,
8 and 11 months for 2001/2002 and 2, 6, and 12 months for 2002/2003; for
orthopaedic surgeries, between 12 to 15 months for 2001/2002 and at 12 months
for 2002/2003; for ophthalmology the greater peak is located at around 15
months for 2001/2002 and a little less than 12 months for 2002/2003. An
interesting nding in the bottom right graph of Figure 3.5 is the presence of a
late peak of orthopaedics at 547 days -and an increasing hazard at 730 days-
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that probably represent the hospital's eorts to clear the last occupants of the
list. This particular peak of orthopaedics molds the overall survival curve of
Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull for 2002/20038. Two insights can be drawn
from the specialty level analysis. Firstly, it is clear that the trust does not adopt
the same behaviour in managing dierent surgical lists; general surgery waiting
lists follow a very dierent pattern than the other two specialties. Secondly, it
shows the eects of waiting times targets; the probability of admission for those
whose wait approaches a target increases and falls when their wait exceeds the
target.
Figure 3.6 shows the estimated survival and hazard functions by dierent
selective operative procedures. The shorter waiting times are for cholecystec-
tomy, inguinal hernia and varicose vein procedures and the longest for lens
prosthesis and hip replacement. Furthermore, it is worth emphasising that the
three general surgical waiting lists do not consist of patients waiting more that
1 year, while lens prosthesis and hip replacement do. The hazard curve for
2001/2002 reveals the following patterns: for cholecystectomy, peaks are at 2
and 6 months, for inguinal hernia at 2 and 8 months, for varicose vein at 2
and 7 months, for lens prosthesis at almost 15 months and for hip replacement
at between 12 and 15 months. The hazard curve for 2002/2003 demonstrates
that as the targets become tougher, the peaks change towards the lower waiting
times. A peak at exactly 12 months, which is the target of that year, is ob-




The case of Royal Free Hampstead
Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull exhibits great management activity to
tackle excessive waiting times for its patients. Quite dierent behavioural re-
sponses are observed by the Royal Free Hampstead trust in London. Analysis
of the overall waiting times of the trust reveals that Royal Free patients have to
wait a little longer for treatment, relative to the other hospital, as the rate of
admission changes slower (Figure 3.7). For 2001/2002 there is a small peak at
around 3 months and another one at around 17 months while for the following
year the hazard curve remains almost constant after a small increase at the
beginning. Therefore, after about four months, the probability of admission for
elective surgery is independent of the time patients spent on waiting lists.
According to ocial returns of waiting lists for elective surgery9, Birming-
ham Heartlands & Solihull had achieved the national waiting time targets for
2001/2002, while Royal Free had not. One limitation of the ocial waiting
list statistics of that year was that broad time intervals of waiting were used
(eg. patients waiting for 12-17 months). Thus, we cannot calculate exactly the
number of people waiting more than 15 months. However, none of their pa-
tients had to wait more than 12 months at the end of 2003, thus both hospitals
achieved the waiting time target for the following year. Conversely, based on
NHS performance ratings, both trusts had no inpatients waiting longer than
the standards for both years tested10.
Yet, less aggregated analysis at the level of the three specialties reveals
greater variation in the shape of survival and hazard curves (Figure 3.8). Gen-
eral surgeries have the quickest admissions compared to the other two special-
ties. However, ophthalmologic procedures are managed quicker for patients
having waited above 456 days in 2001/2002 and above 547 days in 2002/2003.
9http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/index.htm
10Department of Health, NHS Performance Ratings 2001/2002, 2002/2003.
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Interestingly, comparing the two survival curves of ophthalmology, we nd that
there is an important decrease of long waiters in the second year and a simul-
taneous increase of patients waiting less than 182 days. Similar to Birmingham
Heartlands & Solihull the survival curves of ophthalmology and orthopaedics
intersect.
In 2001/2002, the probability of admission for general surgeries spikes at 3
and a little after 15 months while a year later the rst peak is of much higher
intensity and the second peak (noticeably milder) moves forward. The other
specialties follow dierent patterns with the presence of higher intensity peaks
at around 456 days for ophthalmologic and 547 days for orthopaedics that do
change signicantly the next year.
At the less aggregated level of waiting lists for dierent operations, the image
is much clearer (Figure 3.9). An seen for Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull,
the three types of general surgery exhibit quicker admission rates, however, for
2001/2002, patients waiting more than 273 days for lens prosthesis are admit-
ted faster than varicose veins and cholecystectomy patients. For 2001/2002,
varicose vein procedures have constant hazard rates, cholecystectomy is char-
acterized by a peak at 15 months while lens prosthesis exhibits a high intensity
peak at the same period. On the other hand, the hazard curve of hip replace-
ments is monotonically increasing with maximum probability of admissions at
638 days. In the case of inguinal hernia, we observe an early peak at around 3
months and after remaining constant for some time it starts increasing again.
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Figure 3.4: Overall waiting times of Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull for
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Figure 3.5: Waiting times by specialty of Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull
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Figure 3.6: Waiting times by operation of Birmingham Heartlands & Solihull
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Figure 3.9: Waiting times by operation of Royal Free Hampstead for years
2001/2002 and 2002/2003.
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Part II: Comparison across dierent types of hospitals
The next step in our decomposition comprises of comparisons of dierent
groups of hospitals and aims at revealing patterns in their survival and hazard
curves. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 illustrate the survival curves of seven large acute
trusts for 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 respectively.
As mentioned already, a survival function is represented as a monotonically
decreasing function that declines from 1 to 0 as waiting time increases. Hence,
all survival curves initiate at 1 as all patients are initially on the list and as
they are admitted for treatment the curves gradually decrease until they reach
0 when the list clears. However, distinct patters on the wait distributions are
evident. For the nancial year 1999/2000, as the survival curves of Bradford
and Berkshire & Battle are far away from the origin they exhibit the worse
admission rates. On the other hand, the rest of the curves are closer to the
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Figure 3.10: KM curves for large acute hospitals for 1999/2000.
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The log-rank test for equality of the survivor functions demonstrates statis-
tically signicant dierences between waiting times for the seven trusts.
Additional information can be derived from a closer observation of the
curves and their various shapes. Let us rst discuss the most important aspects
of the observed variations. Using the terminology of Weon and Je (2011, 2012),
survival curves vary in terms of `shape' and `scale'. Scale refers to changes in
the position of the curve (closer or further away from the origin), while shape
refers to changes in the slope of the survival curve. Clearly, the slope of the
survival curve is changing as duration increases; however, there are plenty of
instances where the change in the slope is more abrupt. The sharpest change
in slope is evident with a change in curvature (sign of the second derivative).
However, we also observe cases where, without a change in the sign, the mag-
nitude of the second derivative changes drastically at particular points in time.
Note that these prominent changes in the shape of the survival function are
captured as spikes in the hazard curves.
Noticeable observations in our example (Figure 3.10) are: (i) There is a steep
fall (up until around 20 days) of the survival curve for Plymouth trust which
implies augmented removal of short waiters o the list. After this striking fall
the curve decreases slower until it reaches 0. (ii) The majority of the survival
curves decrease monotonically without any change in curvature (they remain
convex, e.g. Wirral Hospital). (iii) Taking a look at the admission rates of
Berkshire & Battle a dierent pattern emerges; the curve is rst concave and
for patients waiting more than 273 days it becomes convex. Finally, due to the
fact that survival curves exhibit various shapes many of them intercept with
others in one or more points.
The tactics of hospitals are dierent for 2000/2001 (see Figure 3.11). Ply-
mouth behaves much worse relative to the previous year, especially with regards
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Figure 3.11: KM curves for large acute hospitals for 2000/2001.
with the ones of Berkshire & Battle we infer that although it admits quicker
patients waiting up to 250 days it delays substantially the treatment of long
waiters. It is worth mentioning that its survival curve changes curvature more
than once. Furthermore, the managing of the list could be identical in specic
parts of the distributions as in the cases of Bradford and Cornwall (their curves
coincide up until 200 days) or with Wirral and Norfolk & Norwitch (they have
similar admittances in middle of the distributions).
Figure 3.12 illustrates the hazard rates for the seven large acute trusts for
1999/2000 and 2000/2001. In the rst year, two trusts exhibit high-intensity
peaks, that is increasing probabilities of admissions, for patients waiting 547
(Norfolk & Norwitch) and 456 days (Bradford). There are lower-intensity wider
peaks such as the ones by Plymouth and Devon & Exeter. Additionally, there
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Figure 3.12: Hazard curves for large acute hospitals, 1999/2000 (top) and
2000/2001 (bottom).
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In 2000/2001, some peaks shift leftwards (Bradford and Plymouth), some shift
rightwards (Cornwall) while others remain unchanged (Devon & Exeter and
Wirral).
To sum up, it is evident that although all trusts are exhibiting high surgical
activity levels (large acute trusts) they develop distinct waiting time distribu-
tions that change over years. This is also the case when we perform comparisons
among medium acute, small acute, specialist, teaching and good/bad perfor-
mance trusts. Selected diagrams from each category aim at exposing the great
level of variation between their waiting time distributions. Log-rank tests for
equality of the survival functions was performed for all comparisons demon-
strating statistically signicant dierences between all relevant waiting times.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 depict the waiting time distributions among thirteen
medium acute trusts. Although hospitals exhibit similar activity levels they
manage quite dierently their waiting lists. In the rst gure, for the year
1998/1999, there is one trust that admits 75% of its patients after having waited
3 months or less (Poole) while in other trusts (Royal Surrey County, Worthing
& Southlands, Newham) the same percentage is achieved for patients whose
waits are up to around 400 days. The rest of the hospitals are characterised by
admission rates between the two extremes. An additional pattern not observed
previously belongs to Walsall, whose curve falls linearly almost until 0, leaving
a huge right tail representing the clearance of the last occupants of its list.
In 2004/2005, all survival curves have shifted leftwards towards the origin and
are much more concentrated than before, implying reduced waiting times for
all waiters. Comparison of two hospitals that show similar behaviour at the
beginning (Walsall and Bromley) shows dierent tactics later on with the former
focusing on the long waiters and the latter on handling well the short waiters.
In line with the survival curves, the hazard rates among medium acute trusts
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Figure 3.14: Hazard curves for medium acute hospitals, 1998/1999 (top) and
2004/2005 (bottom).
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multi-peak and quasi constant hazards. Walsall hospital exhibits two peaks,
the rst one corresponding to the visible change in the slope of the survival
curve at about 180 days. Poole has a quite wide and smooth peak with high
admittance rates spanning from about 91 to 182 days (consistent with a smooth
and close to the origin survival function). The hazard of Basildon & Thurrock
ends up at a steep increasing rate, although Bromsley appears to have a quite
constant instantaneous admittance rate.
Further, in year 1998/1999 the majority of peaks are located around 547
days while 6 years later increasing probability of admissions is observed for
people with shorter waiting times. It is clear that peaks have moved leftwards;
one plausible interpretation of which could be attributed to the hospitals' eorts
to meet national targets. As a result the majority of the peaks are now situated
around 365 days, with some of course before and some after this point.
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Figure 3.15 demonstrates the survival and hazard curves of twelve small
acute hospitals for 2005/2006. Due to a smaller overall number of admissions,
there are survival curves with visible steps, as is the case for East Somerset,
South Warwickshire and Royal West Sussex in the rst graph. Considerably
quick admissions characterise East Somerset until the rst three months of wait;
only about 10% of patients wait for more than three months, but they take long
to be treated. On the other hand, Royal West Sussex performs the worst; 50%
of elective patients will have to wait more than 6 months in order to be treated.
Patients are initially taken o the list at a decreasing rate and later on at an
increasing one. The rest of the hospitals, clustered between those two, exhibit
similar behaviour.
As regards to the equivalent hazard curves, the hazard curve for East Som-
erset starts o and remains much higher for until about three months. The very
increased instantaneous probability of admissions observed is attributed to the
fact that about 90% of the list is admitted for surgery within three months.
It then decreases until it becomes zero between 182 and 273 days of wait; no
patients are admitted during this period (this is also reected in the constant
survival). As the survival steps down, the hazard exhibits another peak of
smaller intensity, and this process is repeated until the list is cleared. Many
trusts have increased probability of admissions at around 6 months, which is
the target of that year, yet there are others with peaks at extended waiting
times (e.g. at 9 months or even more than a year).
We now turn to specialist hospitals. Analysis undertaken among four or-
thopaedic hospitals reveals dierences on the scale of their survival curves (Fig-
ure 3.16). The Royal Orthopaedic Hospital admits quicker its patients, followed
by the Royal National Orthopaedic, Nueld Orthopaedic and nally by Robert
Jones & Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic. The last two curves intersect more than once
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Figure 3.15: Survival and hazard curves for small acute hospitals for 2005/2006.
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the 25% , 50% and 75% admission rates of the four hospitals are illustrated in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Survival times for four orthopaedic hospitals.
Proportion of patients
still on the list
Hospital Patients 75% 50% 25%
The Royal National Orthopaedic 4149 34 97 223
Nueld Orthopaedic 5420 55 139 303
Robert Jones & Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic 4154 93 187 336
Royal Orthopaedic Hospital 8792 32 76 147
A slightly dierent pattern appears when we control for the type of surgery
(total hip replacements only): (i) Besides an intersection at 91 days, the rst
two curves (yellow and blue) are quite similar to their corresponding overall
waiting time graph (ii) This is not the case for the other two hospitals. Robert
Jones & Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic admits quicker patients whose waits range
from 91 to 400 days compared to Nueld Orthopaedic. These ndings suggest
that more disaggregated analysis -by operative procedure- reveals patters that
depart from the overall waiting time, and additionally variation still persists
even when we control for the same treatment procedure (in terms of type and
size of resources required).
Increasing probabilities of admissions expressed by peaks in the hazard
curves are as follows: According to the order of their survival curves, the Royal
Orthopaedic Hospital has a two-mode peak between 365 and 456 days, followed
by the peak of the Royal National Orthopaedic at 456 days, the wider peak
of low intensity by Nueld Orthopaedic again at 456 days and lastly the one
by Robert Jones & Agnes Hunt Orthopaedic at 547 days. As for the hip re-
placements, Royal National and Robert Jones & Agnes Hunt Orthopaedics have
monotonically increasing hazard rates that diverge from the overall admission
pattern while the other two have quite similar curves to it.
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Figures 3.17 and 3.18 demonstrate the waiting time distributions of a set
of teaching hospitals in London for years 2002/2003 and 2005/2006. For the
rst year, the admission rates by St George's are the worst of all as its curve
is far away from the origin. It is worth mentioning the dierent tactics by
Hammersmith and Chelsea & Westminster hospitals with the former handling
quicker the short waiters (<200 days) while delaying admission to long waiters
compared with the latter that does the opposite. In 2005/2006, all curves
are more concentrated and have shifted leftwards showing better waiting list
administration. Interestingly enough, Hammersmith decreases signicantly the
admission rates for the short waiters, or in other words, the 75% of the patients
with the shorter waits as illustrated by the convexity of its survival curve for this
segment. Among all, Hamstead performs the best and Chelsea & Westminster
the worst.
In 2002/2003, with the exception of Hammersmith that exhibits a high
intensity peak between 365 and 456 days, the rest of the hospitals have low
intensity wider peaks and Hamstead a constant hazard rate. Three years later,
all trusts exhibit earlier peaks, a remark supporting the argument of increased
elective activity to catch the national targets. However, we also observe delayed
peaks that probably account for eorts to treat patients that have remained in
the lists for an unexpectedly long time.
Figure 3.19 depicts the 2002/2003 survival and hazard curves of eight hospi-
tals that had dierent performance ratings between nancial years 2000 to 2004.
In particular, Basildon & Thurrock, Devon & Exeter, Countess of Chester, Sun-
derland and Queen Victoria have scored excellent (3 stars) in the performance
rating for NHS trusts during the period 2000/2001 to 2004/2005. On the other
hand, Weston area, Bristol and Bath have showed bad performance grades.
Although the patterns of survival rates appear to vary substantially by hospi-
tal, results are not as expected with some of the good performers having slow
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admission rates (e.g. Countess of Chester) and bad ones having curves close to
the origin (e.g. Bristol). Besides these two exceptions, the rest of the trusts
behave as expected. Peaks on the hazard curves are taking place for various
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Figure 3.16: Overall waiting times (1st column) and hip replacements (2st
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Figure 3.19: Survival and hazard curves for good and bad performers for
2002/2003.
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Part III: Comparisons over time
In an attempt to understand how admission rates and increasing probabil-
ities of admission evolve over years, the next step in our analysis explores the
waiting time distribution of hospitals over time. Of all the analyses performed
we have selected to present the example of Hammersmith hospital as it shares
common characteristics with many of the other trusts. Figures 3.20 and 3.21
demonstrate the survival and hazard curves of Hammersmith from March 1997
to April 2006 while Figure 3.22 summarises distinctive patterns of the admission











91 182 273 365 456 547 638 730
waiting time (days)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Figure 3.20: Evolution of survival curves of Hammersmith from 1997 to 2005.
The trends in the survival curves of Hammersmith hospital dier markedly
between the nine year period. Admission rates for the rst two years are quite
slow but they do ameliorate gradually as time passes. One can observe that
the curves shift leftwards year by year, mainly in a parallel manner, implying
a proportional decrease of the waiting time of patients (scale change in the
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survival curves). It is also clear that much eort is devoted to reduce extremely
long waits; while 20% of patients had to wait more than a year in 1997 and
1998, less than 10% wait more than a year during the following four years and
none is waiting such a period in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Of great importance is
the fact that for the last two years Hammersmith increased the waiting times of
people waiting less than 6 months compared to the equivalent waits of previous
years. Graphically, this is represented by a rightwards pivot of the rst part
(0-182 days) of the waiting times distribution that also led to a change in the
curvature of the survival curves. Even though the hospital cuts further long
waits, at the same time, it delays the admission of short waiters. In essence, as
years pass, Hammersmith hospital clears its stock of patients quicker, however,
after some point in time there is a trade-o between short waiters and long
waiters.
Comparison of the survival curves for 1997 and 2005 of another eight trusts
besides Hammersmith hospital (Figure 3.22) reveals dierent behaviour by hos-
pitals across time. Two distinct patterns are evident after the nine year period:
(i) there are hospitals that manage to reduce the waiting times of the subset
of elective patients that experiences long waits while at the same time increase
the waiting times of short waiters and (ii) there are hospitals that achieve to
decrease the waiting time of all their patients on lists.
Graphically, the rst outcome is generated by an intersection between the
two survival curves and the second by a leftward shift of the 2005 survival curve.
Clearly, the level of substitution of high wait for low wait patients in the rst
case varies in terms of magnitude; it can be of the same (the created parts before
and after the intersection of the two lines have equal area as is is the case for
Hamstead and Nueld hospitals) or dierent size (the two areas are unequal as
we observe for South Manchester, Southampton and Hammersmith hospitals).
Under the last scenario, the reduction of long waiters might be greater compared
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to the increase of short waiters (Southampton and Hammersmith) or vice versa
(South Manchester). Even when hospitals increase the admission rates of all
their patients (e.g. the cases of Great Ormond Street, Norfolk, St George's and
Bradford hospitals), the change in scale of the new survival curve diers; the
shift could be parallel or not, quite big or smaller.
In Figure 3.21, increasing probabilities of admission represented by peaks
are present for every year. In fact, what characterises the evolution of the
hazard distribution over time is a leftward shift of these peaks; in 1997 the
peak is at around 600 days, in 1998 moves to exactly 547 days, the next year
shifts slightly leftwards resulting at 456 days in 2000 and 2001 (while of greater
intensity), in 2002 it progresses towards 365 days that actually reaches in 2003
and nally in 2004 and 2005 the peaks are located between 365 and 182 days
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Figure 3.21: Evolution of hazard curves of Hammersmith from 1997 to 2005.
This behaviour is consistent with the general way of conduct of many trusts
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that increase elective activity as targets approach and decrease it after the tar-
gets. Sometimes peaks coincide with the corresponding target while in other
points in time they are very close to them. For instance, in the case of Ham-
mersmith hospital, in 2001, the peak coincides with the national target of 15
months announced for that year while in 2005 it is clearly moving to catch up
the target of 6 months.
In conclusion, the hospitals are trying to catch up with the new tougher
targets by increasing their eorts in admitting patients with shorter waiting
times. In other words, in order not to breach the increasingly stricter targets
their hazard rates tend to shift leftwards in accordance with the target move-
ment. It seems that after an action (new target issued by the government), a
























































































































































































































































































































































3.3.2 Behaviour of physicians
Focusing on how physicians manage their waiting lists we nd evidence of great
variation in the waiting time distributions of their patients. Figures 3.23, 3.24,
3.25 and 3.26 demonstrate the survival and hazard rates for a set of high activ-
ity general surgeons either by overall waiting list or by operative procedure, for
particular nancial years. Analysis of the evolution of waiting time distribu-
tions over time is presented for two physicians that exhibit distinct behavioral
patterns (Figures 3.28 and 3.29).
Our results are as follows: (i) Elevated level of variability is evident in the
survival curves of general surgeons in 2004. Plasticity in the survival curves
ranges from smoothly decreasing curves to curves characterised by substantial
change of curvature as waiting time increases. In accordance with this nding
are results from a more disaggregated analysis performed in 2000 by a single
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Figure 3.23: Survival curves of high activity general surgeons in 2004/2005.
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As expected, the survival curves are stepwise because the number of pa-
tients is much smaller relative to the aggregate waiting time distribution (for
all procedures). Even though we control for high activity surgeons and type
of procedure, variation is extensive. As a consequence, there are doctors that
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Figure 3.24: Survival curves for primary repair of inguinal hernia in 2000/2001.
(ii) The presence of great variation in the shape of hazard curves is another
nding of this analysis. In Figure 3.25, increasing probabilities of admission are
observed for patients having waited various periods. These peaks can be quite
wide or steep, of high or low intensity and additionally there are doctors that
admit patients in the same rate and have almost constant hazard curves.
(iii) Furthermore, we can point out the behaviour of two doctors (green and
red lines) that show early peaks of great magnitude for patients waiting less than
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3 months. This pattern that involves the presence of peaks at the beginning of
the hazard function is related to their survival curves. The equivalent survival
curves of the two doctors in Figure 3.23 are the rst two that start decreasing
steeply from 1. On the other hand, in the same gure, the doctor's survival
curve represented by yellow, that is characterised by a concave part, implying
considerably delays for patients' treatment, corresponds to the last curve to
start rising in the hazard rates graph. Finally, monotonically increasing hazard
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Figure 3.25: Hazard curves of high activity general surgeons in 2004/2005.
Similar patterns are observed when we control for the type of operation.
Figure 3.27 illustrates a summary of ve distinct patterns of the hazard rates
with the equivalent survival curves. Of great interest is the red hazard line that
starts with an early strong peak, then falls, has a couple of peaks at around 3
months, decreases again until it reaches 0, has a nal peak and becomes 0 once
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again. This corresponds to the survival curve located closer to the origin that
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Figure 3.27: Five patterns of survival and hazard curves for doctors performing
primary repair of inguinal hernia in 2000/2001.
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Over time analysis of the waiting time distributions by physicians comprises
the nal part of this chapter. We conclude that doctors manage their waiting
lists dierently across time although they all face similar pressure regarding
compliance to national targets.
In particular, variability of the survival and hazard curves of patients' waits
appears in a greater level compared to the analysis based on hospitals. We
observe reductions of the waiting times of all patients (parallel shifts of survival
curves towards the origin), trade-os of short waiters for long waiters (parts of
the waiting time distributions shift leftwards and other parts rightwards) but
at the same time increases in the waiting times of all or subsets of patients.
Although doctors' behaviour does not follow the pattern of gradual smooth
changes in patients' waiting time distributions as demonstrated for Hammer-
smith hospital, there is evidence for substantial reductions of long waiters.
Notwithstanding we performed various analyses, we decided to present the
waiting time distributions of two doctors showing dierent admission rates with
the rst having more concentrated survival curves over time than the second. In
accordance with this, the hazard curves of the second exhibit greater variation
regarding the peaks. In general, the shape of the curves can be monotoni-
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Figure 3.29: Evolution of survival and hazard curves by physician - doc2.
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3.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter investigates the way hospitals and consultants manage their wait-
ing lists by estimating the survival and hazard functions of the waiting times of
their patients. We nd evidence of great variation in waiting time distributions
and implied admission tactics both by hospital and by physician. In addition,
the more disaggregated the analysis the greater the observed variation. On top
of that, greater variability is present in the doctors' survival and hazard curves
compared with those of hospitals.
The patterns of survival rates appear to vary substantially by hospital and
by doctor. In particular, there is signicant variation in both the shape and
scale of their survival curves. Our ndings suggest that some curves, while
retaining the same curvature, exhibit abrupt changes in the magnitude of the
slope, while others alter from convex to concave or vice versa. These distinct
dierences in the slope (magnitude or sign) of the survival functions, correspond
to spikes in the hazard curves. Additionally, there are survival curves that move
closer to the origin and others that shift rightwards, in a parallel way or not.
The dierent shapes reect dierences in the second order derivative of the
removal rate of individuals from the list and variation in the shifts implies that
hospitals admit all patients with a slower or quicker rate compared to others.
Consequently, trends in hazard curves also dier markedly between various
sets of hospitals and consultants. We observe trusts/doctors with notable peaks
of high intensity, others with very short wider peaks and nally some with
constant hazard rates expressed as straight lines. Furthermore, it is worth
mentioning two additional issues: the number of peaks varies and they can be
located earlier or later in the waiting time distribution. Lastly, we report the
appearance of cases in which hazards are illustrated as monotonically increasing
probabilities of admission. These results indicate dierences in the management
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of the lists, in the decision process and admissions criteria, even when we control
for particular characteristics of the list (type of hospital, operation, and even by
physician). At hospital level we compare waiting time distributions controlling
for size (large, medium, small acute), type (acute, specialist, teaching) and
performance rating and indeed conrm sucient heterogeneity. A promising
path for future research would entail a more systematic empirical analysis of
the heterogeneity in hospitals' behaviour. This can be inferred by a regression
analysis, similar to the one conducted in Chapter 2, in which the focus would
now be on supply side factors (size of hospital with number of beds or number of
admissions as proxies and type of hospital in dummy variable format, hospital's
budget, performance rating etc).
Focusing on comparisons across time, the eect of targets on waiting time
distributions is evident; lots of peaks are situated exactly at the wait period
that coincides with the set target for the specic nancial year. However, rst,
there might be additional peaks along the distribution representing increased
admission activity for dierent groups of patients with respect to their waiting
times and second, there are cases in which peaks do not coincide with corre-
sponding targets. One plausible explanation of this nding could be that trusts'
and doctors' decisions are inuenced by several factors besides meeting targets
to ameliorate performance, such as severity of patients' medical status, hospital
budget and available resources.
In addressing the question of how waiting time distributions by hospitals
have evolved over time the answer would include the following points. First
and foremost, much eort has been directed in reducing extremely long waits.
The new element in the study is that we nd that some hospitals admit all
their patients quicker while others cut long waiters by delaying the admission
of short waiters whose waits are by far below the corresponding target. In
essence, as years pass, hospitals clear the stock of their patients quicker, how-
134
ever, after some point in time there is a trade-o between short waiters and
long waiters. Regarding the evolution of the hazard curves over time, hospitals
tend to increase their eorts in admitting patients with even shorter waiting
times in order to catch up with the stricter targets. In other words, in order not
to breach the increasingly tougher targets their hazard rates tend to shift left-
wards in accordance with the target movement. Although this way of conduct
is also observed by doctors, analysis at that level exhibits much more variation.
Furthermore, all the analyses in this chapter support the usefulness of du-
ration analysis techniques and their wider application in the hospitals setting.
Illustration of waiting time distributions of patients by KM and hazard curves
can be proven an informative tool of auto-evaluation by every hospital. They
could have the opportunity to assess how well they manage their waiting lists
and detect consultants that could improve their performance. However, one
could possibly argue that one limitation is that this methodology can be used
in a retrospective manner as it handles completed spells. This caveat can be
easily overcome as these techniques can allow for the utilisation of censored
observations.
To conclude, this chapter brought in the surface various patterns of waiting
time distributions as both survival and hazard curves dier even when we inves-
tigate the admitting behaviour of one health care provider. Interpreting these
patterns constitutes the aim of the following chapter that develops a theoretical
model on how the hospital manages its waiting list, focusing on the supply side
of healthcare provision. Although we previously emphasised the signicant role
of targets, we are now attempting to examine additional attributes that could
explain specic distributional patterns. One of the main questions we seek to
explore is: How changes in the objective and cost function of the hospital, level
of capacity and budget, demand for elective health care, severity of patients'




A theoretical model of waiting times for
elective surgery
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical model of how a public hospital manages
its stock of patients for elective surgery. It aims at identifying the optimal
waiting time distribution of a hospital given its objective function and the
constraints it faces. Patients that have been referred to clinical physicians by
general practitioners and are eligible for surgery join the NHS waiting lists of the
former. The patients clinical pathway comes to an end when they are admitted
to hospital to receive treatment, after having waited for a period of time. The
focus of the model is on the selection mechanism that the hospital employs
when taking patients out of its list. It is primarily a supply side model that
illustrates the trade-os in the decisions the hospital makes while managing its
waiting lists, given its overall attitude towards admissions and the constraints
it is faced with.
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The closest analyses to this paper come from Iversen (1993), Olivella (2002)
and Siciliani (2006). Although they all develop supply models of health care,
they have quite distinct rationales and raise dierent issues. Yet, none of them
obtain the optimal waiting time distribution of patients, which is the main
contribution of this paper. Iversen (1993) models the long-run equilibrium
of a non-cooperative game between the hospital and the government in an
attempt to understand the mechanism of waiting in the National Health Service
in Norway. According to Inversen, the hospital derives utility when the number
of admissions increases and when the waiting time is reduced and maximises
its objective function subject to its resources that are set by the governments
decision for budget allocation. The government's utility function incorporates
a part that reects its willingness to pay function net of the costs, since it
is nancing the budget of the hospital. He concludes that excessive average
waiting times exist only under a Stackelberg equilibrium1.
Olivella (2002) analyses the consequences of prioritisation in waiting lists
by introducing dierent severity levels of patients' health status. In particular,
he assumes that the actual waiting time of a patient is a function of the average
waiting time and the severity of the patient's health status. Waiting time is
increasing with increases of average waits and can either increase or decrease
with severity, for dierent severity levels. He maximises a utilitarian social
welfare function by minimising the social costs of health care. Three separate
situations are examined in which: (i) the private sector does not exist (ii) the
private sector sets the fees monopolistically and (iii) the public sector regulates
the private fees2.
Siciliani (2006) formulates a dynamic model using optimal control theory to
1Farnworth (2003) builds on Iversen's framework and develops a theoretical model of how
interactions among hospitals that charge dierent prices for health services can determine and
aect the equilibrium expected waiting time. He discovers that, under specic circumstances,
an increase in the price charged to one hospital can lower the waiting time for all.
2Iversen (1997) studies only the latter case under the assumption of zero total prots.
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examine hospitals' incentives within a continuous-time dynamic framework. He
analyses not only the steady state, but also possible optimal paths towards the
steady state. He also considers the eects of exogenous shocks on both demand
and supply of healthcare. The utility function of the hospital is inuenced
by the number of treatments supplied, the current size of the waiting list and
the expected waiting time. Two dierent specications for the formulation of
waiting time are assumed. In the rst case, expectations are myopic and the
waiting time is perceived to be proportional to the waiting list. In the second
case, specialists estimate future supply on the basis of current supply, hence
waiting time is proxied by clearance time. The rst model results in an increase
of supply and waiting list towards the steady-state value given that the initial
waiting list size is lower than the steady-state value. The author also derives
the optimal supply path to reach waiting list targets which depends on the
time horizon. The second reaches similar conclusions given the responsiveness
of demand is low.
The last two papers allow for the interaction between the public and the
private sector while the rst one does not. In Iversen (1993) and Siciliani
(2006), the emphasis is on the hospital decisions on optimal expected waiting
time. However, in Olivella (2002), the focal point lies in the inuence of waiting
times on patients' welfare raising at the same time some prioritisation issues3.
An important aspect of our work is that the emphasis lies on waiting time dis-
tributions, while the existing literature on waiting times utilises average waiting
times only. Dixon and Siciliani (2009) is an exception. Their paper describes
and maps the distribution of patients already treated (HES data) with the dis-
tribution of patients waiting on the list (waiting list returns). At the steady
state, a comparison between the two distributions is performed, under dierent
3A study by Barros and Olivella (2005) develops a supply model of waiting lists for public
hospitals when private doctors are able to select the patients they treat. The authors conclude
that doctors do not necessarily treat the milder cases.
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assumptions on the hazard function, however, the waiting time distributions
are not derived within a model.
Our main contribution is the derivation of the whole waiting time distri-
bution in the maximisation problem. The hospital's optimisation problem is
solved at the steady state and obtains the optimal number of patients admitted
for surgery for every single waiting time. That means that we derive the opti-
mal steady state probability density function of waiting times. On that basis,
we also explore and compare the corresponding survival and hazard functions.
Within this context, we focus on identifying important determinants of the
hospital's admissions patterns, their implications and their connection with the
empirical ndings of the previous two chapters.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides the descrip-
tion of the model, the waiting list and distribution and the hospital's maximi-
sation problem. Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 present the numerical solution and
several comparative statics exercises. We identify, thus, the impact on the hos-
pital's managing of the waiting list of several supply side factors. The inuence
of the introduction of universal waiting time targets is also analysed. The last
section concludes.
4.2 Model
The model has two main elements: a set of patients that are currently waiting
to be treated and the hospital that supplies healthcare. The government will be
introduced through the policy measures it sets up in order to reduce waits and
monitor the hospital's performance (waiting time targets). As already stated,
the focus of the model is on the supply side and in particular on the optimal
behaviour of the hospital while managing its waiting list.
Our model determines the waiting time of each patient treated, allowing us
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to examine the optimal behaviour of the hospital when admitting patients, who
have been waiting dierent periods of time for treatment and pinpoint a set of
important determinants. The two main players of the model, patients currently
waiting to be treated, and the hospital and analysed below.
4.2.1 Patients
There are currently Lt patients in the waiting list. Patients in the waiting
list are characterised by the severity of their disease, denoted by s = 1; 2; :::p,
where s is increasing in severity, and the time they have been in the list, their
waiting time4, or equivalently, their duration, d = 1; 2; :::q. Thus, d denotes the
period elapsed between joining the waiting list of a specialist and admittance
for surgery at the hospital. The minimum possible waiting time is one period
(d = 1) and the maximum time a patient can wait is q. That is, patients do
not wait innitely so that a maximum nite duration exists. Thus, i(s; d) 2 Lt
is one of the patients, at time t, that has been in the stock for duration d with
severity level s. Denote kt the overall number of patients from the list that are
being treated at any period t, hence kt  Lt. The overall number of patients
treated consists of subsets of patients classied according to their duration and
severity levels, kd;s;t; thus k2;1;t shows the number of patients treated at t with
duration two and level of severity one.
We do not explicitly consider the decay in health from waiting. A patients'
severity does not alter with time, and hence with their waiting. In other words,
even if waiting time does cause deterioration to the health status, it does not
make the patient's condition to move to the higher severity level and conse-
quently, s is not a function of d.
The inow of patients in the list, and equivalently, the demand for elective
4The terms `waiting time' and `duration' will be used interchangeably throughout the
chapter.
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health care at the beginning of time t is given by:
xt = f(Et 1(d); Zt)
where Et 1(d) denotes the expected or perceived waiting time based on avail-
able information at t   1, and Zt is a vector of demand factors. These could
include socio-economic conditions and morbidity rates. For example, it is ob-
vious that increased morbidity indexes would lead to a rise in the demand of
health services. Given that the focus of the model is on the supply side, we
treat Zt, which can be viewed as potential demand for health care, as exogenous
and xed. The inow of patients is decreasing in expected duration; the higher
the expected waiting time at the beginning of t, the lower the demand for pub-
lic health care. As standard in the literature5, waiting times act as rationing
devises in order to equilibrate demand and supply, similar to what prices do.
Thus, extensive expected waiting times can reduce demand of elective surgeries,
by discouraging GPs from making referrals and specialists from adding patients
to their lists or encouraging patients to seek private insurance.
We set the inow to be:
xt = Zt   Et 1(d) (4.1)
where Zt is the exogenous level of potential demand for health care and 
denotes the sensitivity of the inow of patients to expected duration. Although
the negative relation between expected duration and inow is not explicitly
modeled here, it can depend on the option of private health care provision. The
expectation formation on waiting time will be formally determined in Section
4.2.3.
5See for instance Cullis et al. (2000), pages 1215-16 and 1229, Goddard et al. (1995), Iversen
(1997), Besley et al. (1999), Martin and Smith (1999), Gravelle et al. (2002), Siciliani and
Hurst (2005) and Siciliani (2006). Section 1.3.2 (pages 32 - 33) in Chapter 1 review empirical
ndings on the elasticity of demand to waiting time.
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4.2.2 Hospital
The utility of the hospital
The hospital's utility for health care provision at any point in time t is given
by






The hospital derives utility from treating patients of distinct severity levels at
dierent durations. g(kd;s;t) denotes the hospital's (monetary or non-monetary)
gain from treating k patients of severity s and duration d. Recall that in our
framework the waiting time (d) is not a choice variable, but it is endogenously
determined. The hospital chooses optimally the number of patients of each
severity and duration at time t, and this choice determines the average waiting
time implicitly.
The properties of the utility function are summarised in the following three
assumptions:
Assumption 1 For a given number of patients treated of the same severity
level (i.e. xed k and s), the higher the waiting time, the lower the hospital's
utility.
That is, the hospital gains more utility from treating today 100 severe patients
that have waited for two months rather than having them waiting for four
months.
g(kd1;s;t) > g(kd2;s;t) where k and s are unchanged and d2 > d1
This implies that the hospital will prefer to treat as many people as possible
faster; and in the relevant literature6 it is equivalent to the assumption that
the more a patient waits the higher are his/hers waiting costs, and thus the
6See Iversen (1993) and Siciliani (2006).
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lower the hospital's utility. This assumption reects the hospital's consideration
of the well-being of the patient (some form of altruism), as well as explicit
benets provided to hospitals by the health care system when times and lists
are managed appropriately.
Assumption 2 For a given number of patients treated of the same duration
(i.e. xed k and d), the higher the severity, the higher the hospital's utility.
That is, treating 100 severe cases that are waiting for two months gives
more utility than treating 100 mild cases that are waiting for two months.
g(kd;s1;t) < g(kd;s2;t) where k and d are the same and s2 > s1
Dierentiating patients according to the severity of their disease allows for
some form of prioritisation, which is reected in the hospital's utility. Similar
to the model here, Olivella (2002) also allows for dierent severity levels in a
continuous manner. The positive utility from more severe cases stems not only
from an assumed altruistic hospital character but in essence from the role of
the hospital per se; to treat the ones that most need it. At this point we should
mention the fact that this view constitutes one of the NHS core principles; good
healthcare available to all with specic goals to meet the needs of everyone, to
be free at the point of delivery and to be based on clinical need, not ability to
pay. Thus, some prioritisation is allowed based on the gravity of the medical
condition of the patients waiting.
Alternatively, assumptions 1 and 2 can be regarded as the benets of pa-
tients from treatment according to their needs (severity of disease and quick
admission). This formulation, in which the benets of the patients enter into
the utility function of the provider, is also present in Ellis (1998) and Ellis and
McGuire (1986).
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Assumption 3 For the same d and s, g(kd;s;t) is concave in kd;s;t 2 [0; k] and
exhibits a turning point.
Thus, up until some point, increasing the number of patients treated (of
the same duration and severity) increases the hospitals' utility. However, from
that threshold level of activity and onwards, the hospital's utility declines as
more patients are treated. The same is assumed for example in Siciliani (2006)
for average waiting time. Assuming otherwise, (i.e. monotonically increasing
utility) could create problems with the management of the list; the hospital
would use up all of its budget and capacity to treat as many patients as possible
within the same period, at the detriment of the remaining patients, whose
treatment would be postponed for much later (due to the lack of adequate
resources). We discuss this feature further while presenting the solution to the
model, and also show the implications of relaxing assumption 3 in Section 4.3.
The cost of the hospital
With respect to the cost of health care provision, we assume that the hospital
is capacity constrained and has a budget allocated for elective surgeries given
by Bt. The hospital's cost from providing health care can be decomposed into
two separable parts:






The rst part is the hospital's scale cost and is denoted by c(kt; k) while the
second is the hospital's duration and severity specic cost and is denoted by
ct(kd;s;t). The former is a function of the overall number of treated patients (kt)
in relation to the limit number of patients, k, the hospital can treat given its
capacity. When Zt > k, the hospital cannot treat all the patients that demand
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elective healthcare at t and thus a waiting list and waiting times emerge7. In
addition, whenever optimal kt > k, the hospital operates above its capacity.
The second part of the cost function is sensitive to the patients' waiting times
and severity levels. Assumption 4 relates to hospital's scale cost and Assump-
tions 5 and 6 to hospital's patient-specic cost.
Assumption 4 Once the capacity limit of the hospital is reached the scale cost,
c(kt; k), is increasing in kt.
Thus, even though the hospital would prefer to treat all its patients immediately
and unless there is a capacity expansion (increase of inputs e.g. more operating
theaters, more clinic space, more beds, more doctors), treating more patients
at t irrespective of their severity or their durations becomes increasingly costly.
This formulation is analysed in more detail in Section 4.3 (pages 160 { 161).
Assumption 5 For the same severity and a given number of treated patients,
treating quicker is more costly.
The duration-specic cost assumes that for the same severity and number of
treatments, cost is deceasing in duration. Thus, treating today 100 patients of a
severity level that have just entered in the list is more costly than treating today
100 patients of the same severity that have been on the list for two months. In
other words, the quicker a patient is treated, the higher the cost for the hospital
and similarly the slower a patient is treated, the lower the cost for the hospital.
We therefore assume that the hospital's cost due to waiting is monotonically
decreasing in duration.
7When Zt < k, the hospital can treat all the patients demanding healthcare will idle
capacity (kt < k), provided that its budget is sucient. In this case, all patients are treated
at t, no waiting list is formed and duration is one for all Lt.
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The relation between average waiting time and the cost of the hospital has
been analysed by a number of contributions. Originated by Iversen (1993) such
a relationship is not necessarily monotonic, some empirical evidence of which is
provided by Siciliani et al. (2009). Inversen argues that for low waiting times,
an increase in duration reduces the provider's cost. However, there might be a
point over which higher levels of duration increase costs. This increase might
be driven by higher administrative and medical resources required to manage
a long waiting list.
In our model, we take under consideration Inversen's rst point by allowing
the hospital's cost to decline in duration. This further implies that it is hard
for the hospital to treat patients quickly or equivalently some waiting allows
the hospital to better time manage the list and its resources. Otherwise, a list
would never be created. The increased costs due to long waits will be intro-
duced in our model distinctly from Iversen (1993). Long waits will be monitored
and `punished' with the implementation of an extra non-smooth cost when we
include the implementation of waiting time targets by the government. The
introduction of such targets, which corresponds to a fundamental health care
policy change will be analysed separately in Section 4.4.2.
Assumption 6 For the same waiting time and a given number of treated pa-
tients, treating more severe cases is more costly.
The severity-specic cost assumes that for the same duration and number of
treatments the cost is increasing in severity. This could be so in terms of both
medical materials and number of personnel and/or hours of work, since a more
severe case might require a more complex treatment and a prolonged length of
stay at the hospital after surgery. The same assumption is supported in both
Ellis's (1998), Olivella's (2002) and Barros and Olivella's (2005) frameworks
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that incorporate patients of dierent severity levels.
Before setting the maximisation problem of the hospital, the following sub-
section analyses the waiting list, the distribution of waiting times and the steady
state framework under which the hospital operates.
4.2.3 Distribution of waiting time and the Steady State
We start by describing the evolution of patients' treatment at a certain hospital
at time t. The variables of interest are the inow, the stock and the outow of
patients of severity s at calendar time t. Denote xs;t the inow, or new arrivals,
to the list of severity s at the beginning of t. kd;s;t is the amount of patients of
severity s that were treated at the end of t and that had waited d periods to be
treated. Note that the minimum possible duration is one period, thus, patients
that enter the list at the beginning of a period and exit at the end of the same
period are said to have duration one8. Lastly, 	d;s;t 1 represents the stock of
patients of severity s that are waiting for d periods at time t and are yet to be
treated.
8In other words we assume that entry to the list takes place only at the beginning of a
period and admission for treatment at the end of a period. So, no one can wait for less than
one period (d = 1).
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The hospital's list at period t
At any point in time t the entire stock of people waiting of severity s is
Ls;t = xs;t (new inow at t)
+ (xs;t 1   k1;s;t 1) (untreated patients from t  1, 	2;s;t 1)
+ (xs;t 2   k1;s;t 2   k2;s;t 1) (untreated patients from t  2, 	3;s;t 1)
+ (xs;t 3   k1;s;t 3   k2;s;t 2   k3;s;t 1) (= 	4;s;t 1)





+ (xs;t (q 1)   k1;s;t (q 1)   k2;s;t (q 2)   :::  k(q 1);s;t 1) (= 	q;s;t 1)
+ (xs;t q   k1;s;t q   k2;s;t (q 1)   :::  kq;s;t 1) = 0
The list, therefore, includes the number of patients that entered at t (xs;t) and
the number of untreated patients from the previous periods (t  1; t  2; :::; t 
(q   1)). In particular, the number of untreated patients from t  1 consists of
the inow of patients at t   1 minus the ones that received treatment at the
end of t   1 (xs;t 1   k1;s;t 1). We set this equal to 	2;s;t 1 which shows the
number of patients on the current list, Ls;t, that have waited for one period and
are currently (at time t) waiting for a second period. Similarly, the number of
untreated patients from t  2, that is, the number of patients currently on the
list that are waiting for at least three periods, is given by the inow of patients
at t 2 minus the ones that received treatment at t 2 and the ones that received
treatment at t  1 (xs;t 2   k1;s;t 2   k2;s;t 1 = 	3;s;t 1). The same stands for
148
the untreated patients from the previous periods (t   3; t   4; :::; t   (q   1)).
Given that q is the maximum duration any patient can wait, the `bottom' of the
list is given by the untreated patients at t that joined the list in time t  (q 1).
These patients, 	q;s;t 1, are waiting for q periods and will be treated at t with
probability one. The last line of (4.3), which is by construction equal to zero,
shows that the untreated patients from t  q were `cleared' in period t  1 after
having waited for the maximum duration.
The waiting list at t can also be expressed as,




For notation simplicity let 	1;s;t 1 = xs;t, then we can write Ls;t =
Pq
d=1	d;s;t 1.
Treating patients at period t
Faced with a waiting list of size Ls;t, the hospital moves towards getting patients
o it to be admitted for surgical treatment. The admittance process is as
follows. Firstly, the hospital will treat k1;s;t patients from the new arrivals;
k1;s;t denotes the number of patients treated at t with waiting time one (d =
1). In addition, the hospital treats k2;s;t from the untreated stock of t   1
(xs;t 1   k1;s;t 1 = 	2;s;t 1). Thus, k2;s;t( 	2;s;t 1) is the number of patients
treated at t with a waiting time of two periods. In the same way, k3;s;t is the
number of patients the hospital treats at t from the untreated stock of t   2
that have waited for three periods, and so on. Schematically, for each duration
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we have:
d = 1 : xs;t   k1;s;t = 	2;s;t
d = 2 : xs;t 1   k1;s;t 1   k2;s;t = 	3;s;t
d = 3 : xs;t 2   k1;s;t 2   k2;s;t 1   k3;s;t = 	4;s;t




d = q   1 : xs;t (q 2)   k1;s;t (q 2)   :::  k(q 2);s;t 1   k(q 1);s;t = 	q;s;t
d = q : xs;t (q 1)   k1;s;t (q 1)   :::  k(q 1);s;t 1   kq;s;t = 0
The total number of patients of severity s that the hospital chooses to treat





Note that the patients treated at t having waited for q periods, kq;s;t, should be
exactly equal to the patients that entered at t  (q 1) and were still untreated
by t  1, 	q;s;t 1. This is shown in the last row of (4.4).
At the end of period t, the untreated stock of patients that will transfer to
next period's (t+1) waiting list will be the sum of 	2;s;t;	3;s;t; :::;	q;s;t. Apart
from this set of patients the t+ 1 waiting list will also include the new arrivals
(xs;t+1). In the same fashion as Ls;t we have:







where as before we set xs;t+1 = 	1;s;t.
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The same evolution of treatments applies for both low and high severity









the overall next period list, including all levels of severity, would be




Finally aggregating for both the severity and duration levels the total number







The distribution of waiting time
Since we have constructed the hospital's waiting list and have described the way
the hospital treats patients, we can now present the waiting time distribution.
In our theoretical model waiting time is modelled as a discrete variable. The
distribution of waiting time depicts the whole spectrum of the relative frequency
of patients having waited distinct periods of time until treatment at t. This is
the probability function (PF) of waiting time, denoted as f(d). Given the fact
that waiting time is discrete, PF is equal to:
f(d) = P (D = d):
Although the PF shows the probability of a patient having waited for d
periods until treatment, the cumulative function (CF) corresponds to the prob-
ability of having waited d periods or less:
F (d) = P (D  d):
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In the waiting time literature, another two representations of the waiting
time distribution are important; the survival function and the hazard function.
The former is dened as the complement of CF, that is S(d) = 1   CF , and
hence it represents the probability that an individual is waiting more than d
periods:
S(d) = P (D > d):
The hazard function, usually denoted as h(d), depicts the probability that
a patient is removed from the list to be treated with waiting time d conditional
on having waited on the list up to that duration. Thus,
h(d) = P (D = djD  d):
The following table describes the PF, the CF, the survival function and the
hazard function of waiting time9.
Table 4.1: Waiting Time Distribution
d f(d) F(d) Survival Function Hazard Function
P (D = d) P (D  d) P (D > d) P (D = djD  d)
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9Appendix A analyses the continuous counterparts of the waiting time distribution, which
were employed in the duration analysis of Chapters 2 and 3.
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The average waiting time of patients














+ :::+ q  kq;t
kt
:
Note that an important distinction of this work is the derivation of the whole
waiting time distribution. This implies that we do not need to relay on any
assumption about the evolution of the waiting list and hence the evolution of
average waiting time. However, we need to determine how expected waiting
time will be formulated at the beginning of time t (i.e. before the actual du-
rations are realised), since the demand for health care (the inow of patients)
takes place at the beginning of time t. Two dierent expectations formations
can be assumed. If individuals are myopic, then expectation formation will be














+ :::+ q  kq;t 1
kt 1
where superscript ME stands for myopic expectations. Expectations are
formed backwards, thus individuals, while deciding whether to enter in the
list assume that the hospital will behave in the future, the same way it behaved
in the past. Perceived average waiting time at the beginning of t is assumed
to be equal to last period's realised average duration. If, on the other hand,
individuals are forward looking, then expectation formation will be rationally















+ :::+ q  kq;t+(q 1)
xt

where superscript RE stands for rational expectations. Here individuals form
expectations on how the hospital will behave in the future and thus on how
the hospital will treat the new cohort of patients that will enter at t. This is
rational formation, since it takes into account that the future service rates of
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the hospital need not be the same as the past ones.
The steady state
It becomes clear that our system is dynamic, since current ows aect future
stocks and ows. As will be seen in the next section, the way the hospital
chooses to treat patients today will have an impact on the future waiting list
and consequently on the future decisions of the hospital. For instance, as shown
in equation (4.5), the t + 1 list depends upon outow decisions at t, which in
turn are inuenced by previous decisions.
Within this dynamic framework we focus on the steady state behaviour of
the hospital, and thus on the steady state waiting time distribution. At the
steady state (i) inow and outow of patients at any given point are equal10,
that is, xt = kt and (ii) the optimal number of patients treated from each
duration and severity (kd;s;t) may depend on the waiting time elapsed between
decision to join a list and actual treatment, but is independent of calendar time
t. Consequently, both the inow and outow of patients are also time-invariant.
Under this condition, the steady state waiting list and the steady state
waiting time distribution are described in Table 4.2. Note that at the steady
state, the survival function shows the proportion of untreated patients for each
waiting time, that is, 	dk =
	d















+ :::+ q  kq
k
; (4.6)
and, since it is time-invariant and k = x it is equivalent for both the myopic
and the rational execrations formation.11
10If for all t, xt > kt the waiting distribution would be explosive.
11The waiting time distribution can also be viewed as the number of periods required in order
to treat current inow, xt. This is how Dixon and Siciliani (2009) construct the distribution
and it is identical to ours at the steady state.
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Table 4.2: Waiting Time Distribution at the Steady State
Duration List PF Survival Function
0 0 0 1
1 x k1k 1  k1k = 	2k
2 x  k1 k2k 1  k1+k2k = 	3k
3 x P2d=1 kd k3k 1  P3d=1 kdk = 	4k
   
   
   
q x Pq 1d=1 kd kqk 0
The main dierences between our theoretical waiting time distributions and
the empirical ones in Chapters 2 and 3, stem from the treatment of time and the
steady state condition. In contrast to the empirical distributions, here, time is
discrete, both in terms of the passage of time and the waiting time (duration).
In other words, entry and exit from the list takes place only at distinct points
in time and the time of wait (duration) is also discrete. Consequently, the
probability, survival and hazard functions here denote the discrete counterparts
of the continuous empirical ones developed in the previous chapters. In addition,
our theoretical model is solved under the steady state condition, in which inow
and outow are equated; an assumption that cannot be made when dealing with
empirical observations.
The main implication of those dierences is on the shape of the hazard
functions. In the theoretical model, since we are at the steady state, and thus
the list clears, the theoretical hazards always reach one. On the contrary this
is never observed with the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates of the HES dataset.
Moreover, the discrete hazard function can be interpreted as a conditional prob-
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ability, while the continuous hazard function cannot.
4.2.4 Hospital's maximisation problem
The hospital maximises its utility function, g(kd;s;t), for the whole spectrum of
















c(kd;s;t) + c(kt)  Bt
0  kd;s;t  	d;s;t 1
xt = Zt   Et 1(d)
d  q
The rst constraint corresponds to the budget constraint of the hospital12.
The second constraint states that the amount of patients of duration d and
severity s treated at time t (kd;s;t) must be between zero and the number of
untreated patients in the list for that duration and severity. In other words,
the number of people selected for treatment at time t cannot exceed the corre-
sponding number of people waiting. Third, the hospital takes the evolution of
patients inow into account, and lastly we impose that the maximum waiting
time is q (set to 36 in the numerical simulations).
At the steady state the number of entries to the list is equal to the number
of patients treated at any point in time (xt = kt) and the optimal kd;s;t are
time-invariant. Consequently, the hospital's maximisation problem becomes:
12Here, unlike in Ellis and McGuire (1986), the budget allocated to the hospital is exoge-
nously given. In the numerical solution (Section 4.3) the budget value is tied to the treatment















c(kd;s;) + c(k)  B
0  kd;s  	d;s
k = Z   E(d)
d  q




s kd;s, the steady state expected duration is dened in




k and 	d;s = ks  
Pd 1
h=1 kh;s. In addition, note
that at the steady state the restrictions that kd;s  	d;s are satised as long as
kd;s are non-negative






















vd;skd;s ++ (Z   E(d)  k)
(4.7)
where  is the lagrangian multiplier of the hospital budget constraint, vd;s is
the lagrange multiplier of the Kuhn-Tucker constraint kd;s  0, and  is the
multiplier for the condition that ensures that the steady state inow and outow
are equal.
Solving the hospital's problem gives rise to 2(ds)+2 Karush{Kuhn{Tucker
(KKT) conditions. For each kh;m where h = 1; 2; :::q and m = 1; 2,
13At the steady state,





































































= Z   E(d)  k = 0









s c(kd; s)) functions, the






















From this we can derive the optimal number of patients of each severity
level treated after having waited d durations as a function of all the structural
parameters (denoted z) of the model, 8fd; sg kd;s = kd;s(z): Although the
rst order conditions can be derived analytically, given the number of KKT
conditions, the maximisation problem is solved numerically in Matlad after the
parameter values are inserted (employing the fmincon command).
4.3 Numerical Solution
The solution to the hospital's problem and the corresponding waiting time
distribution will be obtained numerically under dierent functional forms and
structural parameters of the hospital. Apart from the restrictions implied in
Assumptions 1-6, generally accepted by the literature, empirical information on
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hospital's gain from treatments and their cost structures as function of wait-
ing times is limited. We start by assuming a set of functional forms for the
key elements of the model and then perform a series of comparative statics for
alternative forms. The key empirical data that we use to discuss the appropri-
ateness of each model specication are the waiting time distributions, described
in detail in the previous chapters.




s g(kd;s;t) is a function of (d  s)






d;s + cd;skd;s + e;
where ad;s < 0; bd;s > 0; cd;s > 0 are functions of duration and severity and
e  0 is a constant. Time t is suppressed for simplicity.
This specication fullls Assumptions 1-3 laid out in Section 4.2.2. The
cubic function ensures that g(kd;s) is concave in kd;s 2 [0; k] for a given set
of d; s, which implies that after some threshold level of activity the hospital's
utility declines as the number of patients treated from the same severity and
duration increases. Moreover, the fact that ad;s; bd;s; cd;s depend on duration
and severity allows for a dierentiation of the hospital's utility with regards
to the duration or severity of a given set of patients. For a given number of
treatments with the same severity level, the combined impact of ad;s; bd;s; cd;s
is decreasing in d and for the same waiting time is increasing in severity.
As an illustrative example, Figure 4.1(a) presents the hospital's utility func-
tion from treating up to 250 milder cases with waiting times ranging from 1 to
8 periods. The highest utility curve corresponds to patients treated within the
same period (duration one); up until approximately 180 patients the hospital's
utility is increasing, although after that, the hospital derives disutility from
treating more patients with waiting time of one period. After the indicated
threshold level, the marginal benet from treating an extra patient becomes
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Figure 4.1: Illustrative Example: Hospital's Utility
negative, ensuring that not all of the hospital's resources are used up for the
treatment of very short waiters, at the expense of very long waiters. Similarly,
the second highest curve denotes the utility from treating patients with dura-
tion two, in which case the turning point happens at around 130 patients. It
is clear that for the same number of treatments smaller duration is preferred.
This is ensured by the ad;s; bd;s; cd;s and corresponds to the vertical dierences
across the utility curves. Similarly, as shown in Figure 4.1(b), for the same
waiting time (d = 1), the hospital derives higher utility treating more severe
cases relative to milder ones. In addition, the turning point for s = 2 is more
to the right (around 210 patients) which indicates that the hospital would also
prefer to treat them faster.
In the following subsection, we will allow for two extra functional forms of
the utility function of the hospital g(kd;s;t) and analyse their implications: (a)
a monotonically increasing function with increasing rates (quadratic) and (b)
a monotonically increasing function with decreasing rates (logarithmic).
On the cost side, the hospital is faced with a scale cost, as well as a cost
specic to the duration and severity of each treatment. The scale cost reects
the capacity constraint of the hospital and thus refers to the overall number
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of treatments irrespective of the waiting time or the severity of the treated.
Denoting the full capacity number of patients as k, the scale cost is assumed to
take the following functional form:
c(kt) = (kt   k)2:
Deviations from full capacity are costly for the hospital. This holds the same
for both under and over capacity14. However, note that at the optimum the
hospital would prefer to be operating above its capacity limit, rather than with
idle capacity, since for the same scale cost it is better to treat more patients
rather than less15. The magnitude of this cost is given by parameter  . A
small  implies that operating over capacity is relatively less costly for the
hospital. Similarly, a higher value for  suggests that it is more expensive
for the hospital to operate when capacity constrained. In the later case, for
example, it is relatively more expensive for the hospital to out-source equipment
or personnel.
The default duration and severity specic cost, c(kd;s;t), is set equal to:
c(kd;s;t) = d;skd;s;t:
That is, c(kd;s;t) is linear in kd;s;t and d;s is decreasing in d and increasing in
s for the same number of treatments. Our specication implies that (i) for the
same duration and severity, as the number of treatments increases the cost for
those treatments increases linearly, (ii) for the same severity level and number
of patients treated, the cost at lower durations is higher (i.e.
@d;s
@d < 0) and (iii)
for the same waiting time and number of patients treated, more severe cases
cost most (
@d;s
@s > 0). Subgure 4.2(a) below shows the duration-specic cost
for the rst 8 durations and for up to 300 severe treatments. The highest cost
14Given the quadratic specication, the scale cost is identical for the same positive or
negative deviation from k.
15This holds as long as the budget is ample relative to the treatment-specic cost.
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curve corresponds to treatments with one period of waiting time. In the same
lines, the severity-specic part of the cost function is depicted in Figure 4.2(b)
for xed duration at 2. In the comparative statics below, we allow, amongst
other things, for the duration and severity specic cost to have a quadratic
specication.































Figure 4.2: Illustrative Example: Hospital's Duration and Severity Specic
Costs
Finally, the evolution of inow is given by xt = Zt   Et 1(d). As stated
before, Zt represents potential demand in terms of number of patients and 
the responsiveness of this potential demand to the expected waiting time. We
always ensure that potential demand is greater than the hospital's capacity,
Zt > k, so that the hospital is capacity constrained.
4.4 Comparative Statics I: No severity levels
We start with the simplest case in which patients are not dierentiated by the
severity of their condition and there is no waiting time target. The default
parametarisation and the maximisation problem under the benchmark speci-
cation are depicted in Table 4.3.
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d + cdkd + e Utility from treating k patients with duration
d
where ad =  0:0002 + 0:0001d parameters of the cubic utility function
bd = 0:02  0:01d
cd = 2 +
5
d and e = 0
c(kd;t) = dkd;t Cost from treatments at duration d
where d =
20
d2 parameter of the linear duration cost function
c(k) = (k   k)2 Scale cost of the total number of patients
treated
where k = 900 Hospital's capacity in terms of number of pa-
tients
 = 10 sensitivity of cost to deviations from full ca-
pacity k
B = 7000 Hospital's budget
Z = 1200 Potential demand for healthcare
 = 50 Sensitivity of inow to expected waiting time

















vdkd ++ (Z   E(d)  k)







































= Z   E(d)  k = 0
Table 4.4 shows the number of patients treated from each duration and the
waiting time distribution of the benchmark model. Based on those structural
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parameters, the hospital treats 917 patients (17 patients above its capacity
limit) at the steady state. The optimal maximum waiting time is 13 periods
(q = 13). Thus, q is the `bottom' of the list and the last patients on the
waiting list were treated after having waited for 13 periods (entered the list 12
periods ago). Given that we are at the steady state, this is equivalent to saying
that it takes 13 periods to clear the inow of patients. Average duration is 5.65
periods. One can also see that the number of patients treated is decreasing in
duration; the hospital treats 154.48 patients with duration one, 102.67 patients
with duration two, 86 patients with duration three and so on.
Table 4.4: Benchmark Model - Results
Duration Optimal kd Survival pf Hazard Rate
0 0 1 0
1 154.481 0.83156 0.16844 0.16844
2 102.677 0.71960 0.11196 0.13463
3 86.047 0.62578 0.09382 0.13038
4 76.759 0.54208 0.08370 0.13375
5 70.417 0.46530 0.07678 0.14164
6 65.574 0.39380 0.07150 0.15366
7 61.571 0.32667 0.06714 0.17048
8 58.066 0.26335 0.06331 0.19382
9 54.854 0.20354 0.05981 0.22711
10 51.768 0.14710 0.05645 0.27732
11 48.625 0.09408 0.05302 0.36044
12 45.237 0.04475 0.04932 0.52431
13 41.042 0 0.04475 1
k 917.119 E(d) 5.6576
The mechanisms that drive the hospital to behave in such a way depend
mainly on its utility, cost and inow interactions. The hospital would prefer to
treat as many patients as possible immediately (with duration one), however
this comes at a higher cost. The vertical dierences across utility curves and
duration specic cost curves reect this. Additionally, given the cubic specica-
tion assumed, the turning point in each utility curve for d = 1; 2; :::q serves as a
threshold for the amount of patients selected from each duration. In particular,
this feature restrains the hospital from excessive `front-loading' of treatments.
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Another reason that restricts the hospital from treating too many patients up
front is the impact of a small expected waiting time on future inow. If the list
is cleared quickly, then expected duration will be low and hence a higher num-
ber of patients will demand healthcare in the following period. Therefore, at
the steady state, the hospital also takes into account the impact of its behaviour
on the inow of patients.
Figure 4.3 shows the graphical representations of (a) the probability function
(b) survival function and (c) the hazard function for the benchmark model.






























Figure 4.3: Benchmark Model - Graphs
The probability function, that is the instantaneous probability of receiving
treatment, is declining and becomes zero for duration 14. This shape is due
to the hospital's treating pattern, which admits more patients with shorter
durations. In the second graph, the survival curve starts at one, as all patients
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are waiting to be treated at duration zero; they are all part of the stock. As
the hospital removes people o the list for treatment, the survival function is
monotonically decreasing reaching zero at d = 13. The hazard curve exhibits
a spike at d = 1, and after waiting period two, it increases monotonically until
reaching unity. The observed decline between durations one and two it due
to the largest proportion (0.168) of treatments taking place within the same
period.
The shape of the benchmark theoretical survival curve matches the `typi-
cal' empirical survival function (e.g. see Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2). That is, it is
convex implying that patients are taken o the list as a decreasing function of
waiting time (d)16. On the other hand, as already explained, the main dier-
ence among the theoretical and empirical hazard functions is due to the steady
state condition. In general, the rst spike is observed in both cases, while it is
only the theoretical hazard that then continues increasing until 1.
4.4.1 Changes in the Structural Parameters of the Model
The following subsections present steady state comparative statics under chang-
ing parameters and/or functional specications.
16The degree of convexity is higher (i.e. survival curve closer to the origin) with the intro-
duction of severity levels.
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Changes in the Utility function
We start our analysis by changes in the parameters of the cubic utility speci-
cation. In particular, our rst set of results focuses on increasing, in absolute
terms, the size of ad;s. This implies that the third order term in the utility func-
tion gains in importance which results in (i) the turning point of each u(kd) hap-
pens at a smaller number of treatments, that is, the maximum utility point shifts
to the left for all kd; d = 1; 2; :::; q (ii) the utility level at each kd gets smaller,
i.e. all utility curves shift downwards and (iii) the u(kd) curves for d = 1; 2; :::; q
get closer to each other. Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4 illustrate the optimal number
of patients treated from each duration and selected survival and hazard curves
when ad is changed. Recall that ad =   210000 + 110000d in the benchmark spec-
ication. In the example presented below (absolute) ad is altered by changing









As (absolute) ad increases three patterns of the hospital's behaviour are
apparent; the hospital treats less patients of the rst duration, more patients
of medium durations and less patients of relatively long durations. The overall
number of treatments marginally increases, as average duration decreases. In
addition, when moving from specication (3) to (4) and (5), the long waiters
are eliminated and thus the optimal waiting time to clear the list is reduced
from 13 to 12 periods. A higher cubic term results in a more equal distribution
of treated patients across durations and a quicker clearance waiting time. This
is clearly seen when comparing case (1), in which the cubic term is very weak,
with case (5). In (1) the hospital treats many patients `up front', but then 46
patients are admitted for surgery in duration 36. In column (5), on the other
hand, patients are somehow more equally distributed in 12 durations.
Given the observed substitution of short and long waiters for more treat-
ments at medium durations, the survival functions intersect (see Figure 4.4(a)).
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Table 4.5: Changes in the cubic term of the utility function:
(1) (2) (3) - Bench (4) (5)
d

ad   210000 + 1:510000d   210000 + 1:210000d   210000 + 110000d   210000 + 0:610000d   210000 + 0:310000d
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 235.8466 170.9073 154.4790 131.6770 122.6675
2 112.1458 101.4629 102.6735 100.9167 101.0130
3 88.3879 82.1707 86.0451 88.7859 91.1851
4 76.5333 71.9129 76.7650 81.5564 84.7460
5 69.0047 65.2905 70.4137 76.3871 79.7426
6 63.6013 60.5982 65.5741 72.2755 75.4063
7 59.4561 57.1276 61.5751 68.7540 71.3787
8 56.1264 54.5171 58.0666 65.5722 67.4438
9 53.3747 52.5433 54.8552 62.5752 63.4168
10 51.0297 51.0949 51.7704 59.6394 59.1371
11 0 50.0854 48.6364 56.6653 54.3043
12 0 49.4302 45.2400 53.5491 48.3578
13 0 49.0816 41.0254 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
36 45.7799 0 0 0 0
k 911.286 916.222 917.119 918.353 918.798
E(d) 5.7743 5.6756 5.6576 5.6329 5.6240



































Figure 4.4: Changes in ad (Table 4.5)
Comparing the survival curves for specications (2) and (5), we notice that in
the rst case, the percentage of patients waiting more than two periods is about
70%, although for case (5) it is about 76%. Up until the intersection, the former
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survival curve is closer to the origin implying that more patients are treated
`up front' (until duration 5.5). On the contrary, around 5% of patients are still
waiting for treatment beyond 12 periods in (2), but for case (5) no one is left
untreated, since q = 12. With regard to the hazard functions, the most notice-
able decrease between durations one and two is observed for case (2), since it
is in this case that the largest number of patients gets treated within the same
period.
As the (absolute) magnitude of the cubic term gets weaker, the utility from
treating patients in the rst durations gets larger. Thus, the hospital strongly
prefers to treat patients as quickly as possible. However, given its cost structure
and budget, this can be achieved at the expense of very long waiters. This
behaviour also ensures that future inow is restrained (through higher average
waiting times) and a steady state distribution is attainable.
Table 4.6: Changes in ad - approaching zero
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
d

ad Bench 0:8ad 0:5ad 0:35ad 0:2ad
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 154.4812 168.4779 221.3891 263.0500 248.9558
2 102.6771 111.3854 153.4201 199.9500 279.4706
3 86.0469 92.4839 130.7895 177.9600 268.5102
4 76.7595 81.8446 118.0173 165.5900 0
5 70.4167 74.6426 109.3474 0 0
6 65.5741 69.3091 102.8531 0 0
7 61.5711 65.0947 0 0 0
8 58.0661 61.6785 0 0 0
9 54.8541 58.8270 0 0 0
10 51.7684 56.4072 0 0 0
11 48.6248 54.3782 0 0 0
12 45.2369 0 0 0 0
13 41.0424 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
36 0 21.5534 75.2341 97.1230 104.6517
k 917.1193 916.0826 911.0507 903.6730 901.5883
E(d) 5.6576 5.6783 5.7790 5.9265 5.9682
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As shown in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5, decreasing (absolute) ad further away
from the benchmark, the waiting time distributions become more unequal and
the survival functions obtain distinct steps. For example, in specication (5),
88% of patients are treated within the rst three durations, and the rest leave
the list after having waited the maximum possible time (36 periods).




























Figure 4.5: As ad approaches zero (Table 4.6)
Changes in the linear term of the utility function
In general, as cd increases the turning point of the utility curves shifts towards
the right for all kd; d = 1; 2; :::; q, all utility curves shift upwards and the vertical
distances between the u(kd) curves for dierent durations increase. Table 4.7
and Figure 4.6 illustrate the optimal number of patients treated from each du-
ration and selected survival and hazard curves when cd is changed. Recall that
cd = 2 +
5
d in the benchmark specication. As cd increases the overall number
of treatments decreases17 and average waiting time goes up. The percentage of
17This does not hold for case (1). Note that for this specication, the hospital is not using
all of its budget.
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Table 4.7: Changes in the linear term of the utility function:
Optimal kd at Steady State
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dncd 0:45cd 0:8cd cd 2cd 4cd 5cd
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 128.3336 147.4386 154.4812 198.5575 257.4583 273.5851
2 94.6469 101.2871 102.6771 124.0844 153.9678 164.4531
3 84.6172 86.7711 86.0469 99.3437 117.8449 125.1002
4 79.0586 78.6071 76.7595 85.2973 96.3200 101.2245
5 75.1512 72.8971 70.4167 75.6574 80.6091 83.4923
6 72.0150 68.3509 65.5741 68.3352 67.4907 68.2875
7 69.2773 64.4164 61.5711 62.3771 54.7588 0
8 66.7484 60.7795 58.0661 57.2937 0 0
9 64.3171 57.2270 54.8541 52.7317 0 0
10 61.9047 53.5839 51.7684 48.4472 0 0
11 59.4361 49.5733 48.6248 0 0 0
12 56.8616 44.6784 45.2369 0 0 0
13 0 31.9083 41.0424 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 0 35.8577 41.2901
36 0 0 0 41.7161 43.2633 46.9872
k 912.3679 917.5189 917.1193 913.8414 907.5705 904.4201
E(d) 5.7526 5.6496 5.6576 5.7232 5.8486 5.9116
patients treated up front (short periods of wait) increases, while very long wait-
ers start to accumulate. The lists are lengthened. The hospital, thus, creates
more asymmetrical waiting time distributions which are characterised by more
`front loading', but at the same time by long tails to the right. On the contrary,
when the linear term is quite small, we see a more balanced admissions pattern
within 12-13 periods of wait.
Looking at the survival curves, specications (1) and (3) intercept at around
d = 8. It is obvious that as cd increases the hospital admits quicker the short
waiters by delaying the admittance of long waiters. In specications (4) and (5)
the survival curves have shifted greatly towards the origin (quicker admittance
rates for durations 7 and 10 respectively), but a long tail persists that would
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eventually reach zero at the maximum allowed duration (d = 36). Regarding
the graph of the hazard functions, there is a small decline of the hazard between
durations 1 and 2 (the largest number of patients are treated at period 1) after
which it increases and reaches 1 at the relevant q. Note that the hazard curve
for case (5) reaches 0 for duration 7, remains as such for another 28 periods and
nally becomes 1 at period 36 when the last 43 patients are treated. Although
not presented here, similar trade-os are observed when we alter the quadratic
term (bd) of the utility function.






























Figure 4.6: Changes in cd (Table 4.7)
Hence, varying the hospital utility allow us to obtain two distinctive types of
waiting lists attesting to the exibility of the theoretical model developed here.
In one case hospitals `front load', treating many patients as quickly as possible
at the detriment of a small fraction that is forced to wait for long periods or
in the other, the hospital selects a smooth waiting list distribution where most
people have to wait for more than 2 periods but no patients is forced to wait
for long periods of time.
We now briey present the steady state waiting time distributions in the
cases where the utility function is (a) quadratic, U(kd) = bdk
2
d + cdkd + e and
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(b) logarithmic, U(kd) = dlog(kd) + g, both depicted in Figure 4.7.


























Figure 4.7: Quadratic and Logarithmic Utility specications
With a quadratic utility function the steady state distribution becomes as
follows: the majority of people are treated within the same period and the rest
of people receive treatment at the largest possible duration (here 36). Why is
this the case? Since the quadratic utility curves have no turning point and since
u(k1) is always the highest, the hospital treats as many patients as possible with
duration one (given the costs and the capacity it faces). However, once this is
done, the remaining of patients are treated at the maximum possible waiting
time, since this is the only way to maintain a steady state average waiting
time and inow. Consequently, the survival graph becomes a one step function,
since 780 patients are treated with duration one, and the rest 126 after having
waited for 36 periods. On the contrary, a logarithmic utility function results in
a very smooth waiting time distribution, in which the hospital treats patients
in each duration. Again, the number of treated patients is decreasing in d, with
more treated up front, however, as the utility curves are now increasing at a
decreasing rate (with no turning point), sucient utility is obtained even when
a small number of patients, kd, is admitted from each d.
These two functional form assumptions serve as the two extremes of the
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hospital behaviour discussed above, highlighting the trade-o in place. On the
one hand, hospitals have an incentive to `front load', treat as many patients
in the rst few periods. On other hand hospitals must ensure that they can
deal with the current inow under a control waiting list. Therefore, if the rst
incentive is strong enough (quadratic) survival functions become a step func-
tion otherwise when utility gains do not change as dramatically with duration,
survival functions are very smooth (logarithmic).
Changes in the duration specic cost function
The benchmark duration-specic cost function is dkd, with d = 20=d
2. The
hospital's budget constraint has two distinct cost parts. The allocation of the
budget is thus driven by (i) the number of patients that can be accommodated
beyond its capacity, k (scale cost) and (ii) how quickly or slowly the patients
(up until k) can be taken o the list (duration specic cost). It is plausible to
assume that a dierent cost structure and/or capacity imply a dierent budget.
The benchmark budget (7000) has been set proportionally to those two costs
(average unit cost (d) times capacity). Here, for the purpose of comparative
statics, we will be changing the hospital's duration specic cost for a xed
budget.











. The cost is increased without altering the vertical dier-
ences across the cost curves for d = 1; 2; :::; q. That is, the cost of treating one
patient with d = 2 is always 1=4 of the cost for d = 1, the cost of one treatment
with duration three is 1=9 of the cost for d = 1 and so on. As shown in Table
4.8, increases in the duration related cost, force the hospital to treat a smaller
overall number of patients. Since we are at the steady state, this translates
both into a smaller outow and inow of patients and a higher average dura-
tion. When d is set to
60
d2
the hospital admits 900 patients, and beyond that
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Table 4.8: Changes in Duration - specic cost, d - scenario A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dnd 20d2 40=d2 60=d2 80=d2 120=d2 140=d2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 154.4790 126.2565 65.0407 32.0208 0 0
2 102.6735 96.3698 100.0166 107.1027 111.3901 66.3736
3 86.0451 83.8812 94.5169 102.4093 107.4771 113.4318
4 76.7650 76.2876 89.0702 96.7338 102.2487 116.4574
5 70.4137 70.8878 84.2797 91.3367 97.2365 112.9873
6 65.5741 66.6642 79.9049 86.1202 92.4303 107.1499
7 61.5751 63.1327 75.7371 80.8972 87.6852 99.8770
8 58.0666 60.0316 71.6095 75.4715 82.8624 91.2815
9 54.8552 57.1950 67.3731 69.6123 77.8273 80.9324
10 51.7704 54.4996 62.8597 62.9372 72.3969 67.4743
11 48.6364 51.8371 57.8218 54.5908 66.3120 41.2621
12 45.2400 49.1159 51.7281 39.5397 0 0
13 41.0254 46.1696 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0
k 917.12 902.33 899.95 898.78 897.87 897.23
E(d) 5.6576 5.9534 6.0008 6.0246 6.0427 6.0554P
c(kd)=B 0.5813 0.9923 0.999 0.9978 0.9935 0.9890
cost, it operates marginally bellow capacity. In eect all the budget is allocated
to the duration specic cost (last row in Table 4.8). Regarding the waiting time
distributions we mainly observe a reduction in the number (and proportion) of
patients treated with very short waiting times. Since, the unit cost for `up
front' treatments is increased, the hospital postpones the quick admissions for
later on. In fact, after specication (2) k1 is drastically decreased and becomes
zero for the last two columns. Due to this, we also observe a reverse in the
number of treatments as duration increases. This behaviour is depicted in the
survival functions, with the curvature shifting from convex to concave for short
durations. The survival curves (1) and (3) of Figure 4.8 intersect around d = 7,
with the benchmark survival being closer to the origin up until that point. For
specication (5) less patients are (cumulatively) waiting for treatment after the
intersection, and the list is cleared at a lower duration (q = 11).
In the following comparative exercise (scenario B), we compare the hospital's
175
















Figure 4.8: Changes in d - Scenario A (Table 4.8)



















In this way, we change the vertical dierences across the cost curves for dierent
durations. Note that for d = 1, the unit cost of treatment is always the same
for all specications and equal to 20. As the power of d decreases, the vertical
dierences in the cost functions decrease as the c(kd) for d = 2; 3; 4::: get closer
to the cost curve for d = 1 (i.e. the cost curves are now higher and get closer
to the top one). Thus, when d =
20
d2
, c(kd) decreases very fast as d increases,
although in the case where d =
20
d0:6
, the cost is decreasing slowly, which
implies a relatively high unit cost for treating patients with medium, as well as
short, durations. The unit cost for the rst 10 durations for those two cases is
presented below.
18Note that a steady state waiting time distribution cannot be obtained for powers lower
than 0.6, unless the hospital's budget is increased.
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Cost of one treatment for durations 1 to 10
dnd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
20
d2 20 5 2.22 1.25 0.80 0.56 0.41 0.31 0.25 0.20
20
d0:6 20 13.20 10.35 8.71 7.61 6.83 6.22 5.74 5.35 5.02
Table 4.9: Changes in Duration Specic Cost, d - scenario B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
dnc(kd) 20d4 kd 20d2 kd 20d kd 20d0:8 kd 20d0:7 kd 20d0:65 kd 20d0:6
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 155.47 154.4812 150.0629 140.22 95.0348 57.0160 7.3750
2 103.82 102.6771 98.6871 93.864 84.9860 87.6120 98.5508
3 87.02 86.0469 82.3820 79.647 83.3582 92.0918 103.7143
4 77.636 76.7595 73.4491 72.077 81.8523 92.3116 103.7342
5 71.187 70.4167 67.5425 67.131 80.0004 90.6354 101.4706
6 66.238 65.5741 63.2104 63.535 77.7817 87.7783 97.7656
7 62.107 61.5711 59.8411 60.736 75.2015 83.9948 92.9022
8 58.438 58.0661 57.1134 58.437 72.2477 79.3210 86.8986
9 55.023 54.8541 54.8304 56.464 68.8785 73.6404 79.5329
10 51.681 51.7684 52.8665 54.711 64.9986 66.5824 70.1962
11 48.165 48.6248 51.1496 53.118 60.4339 57.0834 56.8056
12 44.177 45.2369 49.6465 51.663 54.7698 31.1057 0
13 38.349 41.0424 48.2915 50.261 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k 919.31 917.12 909.07 901.8640 899.54 899.17 898.95
E(d) 5.6138 5.6576 5.8185 5.9628 6.0091 6.0165 6.0211
% Dur Cost 0.467 0.581 0.882 0.995 1.000 0.999 0.998
When the duration-specic cost increases in this way, the hospital treats less
and less patients overall, reaching its capacity level while average waiting time
increases. In addition, the duration required to clear the list gradually decreases
from 13 to 11 periods and in general less patients are treated within the same
period. In line with Scenario A, as the duration specic cost rises, the hospital
is allocating almost all its budget to it. The last two columns of Table 4.9
exhibit a dierent admittance behaviour. The duration-specic cost curves are
all close to the top one (c(k1)), which implies that it is relatively more costly to
treat signicant amount of patients in the rst few periods of wait. As a result,
the hospital starts by treating only a few patients within one period (only 7.3 in
the last case) and continues with increased number of treatments up until d = 4,
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treating 14% less patients in the rst 3 periods comparing to the benchmark
case. After that, the decreasing feature of the cost structure induces the hospital
to adopt the `typical' admittance pattern in which the number of treatments
decreases with duration. In Figure 4.9(a), survival curve 7 moves further away


























Figure 4.9: Changes in d - Scenario B (Table 4.9)
from the origin until d = 6. This indicates a slower admittance rate relative to 4
for small waiting times. After the intersection, the admittance rates for higher
d are increased. Due to an increasing number of treated patients for durations
one to four, the survival function 7 starts o decreasing at a decreasing rate,
and it then exhibits a change in curvature. Similarly, the hazard function is
now monotonically increasing, with a noticeable increase between durations 1
and 2. Thus, the `usual' spike in d = 1 is not observed in this case.
Once again, the model proves to be quite exible in accounting for dierent
patterns of waiting time distributions. In altering the relative cost of duration
specic treatment we highlight the trade-os the hospital faces. When costs
of early treatments are relatively high, the incentive to `front load' diminishes
leading to an initially concave survival function. This pattern is strongly rein-
forced when a quadratic duration cost specication is used, as shown next.
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Quadratic Cost Function
We now turn to examine the case in which the duration specic cost of the
hospital is quadratic, c(kd;t) = dk
2
d;t. Due to the quadratic term, the share of
the duration specic cost in the hospital's budget is considerably greater, thus,
the budget is increased now to 30,000 and the unit cost is decreased to 1=d2.
Selected comparative statics are depicted in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.10. With
Table 4.10: Changes in d - Quadratic Cost Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d n dk2d 1d2 k2d 2d2 k2d 4d2 k2d 6d2 k2d 7d2 k2d 8:5d2 k2d
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 141.99 101.32 55.640 29.469 20.833 9.1729
2 103.83 98.023 89.242 71.610 58.794 32.174
3 89.450 89.818 93.320 92.164 87.781 63.162
4 81.141 83.650 91.191 97.538 99.889 94.644
5 75.391 78.832 87.620 97.024 102.92 119.37
6 70.976 74.831 83.582 93.927 101.50 133.27
7 67.314 71.314 79.277 89.387 97.592 135.46
8 64.122 68.082 74.700 83.768 91.959 126.21
9 61.225 65.006 69.746 77.063 84.781 104.74
10 58.479 61.983 64.200 68.914 75.791 65.349
11 55.786 58.906 57.637 58.169 63.880 0
12 53.092 55.685 48.790 28.417 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0
k 922.80 907.45 894.95 887.45 885.72 883.55
E(d) 5.544 5.851 6.101 6.251 6.286 6.329
a higher quadratic cost, the hospital treats a smaller overall number of patients
at a higher average waiting time. Thus, as the unit cost progressively increases,
lesser patients are treated quickly (with waiting of one or two periods) and
from specication (3) and onwards the number of treatments is increasing in
d for small durations. However, the clearance waiting time (q) remains the
same until case (4), and it actually decreases at high d levels. This could be
attributed to the smaller number of overall treatments. The above mentioned
admittance pattern is also reected in the shapes of the survival and hazard
functions. Apart from the rst survival curve (dotted line) in Figure 4.10, all
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Figure 4.10: Changes in d - Quadratic Cost Function (Table 4.10)
others start o further away from the origin and are concave for short durations.
That is, the number of patients still waiting for treatment is decreasing, but at
a decreasing rate. The shift in the curvature takes place at higher durations as
d increases. The survival curves intersect. Thus, for instance, at d = 3, 63.6%
of patients are still waiting to be treated in case (1), while 88.1% are waiting in
case (6). However, at d = 8 (after the intersection) the reverse holds; 24.7% are
still on the list for (1) against 19.2% for case (6). Similarly, the hazard curves
for specications (3), (5), (6) are always increasing.
Concave survival functions are also observed empirically, especially at a
disaggregate level. For example, in the specialty of ophthalmology (and in par-
ticular the operation of lens prosthesis) of Birmingham Hospital the concavity
of the survival function is clear.
Changes in the budget of the hospital
Table 4.11 and Figure 4.11 illustrate the optimal number of patients treated
from each duration and the relevant survival and hazard curves when the hos-
pital has a higher budget, B, at its disposal. By increasing the budget of the
hospital, we observe an increase in the total inow (xt) and outow of patients
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(kt) and a quicker list clearance (q
 gets smaller). At the same time, the ex-
pected waiting time decreases. Ceteris paribus, with a bigger budget for elective
surgery, the hospital has the opportunity to both treat above its capacity (scale)
and to manage the (larger) list quicker.
Table 4.11: Changes in Budget - Optimal kd at Steady State
Lists Proportions (PF)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dnB 3150 7000 10500 20000 30000 3150 7000 10500 20000 30000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 109.081 154.481 155.691 164.198 168.299 0.121 0.168 0.168 0.175 0.177
2 96.490 102.677 103.776 111.424 115.479 0.107 0.112 0.112 0.119 0.121
3 86.600 86.047 87.477 94.821 99.054 0.096 0.094 0.095 0.101 0.104
4 79.839 76.759 78.643 85.405 89.755 0.089 0.084 0.085 0.091 0.094
5 74.654 70.417 72.822 78.695 83.114 0.083 0.077 0.079 0.084 0.087
6 70.329 65.574 68.598 73.254 77.698 0.078 0.072 0.074 0.078 0.082
7 66.476 61.571 65.299 68.428 72.883 0.074 0.067 0.071 0.073 0.077
8 62.859 58.066 62.599 63.841 68.314 0.070 0.063 0.068 0.068 0.072
9 59.311 54.854 60.330 59.211 63.728 0.066 0.060 0.065 0.063 0.067
10 55.676 51.768 58.376 54.199 58.863 0.062 0.056 0.063 0.058 0.062
11 51.726 48.625 56.618 48.190 53.331 0.057 0.053 0.061 0.051 0.056
12 47.097 45.237 55.047 37.832 0 0.052 0.049 0.059 0.040 0.000
13 40.359 41.042 0 0 0 0.045 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k 900.50 917.12 925.28 939.50 950.52 E(d) 5.99 5.65 5.49 5.21 4.98
% c(kd) 0.999 0.581 0.392 0.218 0.149
Moving from the benchmark budget, (2), to (4) more patients with dura-
tions d = 1; 2; :::; 10 are admitted for treatment and the long waiters of dura-
tion 13 are eliminated. Despite the fact that the hospital now treats 23 more
patients, it does so quicker (q = 12) and at a lower average waiting time.
Comparing specications (3) and (4), where q stays the same at 12 periods,
the hospital decides to treat a greater proportion of patients with d = 1; 2; :::; 8
while reducing the proportion of admitted people from the remaining periods.
This behaviour reveals that increased budgets permit the hospital to reduce the
number of people waiting a lot and admit more patients quickly. Increasing the
budget beyond 30,000 is not aecting the steady state waiting time distribu-
tion. Given the xed cost structure and capacity, the hospital cannot absorb
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the excess funds (thus, the budget constraint holds strictly as an inequality).
For the list to get shorter, we need to increase the hospital's capacity in line
with the budget. This result indicates that policies aimed at improving hospital
performance as regards waiting lists, must account for both types of investment,
namely, monetary budget (ow) and capacity (stock).






























Figure 4.11: Changes in the hospital's budget (Table 4.11)
The more funds the hospital has for elective surgery, the more the survival
curves shift towards the origin without intersecting (Figure 4.11(a)). The ad-
mittance rates for treatment get greater throughout. The list also clears earlier,
shown by the fact that they reach the x axis at 13, 12 and then 11 periods.
Regarding the hazards, with the exception of a small decline between d = 1
and d = 2 (this is the case because, in all specications, the hospital admits
the larger number of patients for d = 1), they are all monotonically increasing
and shifting to the left. As the list is gradually getting empty, the probability
of treatment given still on the list gets bigger.
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Changes in the scale capacity of the hospital
We continue our analysis with changes in the specication of the hospital's
scale cost, c(k) = (k   k)2, both in terms of numbers of patients (k) and the
sensitivity to deviations from full capacity ().
Changes in capacity (k)
As expected, steady state outow (inow) and expected waiting times are very
responsive to the hospital's capacity. As k increases, the optimal waiting time
to clear the list q decreases drastically, and the hospital treats more and more
patients at shorter durations (Table 4.12). When capacity approaches the po-
tential demand for health care (Z set at 1200), the distribution should eventu-
ally get eliminated19.
For relatively low capacity levels (below the benchmark case), long waiters
at the bottom of the list are showing up. The hospital is heavily constrained,
and given potential demand, attempts to restrain inow by increasing expected
waiting time, which for k = 700 is almost 10 periods.
As shown in Figure 4.12, with increased capacity, the survival curves move
closer to the origin and reach the x axis quicker. Similar patterns are observed
for the hazard curves. Specication (2) (dotted line) is an exception, since it
stays to the left of the benchmark curve until they intersect at d = 11. The ad-
mittance rate is higher due to the smaller overall treatments (100 patients less).
19Given that the hospital's funds are in line with its high capacity and duration costs. Recall
that here, for comparative statics reasons, the budget is xed. That is why, when capacity is
increased a lot, the hospital operates below capacity, since its budget is insucient.
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Table 4.12: Changes in Scale Cost: k
(1) (2) (3)-Bench (4) (5)
dnk 700 800 900 980 1050
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 148.990 149.791 154.479 174.033 232.567
2 97.083 97.972 102.673 121.634 206.351
3 80.017 81.017 86.045 105.555 182.870
4 70.446 71.530 76.765 96.455 160.426
5 63.985 65.137 70.414 89.943 136.109
6 59.182 60.360 65.574 84.610 106.131
7 55.399 56.601 61.575 79.865 18.235
8 0 53.487 58.067 75.368 0
9 0 50.835 54.855 70.912 0
10 0 48.522 51.770 66.295 0
11 0 0 48.636 0 0
12 0 0 45.240 0 0
13 0 0 41.025 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0
34 46.978 0 0 0 0
35 47.566 40.867 0 0 0
36 48.131 41.475 0 0 0
k 717.78 817.60 917.12 964.67 1042.69
E(d) 9.644 7.648 5.658 4.707 3.146








































Figure 4.12: Changes in k (Table 4.12)
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Changes in 
Recall that  denotes how costly it is for the hospital when deviating from its full
capacity. As  increases, there is a decline in the overall number of treatments
Table 4.13: Changes in Scale Cost: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dn 0.5 5 Bench 50 100
1 2 3 4 5
d 0.5 5 10 50 100
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 169.712 153.956 154.481 151.145 150.384
2 116.735 103.217 102.677 98.547 97.508
3 100.211 87.161 86.047 81.636 80.506
4 90.760 78.454 76.759 72.394 71.268
5 83.916 72.723 70.417 66.342 65.306
6 78.257 68.576 65.574 62.024 61.152
7 73.136 65.364 61.571 58.799 58.163
8 68.186 62.754 58.066 56.327 55.997
9 63.103 60.573 54.854 54.413 54.451
10 57.549 58.719 51.768 52.935 53.394
11 50.846 57.075 48.625 51.814 52.731
12 0 55.621 45.237 50.996 52.387
13 0 0 41.042 50.421 52.288
14 0 0 0 0 0
k 952.410 924.193 917.119 907.794 905.534
E(d) 4.952 5.516 5.658 5.844 5.889
and an expansion in both the clearance of the list and average waiting time, E(d)
(Table 4.13). Since it gets costlier for the hospital to operate above capacity,
the overall number of treatments approaches 900 patients. Overall, a higher 
leads to a smaller number (and percentage) of patients treated quicker, at short
durations up until d = 7 and there are more long waiters.
As depicted in Figure 4.13, the survival and hazard curves move propor-
tionally further away from the origin.
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Figure 4.13: Changes in  (Table 4.13)
To sum up, when the budget or the scale cost structure of the hospital
is altered, the corresponding response is an overall change in the admittance
patterns. In particular, when the budget, capacity or the ability to operate
above capacity are increased, the survival curves shift inwards, closer to the
origin, and the hazard function shift upwards, reaching one faster. Therefore,
the scale empirical dierences observed when comparing the estimated survivals
across dierent hospitals or specialities could be attributed to dierences in the
above mentioned parameters of the trust.
4.4.2 Waiting Time Targets
The waiting time target is imposed at an individual level, `no patient should
wait more than bd periods since he/she is added to the list', and is incorporated
to our model in the cost function of the hospital, Ct, as an extra steep cost at
the limit of the target. Denoting the targeted duration as bd, then the extra cost
faced by the hospital is:
ec(d) =
8><>: 0 if d 
bd
dkd;s if d > bd
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Two are the important characteristics of our target structure: how restric-
tive the waiting target is (given by the level of bd), and the magnitude of the
cost/punishment when the target is breached (ec(bd)).
The rst waiting time target we are introducing in the benchmark speci-
cation is a 12 period target; this indicates that no one should wait more than
12 periods until admittance for hospital treatment. In other words, the waiting
time to clear the list should be q = 12, although without the target the bench-
mark steady state clearance waiting time is 13 periods (Column (1) in Table
4.14). For waiting times above bd = 12 we start by assuming that d is at and
independent of duration, meaning that the unit cost from breaching the target
is the same irrespective of the duration at which the `long' waiters are treated.
Table 4.14: Optimal kd - Changes in the penalty of a target at 12 periods
(1)-Bench (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d nd 0 5 10 20 30 50
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 154.4812 153.9767 153.4176 151.3251 150.9161 150.2007
2 102.6771 102.2808 101.8348 100.2629 99.9077 99.2741
3 86.0469 85.6767 85.2890 84.1744 83.8453 83.2729
4 76.7595 76.4430 76.1077 75.6485 75.3814 74.9038
5 70.4167 70.1717 69.9334 70.3173 70.1210 69.7870
6 65.5741 65.4184 65.2958 66.7112 66.6173 66.4662
7 61.5711 61.5332 61.5549 64.1887 64.2155 64.2793
8 58.0661 58.1807 58.3886 62.4078 62.5636 62.8640
9 54.8541 55.1606 55.6029 61.1587 61.4510 61.9989
10 51.7684 52.3209 53.0535 60.3044 60.7417 61.5388
11 48.6248 49.5179 50.6211 59.7590 60.3409 61.3825
12 45.2369 46.6442 48.2648 59.4528 60.1763 61.4559
13 41.0424 39.2652 36.7460 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 0 1.5387 1.0048 0
k 917.12 916.59 916.11 917.25 917.28 917.42
E(d) 5.658 5.668 5.678 5.655 5.654 5.652
As seen is Table 4.14, when the target is introduced and the penalty from
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breaching it is not costly enough, the hospital starts by reducing the number
of patients waiting at d = 13 (by increasing the admittance of patients in the
durations before the targeted one). As the penalty from treating patients after
having waited for 12 periods gets heavier, the hospital sets k13 equal to zero,
but a couple of patients are left for treatment at the bottom of the list. Finally,
for d = 50 and above, the target is met. Although the overall number of
treatments and expected duration are very much in line with the pre-target
levels, the two waiting time distributions are distinct. Comparing columns
(1) and (6), a trade-o between short and longer waiters is present; with a
high penalty for treatments beyond the 12th period, the hospital is reducing
the number of patients treated quickly, up until duration ve, postponing the
treatments for subsequent periods. The biggest increases in numbers of patients
are observed in the periods right before the waiting time target. Finally, the
41 patients treated in (1) after waiting for 12 periods are eliminated in (6).
What happens when the target gets more stringent in terms of the waiting
time? Table 4.15 depicts the hospital's response when the waiting time target
is reduced to 11 periods. Here, the hospital is, ceteris paribus, asked to treat
86 patients quicker. The process of reaching target gets clearer. At low penalty
levels, the hospital gradually reduces the number of patients previously waiting
for more than 11 periods (k12; k13). As the penalty of breaching the target
gets more sizeable, the hospital starts the process of eliminating the `breached'
waiters. However, this is done by creating a very long tail (treatments at the
bottom of the list). This way, average waiting time is increased and overall
treatments are lowered. The patients with d = 13 are eliminated rst and
then the ones that waited for 12 periods. When the cost becomes suciently
high (d = 350), the longest possible waiters are eliminated and the target is
reached.
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Table 4.15: Optimal kd - Changes in d for a target at 11 periods
(1)-Bench (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dnd 0 10 20 30 50 200 350
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 154.481 152.377 149.418 151.027 154.163 143.779 140.675
2 102.677 101.071 98.9741 100.713 103.551 95.3737 92.2389
3 86.0469 84.5882 82.7928 84.8542 87.8870 81.0117 78.4098
4 76.7595 75.5039 74.0738 76.4493 79.6936 74.6669 73.0670
5 70.4167 69.4379 68.5165 71.1991 74.5861 71.9036 71.5471
6 65.5741 64.9628 64.6670 67.6418 71.1136 71.0848 72.0047
7 61.5711 61.4334 61.8929 65.1367 68.6386 71.3932 73.5101
8 58.0661 58.5197 59.8721 63.3486 66.8300 72.3675 75.5618
9 54.8541 56.0346 58.4074 62.0776 65.4945 73.7357 77.8857
10 51.7684 53.8564 57.3600 61.1942 64.5093 75.3344 80.3324
11 48.6248 51.8920 56.6229 60.6094 63.7910 77.0638 82.8222
12 45.2369 43.9444 40.1972 40.2263 0 0 0
13 41.0424 41.0311 39.3670 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 0 8.0352 14.5387 6.2070 0
k 917.119 914.652 912.161 912.512 914.797 913.921 918.055
E(d) 5.658 5.707 5.757 5434.572 5.704 5.722 5.639
%DurC 0.5813 0.693312 0.788721 0.776367 0.687224 0.723142 0.534304
The following graphs show the hospital's successful behaviour as the waiting
time target gets more rigid for the same at penalty set at  = 2000. We show
the survival and hazard curves for the pre-target case together with the cases
where the target is set at 11, 9 and nally 7 periods.
Once again we see how the hospital is managing to reach the ever restrictive
targets. The trade-o between shorter and longer waiters is also apparent in the
survival curves. Survival curves (1) and (2) have similar shapes and intercept
at about d = 8 and. (1) and (3) intersect at about 6 periods, and the two trade
o areas are already bigger. Up until d = 6, the cumulative admittance rate
is higher for the pre-target case (1), although the opposite occurs afterwards.
For example, the percentage of patients waiting on the list for more than two
periods is 72% for (1), although it is about 83% for case (3). On the contrary,
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  No Target   (1)
Target at 11 (2)
Target at 9   (3)
Target at 7  (4)
(a) Survival Functions













  No Target   (1)
Target at 11 (2)
Target at 9   (3)
Target at 7  (4)
(b) Hazard Functions
Figure 4.14: Changes in the waiting time target - at penalty
the percentage of patients still on the list after 8 periods is 26% for (1) and only
15.2% for (3). In the latter, no one is waiting more than 8 periods. Moreover,
in the three periods prior to the 8 period target, the hospital treats 394 patients
or about 42% of the total admissions, but with no target the hospital treats half
the amount. In survival curve (4) the waiting time target is set at 7 periods,
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and the hospital manages its list, by having no treatments from durations one
and two (i.e. the minimum waiting time for all patients is 3), 71 patients of
waiting time three, 155 from d = 4, and the rest 698 patients treated in the
last three periods prior to the targeted level. The curve starts o very far away
from the origin and is decreasing at a decreasing rate until d = 5. The hazards
curves move inwards as the targets get more stringent, reaching one at the
corresponding target. In addition, they get steeper as the waiting time target
is approached indicating the high admittances close to the target.
Therefore, at the steady state with the same resources, the hospital manages
to eliminate the long waiters (i.e. patients previously treated after the set
target) by reducing the amount of very short waiters and at the same time
increasing the amount of medium waiters (increased treatments in the periods
prior to the target). This `manipulation' of the waiting time distribution is
necessary so as to keep the steady state expected duration and overall number
of treatments controlled. Note that for the targets set at 9 and 7 periods, overall
admissions are increased and average waiting time is lowered, relative to the
pre-target situation.
When the penalty structure is increasing in duration (for d > d^; d = d),
the cost at longer waits is rising. Thus, the unit cost from breaching the target
at, say, d = 36 is much bigger than at d = 20. In particular, when d is set such
that it matches the at cost right after d^, we observe that, in the process of
meeting the target, the hospital puts more eort in reducing the patients pre-
viously waiting straight after the targeted duration and has a smaller incentive
to leave people for treatment at the end (36). In addition, the hospital meets
the target `easier', that is at a lesser penalty.
Let us consider now a case where a universal target is implemented to a set
of hospitals diering with regards to the level of capacity. The penalty from
breaching the target is increasing in waiting time (after d^). In particular, we
191
have d = 20d and the target level is rst set at 12 periods and then at 9. We
focus on three cases where the capacity is 1050, 900 and 800 patients. The
pre-target optimal lists are replicated in Table 4.16 together with the results
from the two targets.
Table 4.16: Waiting Time Targets and dierent capacity
Lists - No target Lists - Target at 12 Lists - Target at 9
(1) (2)-Bench (3) (1) (2)-Bench (3) (1) (2)-Bench (3)
dnk 1050 900 800 1050 900 800 1050 900 800
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 232.567 154.479 149.791 232.567 150.200 104.740 232.567 87.878 0
2 206.351 102.673 97.972 206.351 99.275 43.919 206.351 62.780 0
3 182.870 86.045 81.017 182.870 83.269 0 182.870 74.383 0
4 160.426 76.765 71.530 160.426 74.915 0 160.426 88.451 0
5 136.109 70.414 65.137 136.109 69.786 54.032 136.109 101.064 68.137
6 106.131 65.574 60.360 106.131 66.458 65.657 106.131 112.273 136.502
7 18.235 61.575 56.601 18.235 64.279 74.860 18.235 122.371 174.333
8 0 58.067 53.487 0 62.863 82.737 0 131.605 203.640
9 0 54.855 50.835 0 61.992 89.743 0 140.133 228.412
10 0 51.770 48.522 0 61.540 96.095 0 0 0
11 0 48.636 0 0 61.396 101.960 0 0 0
12 0 45.240 0 0 61.450 107.420 0 0 0
13 0 41.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 40.867 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 41.475 0 0 0 0 0 5.489
k 1042.69 917.12 817.60 1042.69 917.42 821.16 1042.69 920.94 816.51
E(d) 3.146 5.658 7.648 3.146 5.652 7.577 3.146 5.581 7.670
Clearly, in the case with ample capacity (1050) the pre-target list is cleared
in 7 periods and the targets have no impact. In case (2) both the 12 period
and 9 period targets are met. In particular, with the more restrictive target,
the hospital ends up treating a few patients more (relative to the pre-target
distribution) and at a slightly lower average waiting time. The majority of the
patients are again treated with waiting times just prior to the targeted level,
and apart from d = 1, the number of treated patients is increasing in duration.
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When the hospital has the capacity to treat 800 patients, it only meets the 12
period target, by decreasing the short waiters (durations 1-5), eliminating the
very long waiters (35 and 36 periods of wait), and increasing the admissions
in medium durations. However, the hospital fails to reach the 9 period target
(with 5.5 patients treated after 36 periods of wait).
The rst two subgures in Figure 4.15 show the survival and hazard curves
for the hospital with capacity of 900 patients, when we move from the pre-target
distribution to a 9-period target. The waiting time target is achieved while the
after target survival curve's curvature has changed (to concave). The hazard
function moves leftwards (attaining unity at the corresponded targeted period),
and it gets steeper prior to the target. The last two subgures show the case of a
hospital with capacity of 800 patients. The waiting time target is not achieved,
however the steady state response of the hospital is apparent. The majority of
patients (99%) are treated with maximum wait of 9 periods, and this is only
attainable with decreasing the number of short-waiters substantially. Similarly,
the spike of the hazard function moves inwards and close to the targeted waiting
time.
The introduction of the waiting time targets allows us to theoretically ex-
plore the waiting list management of the hospital, when such an important
policy shift is implemented, as in the case of NHS since 1999-2000. Other
things being equal, the waiting time target can be achieved by reducing both
the long and short waiters, at the expense of higher admittance rates in medium
durations (prior to the target). This distinct pattern is also observed to a higher
or lesser degree in particular hospitals analysed in Chapter 3. Figure 3.22 com-
pared the survival curves of nine hospitals at a pre-target year (1997) and an
after-target year (2005, target set at 6 months). More than half of the hospitals
exhibit the trade-o between short and long waiters. In the same lines, the re-
sponse of the hazards curves is also similar; the peaks of the estimated hazard
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(a) Survival Functions - k = 900












(b) Hazard Functions - k = 900












(c) Survival Functions - k = 800











(d) Hazard Functions - k = 800
Figure 4.15: Survival and Hazard Functions - Impact of Targets to dierent
capacity (Table 4.16)
functions are moving inwards following the introduced targets.
Another empirically observed response to the waiting time target is an over-
all inwards shift of the survival curve towards the origin, which implies an
improvement in admittance rates throughout the distribution. This pattern
can be replicated here only if we allow for the budget or capacity parameters
to change at the same time. Indicatively, we present a case below where in
conjunction with the target,  is decreasing. Hence, as the waiting time gets
stricter the hospital's access to outsourcing is ameliorated.
As one can see from Figure 4.16, the survival curves shift inwards in line
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 No target; Bench
 Target at 10; τ=1
 Target at 9; τ=0.5
(a) Survival Functions









 No target; Bench
 Target at 10; τ=1
 Target at 9; τ=0.5
(b) Hazard Functions
Figure 4.16: Waiting time targets and changes in 
with the tougher waiting time targets. Therefore, since it is less costly for
the hospital to deviate from its capacity (by outsourcing for example private
hospitals/clinics), the institutional target is achieved by increased admittances
at any given duration.
4.5 Comparative Statics II: Severity Levels
Patients are now dierentiated according to the level of severity of their health
condition. We have two types of severity (s = 1, low) and (s = 2, high). This
allows the hospital some degree of prioritisation of the list. We start with the
parametarisation presented in the following table.
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d + cd;skd Utility from treating k patients with duration
d and severity s
where for the case of low severity: parameters of the cubic utility function for low
severity
ad;1 =  0:0002 + 0:0001d
bd;1 = 0:02  0:01d
cd;1 = 2 +
5
d
and for the case of high severity: parameters of the cubic utility function for
high severity
ad;2 = ( 0:0002 + 0:0001d )  0:9
bd;2 = 0:02  0:01d
cd;2 = 3 +
5
d









c(k) = (k   k)2 Scale cost of the total number of patients
treated
where k = 900 Hospital's capacity in terms of number of pa-
tients
 = 10 sensitivity of cost to deviations from full ca-
pacity k
B = 13500 Hospital's budget
Z = 1200 Potential demand for healthcare
 = 50 Sensitivity of inow to expected waiting time
p = 0.7 Proportion of the milder treatments (s = 1)
q=36 Maximum allowed waiting time
The more severe cases have a higher utility gain, but at the same time
they are more costly (for any given d)20. Given the magnitude of those two
trading-o forces and in relation as well to the costs and gains of the milder
cases, the hospital admits for surgery the severe cases ( 30% of the overall
20Given that the treatment specic cost has now increased (due to the high severity pa-
tients), the budget of the hospital is appropriately adjusted.
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Table 4.18: Steady State List with Severities
Duration list1 list2 Agg List
0 0 0 0
1 147.922 141.765 289.686
2 96.075 81.802 177.877
3 78.818 52.199 131.016
4 68.982 0 68.982
5 62.223 0 62.223
6 57.045 0 57.045
7 52.847 0 52.847
8 0 0 0
. 0 0 0
. 0 0 0
. 0 0 0
35 39.219 0 39.219
36 40.322 0 40.322
k 643.45 275.765 919.218
E(d) 7.3044 1.6752 5.6156
treatments) much quicker (q = 3 and average duration at 1.6). At the same
time the hospital also treats less severe cases (in a pattern similar to before) up
until d = 7 and then the last 80 patients are treated at the end (after 35 and
36 periods of wait). The overall number of treatments is 919 and the overall
average waiting time is 5.6 periods, although milder patients wait on average
much more than more serious cases (Table 4.18).
Thus, the hospital prioritises the more severe cases. However, given that
this entails a higher cost for the quicker treatment of the more severe patients
(c(kd;2)), some of the milder cases are prolonged until the maximum possible
duration, due to the budget the hospital has available.
As shown in Figure 4.17, the survival curve for the more severe is very close
to origin, decreasing quite steeply and reaches zero after only three periods of
wait. On the other hand, the survival function for the milder cases is further
away from the origin throughout, decreasing much slower until d = 7, after
which point it attens, until the maximum duration of 36. The aggregate
survival curve still displays the same long right tail, however, we also observe
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a change in the rate of decrease. Thus, the cumulative admittance rates are
relatively larger for the rst three durations, and then slow down after that
period of wait. In other words, the survival's (decreasing) slope is much steeper
before d = 3 relative to after.













(a) Aggregate Survival Function















(b) Survival Functions for s = 1; 2
Figure 4.17: Survival Functions with two Severity Levels (Table 4.18)
The majority of the treatments take place within the same period (d = 1),
thus, the aggregate hazard curve decreases between d = 1 and 2. In addition,
since the more severe cases are treated within the rst three periods, we observe
a second drop in the hazard function between durations 3 and 4. After that
the conditional probability of being treated keeps increasing until duration 7,
drops to zero for the next 28 periods and nally reaches one at duration 36.
As shown in Figure 4.18, the hazard curves for the two levels of severities
are quite distinct. The hazard for s = 2 is quite steep, attaining one (i.e.
clearance of the list) in three periods, while the hazard for s = 1 attains unity
only in duration 36. The aggregate hazard curve is now more `volatile' relative
to the case with no severities. Apart from the typical rst spike at d = 1 (since
again the largest percentage of patients are treated after one period of wait),
the hazard is decreased substantially at d = 4, due to the clearance of the more
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(a) Aggregate Hazard Function
















(b) Hazard Functions for s = 1; 2
Figure 4.18: Hazard Functions with two severity levels (Table 4.18)
severe patients.
4.5.1 Changes in the Structural Parameters of the Model
Changes in the utility function
Suppose that the gain the hospital obtains from treating more severe cases
increases, by lowering (absolute) ad;2. Recall that such a change implies that
the turning point for U(kd;2) moves to the right and the utility level at each
kd;2 gets larger (the utilities shift upwards).
As depicted in Table 4.19, the hospital has a higher incentive to treat the
more severe patients quicker. Therefore, as (absolute) ad;2 decreases, the list for
s = 2 clears faster and in specication (4) all severe cases are treated within the
same period (no waiting time distribution). In doing so, the hospital decreases a
little bit the overall patients treated, coming mainly from the milder cases, while
the aggregate average waiting time rises. In addition, although marginally, the




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(a) Aggregate Survival Functions















(b) Aggregate Hazard Functions
Figure 4.19: Changes in ad;2 - Increasing Utility for High Severity patients
(Table 4.19)
Looking at the survival and hazard functions (Figure 4.19), the most notice-
able changes between specications (1) and (4) are observed during the rst
3 durations, since it is that part of the overall distribution that is changing,
driven by the quicker admittance of the severe cases.
We now consider the case where the utility specication for the milder cases
is also altered. In particular, we assume that the cubic term for s = 1 is
increased (in absolute terms) reducing the hospital's incentive to treat a lot of
less severe patients up front. Table 4.20 and Figure 4.20 compare the steady
state waiting time distribution for the benchmark specication (1) and the one
in which ad;1 = 2( 0:0002 + 0:0001=d), and ad;2 = 0:5( 0:0002 + 0:0001=d),
denoted (2).
Comparing (1) to (2), the incentive to `front load' the more severe cases
in increased and at the same time the incentive to balance out the list of the
milder cases in strengthened. Thus, what we observe here is that the list for
s = 2 gets cleared quicker (from q2 = 3 to 2 periods), while the patients with
s = 1 are admitted for treatment in a much smoother way, relative to (1).
There are no long waiters at the end, but their inow clears in 18 periods.
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Table 4.20: Changes in both ad;1 and ad;2
Aggregate Lists Lists - Severity 1 Lists - Severity 2
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
ad;1 = 2ad ad;1 = 2ad ad;1 = 2ad
dnad;s Bench ad;2 = 0:5ad Bench ad;2 = 0:5ad Bench ad;2 = 0:5ad
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 289.6864 283.7640 147.9216 97.8804 141.7648 185.8836
2 177.8773 151.7322 96.0751 61.5906 81.8022 90.1416
3 131.0161 49.7792 78.8176 49.7792 52.1985 0
4 68.9825 43.2234 68.9825 43.2234 0 0
5 62.2233 38.8548 62.2233 38.8548 0 0
6 57.0450 35.6430 57.0450 35.6430 0 0
7 52.8470 33.1528 52.8470 33.1528 0 0
8 0 31.1466 0 31.1466 0 0
9 0 29.4858 0 29.4858 0 0
10 0 28.0912 0 28.0912 0 0
11 0 26.9146 0 26.9146 0 0
12 0 25.9215 0 25.9215 0 0
13 0 25.0845 0 25.0845 0 0
14 0 24.3821 0 24.3821 0 0
15 0 23.8025 0 23.8025 0 0
16 0 23.3500 0 23.3500 0 0
17 0 23.0009 0 23.0009 0 0
18 0 22.7549 0 22.7549 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
. 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 39.2189 0 39.2189 0 0 0
36 40.3221 0 40.3221 0 0 0
k 919.2186 920.084 643.453 644.0588 275.7656 276.0252
E(d) 5.61563 5.5983 7.3044 7.4291 1.6752 1.3266
Overall the changes in average waiting time or total number of treatments are
minimal. Despite those sizeable dierences, note that the aggregate steady state
outows are not changing a lot for d = 1; 2 (rst two columns of Table 4.20).
That is, the two opposing drives (more severe patients but less milder patients
treated quicker) oset each other at the aggregate level. This result also shows
in Figure 4.20(a), where, the two aggregate survival curves are diverging from
one another after d = 2. However, beyond that point, the two curves deviate
noticeably and intersect at duration 15. Cumulatively, the benchmark case has
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a higher admittance rate (until d = 15), but specication (2) clears the list
much faster (at q = 18).

























Figure 4.20: Changes in utilities of both milder and severe cases
With regards to the hazard structures, specication (2) exhibits a clear spike
at d = 1, it then decreases until d = 3, and after that in keeps on increasing
steadily until the overall list is emptied at waiting period 18. In contrast, the
hazard of the benchmark, while with more uctuations, stays on top of (2) until
waiting time 7. It then drops to zero and reaches one at the maximum possible
period.
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Changes in the Duration and Severity Specic Cost
We continue by analysing the optimal behaviour of the hospital when the dura-
tion and severity specic cost is altered. We concentrate in changing the power
of d;s, which aects the vertical distances among the cost functions, making
sure that the cost function of the more severe is still higher than the one of the
milder cases. Table 4.21 depicts selected results, as d;s.



















As the treatment specic cost increases, we observe that a lesser number
of patients are treated up front, at the aggregate level. In specication (4)
admittance for elective surgery starts only after two periods of wait. Overall
number of treatments and aggregate average waiting time remain unchanged.
The reduction in very short waiters is reected in both severity levels, although
it is much more sizeable for s = 2 (see last three columns of Table 4.21). At
the same time, the very long (mild) waiters of specication (1) are at rst
substituted by a smaller amount of more severe long waiters (2), and then
eliminated, as the distribution of treated concentrates in the middle. It is
important to notice the interplay in the admittance rates between the two
severity levels. The hospital prefers treating more severe cases quicker, but
this comes at an ever growing cost. Moving from (1) to (2), both individual
average waiting times increase. However, from specication (2) onwards, there
is a trade-o in the `delaying' of patients: In (3) milder patients are waiting on




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.21 depicts the survival and hazard curves for specications (1), (2)
and (4)21. As d;s increases, we see the trade-os between shorter and longer
waiters in subgure (a). Originally, much more patients were treated within
the rst 8 waiting periods, but a few were left for the end. In (2) more patients
are still waiting to be treated (until d = 10), but less are waiting until the end.
Finally, in (4), the curvature becomes concave (until approximately duration 6)
and then switches to convex. In all three survival curves, we observe changes
in the rate of change of the slope. With regards to the hazard curves, apart
from (4) which monotonically increases, the other two exhibit three spikes, as
the consequence of the change in the second derivative of survival curves (1)
and (2).













(a) Aggregate Survival Functions













(b) Aggregate Hazard Functions
Figure 4.21: Changes in the cost structure of both milder and severe cases
4.5.2 Waiting Time Targets with Severity Levels
As already discussed in Section 4.4.2, the waiting time targets are introduced at
an individual level, and the hospital is faced with a penalty proportional to the
number of patients and/or the periods after which the target level is surpassed.
Recall that the benchmark parametarisation with severities has a long right
21The time span on Figure 4.21 has been reduced to 20 periods of wait, so as to have a
clearer picture of the graphs. That is why, hazards (1) and (2) are not reaching one.
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tail (since 80 of the milder patients are treated in periods 35 and 36). Table 4.22
and Figure 4.22, present the hospital's optimal response for a target starting
at 17 periods of wait and decreasing to 14 and nally 11 periods of wait. The
penalty from breaching the target is set at 400 irrespective of the severity level.
All targets are met with the overall number of treatments and aggregate waiting










 No Target    (1)
Target at 17 (2) 
Target at 14 (3)
Target at 11 (4)
(a) Aggregate Survival Functions










 No Target     (1)
Target at 17 (2) 
Target at 14 (3)
Target at 11 (4)
(b) Aggregate Hazard Functions
Figure 4.22: Changes in the waiting time targets
time remaining almost at the same pre-target levels. Similarly to the case with
no severities, at the aggregate level, the hospital's eorts to avoid breaching
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the institutional target entail trading-o between short and long (`breached')
waiters. As conrmed by Figure 4.22, aggregate survival functions reach zero at
the corresponding targets, but their intersections suggest the above mentioned
trade-os. The hazard curves move inwards, reaching one at the ever restrictive
targets, with much variation and dierent peaks during the rst few durations.
However, having a closer look at the admission patterns across severities
provides us with more insight on the hospital's behaviour. The rst target (17
periods of wait) is achieved by manipulating the treatment of the milder cases
almost exclusively; the admittance rates of s = 2 remain virtually unchanged.
On the contrary, when the more restricted target of 14 periods in imposed, the
average waiting time for s = 2 is increased, while for s = 1 decreases. For s = 1
both short and long waiters are decreased (at the expense of medium waiters),
although in the case of s = 2 short waiters are substituted for long waiters.
Thus, although before the introduction of the target all severe cases were treated
within the rst three periods, now 27 patients are postponed treatment until the
targeted waiting time (d = 14). The average waiting time for s = 2 increases
from 1.68 (pre-target) to 2.85 periods of wait. This pattern gets considerably
evident when the target is set at 11 periods; 38% of the more severe patients



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results provide evidence of trade-os across both the duration and the
severity of the patients on the list. Elimination of the long-waiters (which were
milder cases) is achieved by delaying the admittance of short-waiters (which
corresponded to more severe cases). In other words, our theoretical model sug-
gests that targets change the order by which the hospital takes patients o the
list so as to inuence the speed of patients treated. This is achieved by sub-
stituting less urgent cases for more urgent cases. The introduction of stricter
targets distorts clinical priorities. The hospital, thus, is considering both the
target and the severity of patients when admitting patients for treatment. It
is important, however, to stress that this result is observed as a comparative
statics exercise in which the introduction of the target is the only factor we
allow to change. As discussed in Section 4.4.2 this result would be dierent
if the hospital, together with the introduction of the waiting time target, was
also allocated with more operational resources (increased budget, capacity or
outsourcing).
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In the nal chapter of this thesis, we develop a theoretical model of the supply
side for healthcare provision. Two are the distinct features of our theoretical
framework (i) the dynamic element of the model and (ii) the derivation of the
entire optimal waiting time distribution of patients treated at the steady state.
The focus of the chapter is on, rst, matching important empirical patterns
of the hospitals, and second identifying possible factors that can explain the
observed patterns and the dierences among them.
Our theoretical model proves to be quite exible in accounting for dierent
patterns of waiting time distributions. Dierences in the parameters of the
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utility of the hospital account for two distinct admissions patterns: (i) the
hospital `front loads', treating many patients are quickly as possible, at the
expense however of a small fraction that waits for long. Thus, more emphasis is
put on increased short waits, and (ii) the hospital prefers a `smoother' waiting
list distribution where patients receive treatment more gradually, but no one
waits extensively; the emphasis is on the long waits. When the treatment
specic cost is dierent, we observe again dierences in the shape of the survival
curves, but now the curvature is altered. When the cost for quick treatment
is increased, the survival curves exhibit concave parts. Finally, changes in the
resources allocated to elective surgery (budget, capacity, cost of operating above
capacity) produce changes in the instantaneous admissions rate for the whole
distribution, thus we observe shifts in the positing of the survival (and hazard)
curves.
The introduction of waiting targets provides additional insight of the hos-
pitals' response to such a policy shift. Other things being equal, the hospital
manages to eliminate the long waiters (i.e. patients previously treated after the
set target) by reducing the amount of very short waiters and at the same time
increasing the amount of medium waiters (increased treatments in the periods
prior to the target). This trade-o between shorter and longer waiters has also
been empirically conrmed at several levels in Chapters 2 and 3. In addition,
increased admission rates throughout the waiting list can be attained when,
together with the target, more spending for elective surgery is allowed.
The identied essential patterns of the hospital's behaviour are also ap-
parent with the introduction of dierent severity levels. What is important
to highlight here is that the aggregate survival curves and hazard curves get
`richer' shapes, matching the empirical estimated distributions in Chapters 2
and 3 closer. Survival curves display various changes in the rate of change of
the (decreasing) slope, and hazard functions are more volatile, showing more
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spikes. This could suggest that in practice some form of prioritisation is also
taking place, since, the extra variation is a result of interplays not only over the
patients waiting time, but also across their level of severity (more versus less
urgent cases). Furthermore, when allowing for dierences in the severity of the
patients' health status, the introduction of strict waiting time targets aects
the prioritisation of the list.
The theoretical model succeeds in replicating the distinct waiting time dis-
tributions observed empirically and at the same time provides valuable insight




Much attention has been devoted by academics and policy makers to the ques-
tion of whether the policy measure of targets has been meeting its objective.
In other words, did hospitals meet the targets? Is there anybody waiting more
than the corresponding maximum target set by the government? However, in
accordance with this query should lie another one aiming at examining the ways
employed by hospitals to abide to national standards. Thus besides seeking an
answer to the before mentioned question, questions such as `How did hospi-
tals meet the targets?' `How are they managing the lists and waiting times of
their patients?' and `What are the steps taken to improve performance?' are
of similar importance. From both a policy and academic perspective it would
be essential to comprehend the actions taken to manage the process of elective
admissions, in an attempt to learn from the successful trusts and at the same
time avoid poor management from the under-performing institutions.
This thesis investigated these exact issues by unwinding the whole waiting
time distribution of patients. Our main contribution was exposing the great
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level of variability in waiting time distributions and implied admission tactics
by hospital, specialty and operative procedure. Furthermore, we found that the
wait distributions tend to change over time. The results from the theoretical
model successfully replicated the distinct waiting time distributions observed
empirically and at the same time provided valuable insights on the potential
factors that may explain these distinct behavioural patterns.
Previous studies have shown that hospitals have eliminated the extremely
long waits for elective treatment. The evidence we presented conrms this pos-
itive eect of targets on hospitals' performance. Not only did we nd evidence
that waiting times have indeed decreased, but as a result of the more detailed
view of the waiting time distributions after the estimation of the survival and
hazard functions, we were able to detect details in their patterns. In particular,
we found that increasing probabilities of admission expressed as peaks in the
hazard curves coincided with the prevailing waiting time target and that the
introduction of shorter targets coincided with a reduction in the waiting time
at which the new peak occurred. This implies that providers tend to increase
their eort as the target approaches and decrease it after the target.
As seen in Chapter 3, the patterns of survival rates diered substantially
by hospital and by doctor. In particular, we observed a signicant variation
in both the shape and scale of their survival curves (plasticity). Some curves,
while retaining the same curvature, exhibited abrupt changes in the magnitude
of the slope, while others altered from convex to concave or vice versa. These
distinct dierences in the slope (magnitude or sign) of the survival functions,
corresponded to spikes in the hazard curves. Additionally, we found evidence of
survival curves that move closer to the origin and others that shift rightwards,
in a parallel way or not. The dierent shapes reect dierences in the second
order derivative of the removal rate of individuals from the list and variation
in the shifts implies that hospitals admit all patients with a slower or quicker
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rate compared to others.
Trends in hazard curves also diered markedly between various sets of hos-
pitals and consultants. We observed trusts/doctors with notable peaks of high
intensity, others with very short wider peaks and nally some with constant
hazard rates expressed as straight lines. Lastly, we reported cases in which
hazards were illustrated as monotonically increasing probabilities of admission.
These results indicate dierences in the management of the lists, in the decision
process and admission criteria, even when we control for particular character-
istics of the list (type of hospital, operation, and even by physician).
In the nal chapter of the thesis, we managed to incorporate the waiting
time distribution of patients within the utility maximisation model of the hospi-
tal. As a result, our model proved useful in interpreting the dierent empirical
patterns. Dierences in the parameters of the utility of the hospital, the treat-
ment specic cost and the hospital resources accounted for distinct admissions
patterns and hazard rates. With the introduction of waiting time targets, other
things being equal, the hospital managed to eliminate the long waiters by re-
ducing the amount of short waiters (trade-o). The introduction of dierent
severity levels led to the appearance of `richer' shapes of the survival and haz-
ard curves, matching the empirical estimated distributions in Chapters 2 and
3 closer. Furthermore, when allowing for dierences in the severity of the pa-
tients' health status, the introduction of strict waiting time targets aects the
prioritisation of the list.
Finally, future research can be directed towards a more thorough empirical
investigation on the inuence of hospital characteristics on waiting times for
elective surgery. These were not included in the regression analysis performed
in Chapter 2 as they were not part of HES data. However, as Chapter 3
indicated, there is scope in undertaking a systematic empirical analysis on the
impact of supply-side factors at a hospital level on the observed waiting time
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distributions. Moreover, the theoretical model could be expanded to include the
demand side in a more explicit manner (e.g. considering alternative treatments
(private hospitals), the possibility of decay of health status while waiting or the
gatekeeping role of GPs in determining `eective' demand). A very interesting
but at the same time challenging path for future research is also the derivation
and exploration of the hospital's admission patterns o the steady state (o-
equilibrium behaviour of providers).
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